Corporate governance structures and financial performance: A comparative study of publicly listed companies in Singapore and Vietnam by Nguyen, Tuan Van
 
 
 
http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/ 
 
 
Research Commons at the University of Waikato 
 
Copyright Statement: 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the 
Act and the following conditions of use:  
 Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private 
study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.  
 Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right 
to be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be 
made to the author where appropriate.  
 You will obtain the author’s permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES  
AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PUBLICLY LISTED 
COMPANIES IN SINGAPORE AND VIETNAM 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Finance 
at 
The University of Waikato 
By 
 
 
TUAN VAN NGUYEN 
 
 
2015 
ii 
 
This page intentionally left blank 
  
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study uses a dynamic modelling approach to investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance structures and financial performance of publicly 
listed companies in Singapore and Vietnam. The dynamic modelling approach 
facilitates answering the first research question: whether the relationship between 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance persists in the 
Singaporean and Vietnamese markets when the relationship’s dynamic nature is 
taken into account. Moreover, by focusing on two different types of national 
governance systems in the Asian region (well-developed vs. under-developed), 
this study observes how the relationship between corporate governance structures 
and firm performance is moderated by each country’s national governance quality. 
By carrying out this observation, this study answers the second research question: 
whether the corporate governance–firm performance relationship varies according 
to the quality of national governance systems in which firms operate. 
Two samples – including a total of 379 publicly listed non-financial companies1 
covering a four-year period from 2008 to 2011– are examined through the use of a 
two-step system generalised method of moments estimator. This estimation 
technique allows for potential sources of endogeneity inherent in the corporate 
governance–firm performance relationship, including dynamic endogeneity, 
simultaneity, and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across firms.  
The results suggest that the performance effect of corporate governance structures 
persists in both markets even after the dynamic nature of the corporate 
                                                 
1 There are 122 companies for the Vietnamese market and 257 companies for the 
Singaporean market. 
iv 
 
governance–firm performance relationship is taken into consideration. For the 
Singaporean market, the results also show that the three corporate governance 
structures (board diversity, board size and ownership structures) appear to have 
statistically significant effects on firm performance. For both markets, it is 
observed that there is a statistically significantly positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and financial performance. This finding supports the 
prediction of agency theory regarding the efficient monitoring effect of large 
shareholders in markets with highly concentrated ownership.  
For the Vietnamese market, the results show that board gender diversity has a 
positive effect on firm performance. Remaining robust even after the alternative 
proxies for gender diversity are employed, this finding is consistent with the 
perspectives of agency theory and resource dependence theory. The number of 
female directors in the boardroom also matters, supporting the view that if female 
board representation affects firm outcomes, this effect is more pronounced when 
the number of female directors increases. However, the marginal positive 
performance effect of board gender diversity ceases when the percentage of 
female directors reaches a breakpoint of about 20%. This finding suggests that 
there is perhaps a potential trade-off between the costs and benefits of board 
gender diversity. 
Importantly, the results indicate that the relationship between the current 
performance and one-year lagged performance is statistically significantly 
positive in both markets, and robust when alternative estimation methods and 
models are employed. In line with Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012), among 
others, this finding suggests that the corporate governance–firm performance 
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relationship should be investigated in a dynamic framework. This means that past 
firm performance should be considered as an important independent variable to 
control for potential effects of unobserved historical factors on current corporate 
governance structures and performance. 
Furthermore, the results show that better national governance quality has a 
positive effect on firm performance, and that the performance effect of ownership 
concentration is contingent upon national governance quality. The results suggest 
that ownership concentration appears to have a stronger positive effect on 
performance of companies in Vietnam where the national governance system is 
underdeveloped. In contrast, concentrated ownership tends to have a weaker effect 
on financial performance of firms in Singapore where the national governance 
system is well-established. This finding is consistent with the argument that 
ownership concentration is an efficient corporate governance mechanism which 
can substitute for weak national governance quality. In the absence of effective 
national governance mechanisms, ownership concentration is likely to be an 
important corporate governance strategy for Vietnamese firms to control potential 
agency problems. On the contrary, in Singapore, where national governance 
quality – such as legal protection of shareholders – is much better, the role of 
ownership concentration in determining performance seems to be weaker. 
This study is novel in that it is the first to explore the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship using a dynamic modelling approach for the Vietnamese 
and Singaporean markets. The findings of this study significantly contribute 
toward a better understanding of international diversity on corporate governance 
by providing robust empirical evidence from the emerging and mature markets in 
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the Asian region. This study also extends the corporate governance literature by 
enriching the understanding of the interaction between corporate-level and 
national-level governance mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 OUTLINE 
Over recent decades, especially after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the 
corporate governance–financial performance relationship has emerged as one of 
the most fascinating and controversial issues in the corporate finance literature. A 
survey conducted by Ahrens, Filatotchev, and Thomsen (2011) shows that there 
are more than 7,776 refereed journal articles on corporate governance and most of 
them (4,783 items) have been published since 2004. The Global Financial Crisis 
of 2007 raised further concerns about the nature of corporate governance practiced 
by publicly listed companies. It also raised an important research question as to 
whether improved corporate governance structures indeed lead to better financial 
performance. 
However, prior empirical studies have reported inconclusive and weak evidence. 
Ahrens et al. (2011, p. 312) state that “despite enormous volume of research, we 
still know very little about corporate governance. We cannot say, for example, 
that specific ownership, or board structures lead to better economic performance”. 
It is argued that mixed findings reported in the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship may have been affected by: (i) the institutional 
differences between countries (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; 
Ahrens et al., 2011); and (ii) the imperfection of estimation methods (Ahrens et 
al., 2011; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Love, 2011). 
To address the abovementioned issues, this thesis – using a well-structured 
dynamic modelling approach – undertakes a cross-national comparative study on 
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the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of 
companies in two Asian markets, namely Singapore and Vietnam. This is 
motivated by several major reasons, which can be described briefly in three 
important questions: (i) why should a dynamic modelling approach be used?; (ii) 
why should national governance quality be involved?; and (iii) why are Singapore 
and Vietnam chosen to be the platform to conduct this research? The following 
Subsections 1.1.1; 1.1.2; and 1.1.3 discuss the questions (i); (ii); and (iii), 
respectively. The significance of the current study is noted in Section 1.2. The 
organisation of the thesis is introduced in Section 1.3. 
1.1 MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.1.1 Why should a dynamic modelling approach be used? 
One of the biggest challenges in corporate governance empirical studies is how to 
deal with the endogeneity of corporate governance variables. It is well 
documented in the corporate governance literature that endogeneity problems may 
arise from two main sources: (i) time-invariant unobserved characteristics across 
companies, and (ii) simultaneity (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). However, recent 
empirical research has recognised that the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship is dynamic in nature which is considered as another 
source of endogeneity, namely dynamic endogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2012).  
The dynamic nature of this relationship suggests that corporates’ 
contemporaneous performance and board/ownership structures are influenced by 
their past financial performance (Wintoki et al., 2012; Yabei & Izumida, 2008). 
This implies that if the dynamic endogeneity problem is not fully controlled, it is 
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impossible to make causal interpretation from the econometric estimations 
(Wintoki et al., 2012).  
For example, theoretical studies by Harris and Raviv (2008); Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998); and Raheja (2005) imply that the relationship between board 
structure and firm performance is dynamic in nature. An empirical study 
undertaken by Wintoki et al. (2012) for the US market confirms that the dynamic 
relationship between current board structure and past firm performance does exist. 
Taking the dynamic endogeneity problem into consideration, Wintoki et al. (2012) 
suggest that board structure has no significant impact on firm performance, and 
the causal relationships uncovered by previous studies using traditional ordinary 
least squares (OLS) or fixed-effects (FE) techniques are spurious. 
It is noteworthy that such a suggestion is drawn from an institutional context 
where the market for corporate control operates well. In cases where internal 
corporate governance structures do not have impact on firm performance, it is 
expected that the markets for corporate control, such as takeover markets, will 
play a compensatory role as the external governance mechanism for monitoring 
managerial behaviour. This has potential to mitigate agency problems and 
ultimately lead to improved performance. However, it is not clear whether the 
findings of Wintoki et al. (2012) can be generalised in the context of Asia where 
the market for corporate control is generally not an effective external corporate 
governance mechanism. In other words, the question here is when the dynamic 
endogeneity is taken into account, whether or not board structure has an effect on 
the financial performance of firms in Asian markets, which are characterised as 
being ineffective markets for corporate control. 
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Similarly, the causal relationship between ownership structure and performance 
predicted by traditional agency theory is also challenged in the corporate 
governance literature. It is recognised that ownership concentration is dynamically 
related to firm performance (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Thomsen & Pedersen, 
2000; Yabei & Izumida, 2008). This implies that the causal relationship (if any) 
may run in the opposite direction, i.e., from past performance to current 
ownership structure (Yabei & Izumida, 2008).  
Taking into account the dynamic endogeneity, recent empirical studies on the 
relationship between ownership concentration and performance in the 
Australasian region have provided conflicting results. For example, some studies 
report that the relationship is insignificant for the Australian market (Pham, 
Suchard, & Zein, 2011; Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010), but significant for the 
Japanese market (Yabei & Izumida, 2008). Arguably, the dynamic nature of the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance in other 
Asian markets is largely unknown and poorly understood. 
The first research question: Given the presence of the potential dynamic 
endogeneity in corporate governance research, it is questioned whether the causal 
relationship between corporate governance structures and firm performance 
suggested by the agency theory and resource dependence theory persists in the 
Asian markets, in particular, Singapore and Vietnam, after controlling for the 
dynamic endogeneity. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no prior study on 
these two markets has treated the corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship this way. More interestingly, by doing so, this study well-responds to 
the recent calls from Flannery and Hankins (2013); Wintoki et al. (2012); and 
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Zhou, Faff, and Alpert (2014) for using dynamic panel models in corporate 
finance and corporate governance research.  
1.1.2 Why should national governance quality be involved? 
It should also be noted that most prior corporate governance research has focused 
on the US or UK markets and ignored moderating effects of national governance 
mechanisms (Filatotchev, Jackson, & Nakajima, 2013). Arguably, such an 
approach tends to offer a narrow and less rigorous understanding about the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance strategies in different institutional 
settings (Kumar & Zattoni, 2013).  
Recently, corporate governance researchers have re-examined the non-
contextualised, traditional agency framework to understand contexts outside 
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, especially in the Asia region where highly 
concentrated ownership is the norm (Filatotchev et al., 2013). Based on the 
institutional corporate governance framework, the researchers have recognised 
that national governance mechanisms, such as legal system, rule of law, or 
investor protection, have the potential to influence the effectiveness of corporate 
governance strategies (Filatotchev et al., 2013). In this regard, Kumar and Zattoni 
(2013) and Filatotchev et al. (2013), among others, have suggested investigating 
the interaction impact of country-level and firm-level variables in corporate 
governance research3. 
The second research question: Based on the aforementioned arguments and 
motivated by the view of institutional theory, this study questions whether the 
                                                 
3 These points will be expanded in Chapter 2. 
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relationship between corporate governance and firm performance varies 
depending on the quality of national governance systems in which firms operate. 
More specifically, this study aims to answer the second research question: 
whether the relationship between corporate governance structures and firm 
performance is moderated by national governance quality. By doing so for the two 
typical Asian markets, this study contributes to an emergent stream of research on 
the interaction between corporate governance mechanisms and national 
institutions. 
1.1.3 Why Singapore and Vietnam? 
In order to address the two research questions mentioned above, it is ideal to have 
a deep and historical database from which generalizable findings can be achieved 
(Heugens, Van Essen, & Van Oosterhout, 2009). This implies that the database 
should be comprehensive and should include as many firm-year observations 
across as many countries as possible.  
However, this is a severe obstacle, given the lack of data on corporate governance 
(Black, de Carvalho, Khanna, Kim, & Yurtoglu, 2014). Prior solo-country 
research offers deep but often too narrow conclusions and thus suffers from lack 
of generalisation. Whereas multi-country studies, suffering from the absence of 
historical and comprehensive data on corporate governance, have potential to 
provide generalizable inferences but usually fail to achieve deep conclusions 
(Black et al., 2014). In fact, collecting data on corporate governance structures, 
especially in multi-country research, is costly and time-consuming. It is, therefore, 
hard for comparative corporate governance studies to simultaneously achieve deep 
and generalizable insights. Black et al. (2014) propose a potential solution to 
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overcome this difficulty through the use of a well-constructed sample in which 
selected countries must be highly representative.  
Following this suggestion, the empirical analyses in this study are based on the 
samples of firms selected from two typical Asian markets: Singapore and 
Vietnam. These markets are chosen to be the platform to conduct this research 
because they are the most two representative markets in terms of corporate 
governance practices and national governance quality in the Asian region.  
Indeed, compared with other countries in the Asian region, these two economies 
are typical for national governance quality. While Singapore is the most 
representative candidate for the ‘high minority protection and high rule of law’ 
cluster (Heugens et al., 2009), Vietnam is a typical market in the ‘low minority 
protection and low rule of law’ group (World Bank, 2006a, 2012). Given that 
Singapore and Vietnam markets are highly representative for two contrastive 
groups of national governance systems (well-developed vs. under-developed) in 
the Asia region, the generalisation of this study’s findings is, to a certain extent, 
achievable. This is supported by Mallin, Melis, and Gaia (2015) who argue that 
comparing such diverse institutional settings should improve the generalizability 
of empirical findings. 
With regard to corporate governance practices, Singaporean firms achieve top 
ranking across Asia (CLSA, 2012) and have the highest average score of 
corporate governance when compared with the rest of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region (Chuanrommanee & Swierczek, 2007). 
In contrast, the corporate governance practices of companies in Vietnam are in the 
early stages of development (World Bank, 2006a) and the average corporate 
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governance score of Vietnamese firms is lower than that of the other markets in 
the Asia region (IFC, 2012)4. From a comparative perspective, this heterogeneity 
of firm-level governance is important to strengthen empirical estimations (Mallin 
et al., 2015) that allow to obtain credible inferences. Therefore, such a sample 
structure guarantees an acceptable compromise between the generalizability and 
credibility of the findings and the limitations on research sources when 
conducting this study. 
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study is novel as it is the first to explore the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship using a dynamic modelling approach for the Singapore 
and Vietnamese markets. The significance of this research, therefore, is in the 
form of applying a better model specification and estimator to two institutional 
settings where the corporate governance arrangements are greatly different from 
those of the US and the UK. 
With regard to the model specification and estimator, most prior studies on the 
corporate governance–firm performance relationship commonly employed the FE 
approach and/or the traditional instrumental variable (IV) approach to mitigate 
potential endogeneity concerns arising from unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity and/or simultaneity. However, these techniques are not designed to 
deal with dynamic endogeneity, which very likely arises in the board structure and 
performance relationship in general (Wintoki et al., 2012); and in the board 
gender diversity and performance relationship in particular (Adams & Ferreira, 
                                                 
4 See Chapter 3 for more details. The IFC stands for the International Finance 
Corporation. 
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2009; Dezsö & Ross, 2012); or in the ownership structure and firm performance 
relationship (Yabei & Izumida, 2008). In addition, applying the traditional IV 
approach, which requires identifying reliable external instruments, is no easy task 
(Flannery & Hankins, 2013). It is therefore extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to look for a set of multiple external instruments for the current study in which 
almost all explanatory variables are considered to be endogenously determined.  
Given the unavailability of appropriate external instruments for corporate 
governance research, the two-step System GMM estimator  ̶  proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998)  ̶  constitutes the most feasible solution for dealing with 
endogeneity issues arising from a dynamic panel setting (Antoniou, Guney, & 
Paudyal, 2008; Nakano & Nguyen, 2012). This technique, on the one hand, allows 
the current study to employ internal instruments available within the panel itself 
(Blundell & Bond, 1998), facilitating the empirical estimation process.  
On the other hand, it allows this study to cope with “the combination of a short 
panel, a dynamic dependent variable, fixed effects and a lack of good external 
instruments” (Roodman, 2009b, p. 156). Indeed, simulation analyses recently 
undertaken by Flannery and Hankins (2013); and Zhou et al. (2014), documented 
that the System GMM emerges as the best-performing estimator across common 
data features encountered in this study’s datasets, including: (i) short panel; (ii) 
endogenous explanatory variables; and (iii) dynamic panel bias. More 
importantly, by construction, the System GMM estimator allows for mitigating 
the problem of the slow-changing characteristics of independent variables, which 
renders the FE estimator powerless (Antoniou et al., 2008). Therefore, to probe 
further the relationship between corporate governance structures and financial 
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performance, the dynamic modelling method is likely to be helpful and more 
robust.  
With regard to the institutional settings on which this study focuses, this study 
extends the extant corporate governance literature by providing an understanding 
of the dynamic nature of the corporate governance–firm performance relationship 
in Singapore and Vietnam. Specifically, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the 
work of Mak and Kusnadi (2005) is the only empirical study focussing on the 
corporate governance–firm performance relationship in Singapore. This study 
differs from theirs in the way it deals with the endogeneity problems. This study 
examines the corporate governance–firm performance relationship in a dynamic 
modelling framework by using the System GMM estimator. This panel-data 
estimation technique, as mentioned above, is able to control for potential sources 
of endogeneity which have plagued many earlier studies. 
Similarly, the corporate governance–firm performance relationship in the 
Vietnamese market is virtually unknown to international scholars. The latest 
review paper on the theme of corporate governance in emerging markets 
conducted by Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) does not include any information 
about Vietnam. Another recent meta-analysis paper concerning corporate board–
firm performance relationship in the Asian region conducted by Van Essen, 
Oosterhout, and Carney (2012) similarly provides no information about Vietnam5. 
Noticeably, in the most recent comprehensive review paper by Terjesen, Sealy, 
                                                 
5 A simple survey was conducted by the author of this thesis at the end of 2012 to look 
for publications regarding the corporate governance–firm performance relationship in 
Vietnam. The author followed Love (2011) and used the key words ‘corporate 
governance’ + ‘performance’ + ‘Vietnam’ to search on www.GoogleScholar.com, 
www.SSRN.com, and the Proquest5000 database. Generally, the search results showed 
that there was no empirical research considering the case of Vietnam. 
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and Singh (2009) dealing with the topic of female directors in the boardroom, 
there is no research using Vietnamese company data among more than 400 
relevant publications either.  
Therefore, Chapter 5 of this thesis will highlight the potential performance effect 
of board gender diversity in the Vietnamese market. Using empirical data from 
the Vietnamese context, this thesis significantly contributes to understanding how 
female representation on boards of directors (BOD) affects a company’s financial 
performance. The topic has recently become a central focus of corporate 
governance rejuvenation efforts around the world, with companies being 
encouraged to appoint female directors to their boards (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
This raises an important research question as to whether there is a causal 
relationship between gender diversity on the BOD and firm performance.  
There has been an increase in the literature on this topic but it relates 
predominantly to studies in mature markets characterised by well-established 
corporate governance systems (Adams & Funk, 2012). Several have reported 
inconclusive results (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; and Rose, 2007). 
Moreover, they have not fully addressed potential endogeneity concerns, making 
inferences about the causal relationship between gender diversity and firm 
performance problematic (Terjesen et al., 2009).  
Consequently, the causal effect of board gender diversity on firm performance, 
especially in markets characterised by underdeveloped corporate governance 
systems, remains unclear. The current research, applying a well-structured 
dynamic modelling approach to control for potential endogeneity concerns, makes 
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a significant contribution to understanding how such diversity works in the 
Vietnamese market and suggests an approach for similar economies. 
The issue tends to be more complicated since, as Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
suggested, the nature of the relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
performance is contingent upon whether the firms are well governed. Using a 
sample of US firms, they contended that because female directors bring tougher 
monitoring to boardrooms, adding more women directors is likely to provide 
excessive and unnecessary monitoring for well-governed firms, which may 
ultimately have a detrimental impact on firm performance.  
If so, the subsequent question is whether more gender-diverse boards will improve 
firm performance in markets where companies, which are generally poorly 
governed, benefit from additional monitoring. Chapter 5 addresses this question, 
contributing to the growing literature of non-US based studies by focusing on 
Vietnam, a market characterised by an underdeveloped corporate governance 
system, where the benefits of board diversity may be more pronounced.  
It is argued by Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) that the link between board 
gender diversity and firm performance is not predicted directly by any single 
extant theory. Therefore, examining this causal relationship becomes an empirical 
issue (Carter et al., 2003). However, as pointed out by Mohan (2014) in a recent 
comprehensive review paper, there are several reasons why such a causal 
relationship has the potential to exist. Mohan notes that the presence of women in 
boardrooms may matter for risk-taking and leadership style, both of which 
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eventually result in effects on firm performance6. If the gender of directors matters 
for firm outcomes, then female directors should fundamentally differ from their 
male counterparts in terms of behaviour and personality characteristics (Mohan, 
2014).  
A recent survey by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO, 2010) confirmed that Vietnamese female entrepreneurs are 
distinguishable from their male counterparts in regard to both human values and 
attitudes to risk 7 . These findings are relevant to the current study since 
Vietnamese female directors are typically appointed from the pool of female 
entrepreneurs. This being the case, it is plausible that female and male directors in 
Vietnam will differ in terms of their human values and attitudes to risk. Following 
Mohan’s proposal, this suggests a causal effect of board female representation on 
firm performance in Vietnamese companies. Therefore, the UNIDO (2010) 
findings strengthen the context for the current study and help establish not only 
the rationale but also the significance of this thesis’s results for policy 
implications.  
                                                 
6 For example, Adams and Funk (2012) documented that female and male directors are 
systematically different in their core values and attitudes to risk. The subsequent 
question is how financial markets evaluate these differences. Adams, Nowland, and Grey 
(2011) found that market reaction to the appointment of female directors is, on average, 
significantly positive, and consistently greater than it is to the appointment of their male 
counterparts. Mohan and Chen (2004), however, documented that the initial public 
offering (IPO) markets do not appear to distinguish between female- and male-led IPOs 
when evaluating them. 
7 For instance, while Vietnamese male entrepreneurs are risk-taking investors and tend to 
make decisions by themselves, their female counterparts –due to cultural tradition and 
their social role– tend to consult their family members on important business decisions 
(UNIDO, 2010). Furthermore, the perseverance and determination to succeed of 
Vietnamese female entrepreneurs appear to be greater than those of their male 
counterparts. As goal-oriented entrepreneurs, Vietnamese women also take their 
businesses seriously, participate in entrepreneurial organisations, and readily grasp how 
to use informal means to promote their own businesses (UNIDO, 2010).  
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1.3 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review 
of the theoretical and empirical literature of the corporate governance–financial 
performance relationship. Based on the literature review, Chapter 2 establishes the 
hypotheses on (i) the relationship between corporate governance structures and 
financial performance; (ii) the performance impact of national governance quality; 
and (iii) the moderating effect of national governance quality. Chapter 3 describes 
the context of corporate governance in Singapore and Vietnam to help the readers 
fully grasp the background of the empirical analyses implemented in Chapters 5, 
6, and 7.  
Chapter 4 describes the research framework, measurement of variables, data and 
data sources, and model specifications for the empirical analyses of the thesis. 
There are two models using the separate datasets of the Vietnamese and 
Singaporean markets, and one model employing the combined dataset of both 
countries. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 in turn examine the relationship between 
corporate governance structures and financial performance of listed companies in 
Vietnam and Singapore. Taken together, the findings attained from Chapters 5 
and 6 contribute to addressing the first research question of this thesis as to 
whether the causal relationship between corporate governance structures and 
financial performance persist in the Vietnamese and Singaporean markets when 
the dynamic nature of this relationship is controlled. 
Taking into account the country-specific institutional characteristics, Chapter 7 
discusses cross-country evidence on the corporate governance–financial 
performance relationship from a comparative perspective. Chapter 7 also 
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investigates how national governance quality affects firm performance and its 
interaction effect on the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. This chapter’s findings contribute to addressing the second research 
question of this thesis.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, clarifies the limitations, and provides 
recommendations for potential future research. The chapter provides a summary 
of empirical findings, reported in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, concerning the relationship 
between corporate governance structures, national governance quality, and 
financial performance of publicly listed companies in Vietnam and Singapore. 
Relevant conclusions and implications for policy formulation in the two markets 
are also noted. 
1.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter discusses the research motivations from which two important 
research questions of the thesis are raised. 
(i) Does the causal relationship between corporate governance structures and 
firm performance suggested by agency theory and resource dependence 
theory persist in the Singaporean and Vietnamese markets, after 
controlling for the dynamic endogeneity? 
(ii) Does the relationship between corporate governance structures and firm 
performance vary according to the quality of national governance systems 
in which firms operate?  
Based on the literature review, Chapter 2 will develop six pairs of hypotheses 
(denoted from [HVN1 – HSG1] to [HVN6 – HSG6]) to provide potential answers for 
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the first research question, and two other hypotheses (denoted as HVN_SG7 and 
HVN_SG8) to respond to the second research question. Using the separate datasets 
of the Vietnamese and Singaporean markets, Chapters 5 and 6 will empirically 
test the six pairs of hypotheses. Chapter 7 will provide empirical evidence for two 
others. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH 
HYPOTHESES 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of this chapter is to develop theory-based hypotheses to empirically 
respond to the research questions established in Subsection 1.1 of Chapter 1. To 
achieve this aim, this chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature of the 
corporate governance–financial performance relationship. The chapter proceeds 
with different definitions of corporate governance in Section 2.1. An overview of 
three major theories in corporate governance literature, from which the hypotheses 
of this study are developed, is presented in Section 2.2. The theoretical 
frameworks and empirical findings of the corporate governance–financial 
performance relationship, especially in the context of the Asian region, will be 
reviewed in Section 2.3. The hypotheses on the effect of national governance 
quality on the relationship between corporate governance and performance are 
introduced in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. Section 2.6 summarises the chapter. 
2.1 DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
There are many different definitions of corporate governance which are usually 
classified as either ‘narrow’ or ‘broad’ (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). According 
to Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013), the narrow cluster of definitions mainly focuses 
on the role of key internal governance mechanisms, such as board characteristics 
and ownership structure, in determining the performance of firms and maximising 
the benefit of shareholders. This type of definition is logically suitable for studies 
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on corporate governance within an individual country (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 
2013).  
On the other hand, the broad set of definitions considers the external institutional 
environment within which firms operate. These definitions are suitable for cross-
country comparative studies as they allow researchers to investigate how 
differences in country-level specific characteristics affect the behavioural patterns 
of firms, shareholders and stakeholders (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). For 
analysis purposes, especially comparative analyses, this current study collectively 
employs both narrow and broad definitions of corporate governance. 
The most typical ‘narrow’ definition in finance literature is originally sourced 
from Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737) who define corporate governance as “the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment”. Denis and McConnell (2003, p. 2) likewise define 
corporate governance as “the set of mechanisms, both institutional and market-
based, that induces the self-interested controllers of a company to make decisions 
that maximise the value of the company to its owners”. In a similar vein, the 
Cadbury Committee (1992, para. 2.5) describes corporate governance as a 
“system by which companies are directed and controlled”. These definitions, 
generally focusing on how shareholders maximise their profit and protect 
themselves against expropriation from managers, are the foundation for solo-
country analyses in this study.  
A broader definition of corporate governance is proposed by OECD (2004, p. 11) 
as follows: 
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Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined. 
This definition shows that corporate governance goes beyond the internal 
corporate governance structures and shareholders’ profit to take account of 
external corporate governance mechanisms and stakeholders’ benefits. By 
integrating the external environment within which firms operate, this stakeholder 
perspective on the firm is suitable for analysing corporate governance in a cross-
country framework.  
Taking both perspectives together, researchers have often classified corporate 
governance mechanisms into two sets which are either internal or external to firms 
(Gillan, 2006). It is argued that such a dual classification is somewhat limited and 
may not capture the “multidimensional network of interrelationships” (Gillan, 
2006). However, for convenience, this study follows Gillan (2006) and 
consistently considers capital structure, ownership structure, and board structure 
(including the diversity, composition, leadership structure, and size of board) to be 
the most important internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
2.2 THREE DOMINANT THEORIES IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE RESEARCH: AN OVERVIEW 
Agency theory is considered to be a predominant theoretical approach in corporate 
governance studies (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Nevertheless, alternative approaches have been considered in prior research. 
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Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that agency theory depicts only a part of the 
complicated picture of an organisation. Moreover, agency theory insufficiently 
presents corporate governance practices in all analytical contexts due to cross-
national differences in institutions (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 
2008). Resource dependence theory, meanwhile, is probably more appropriate for 
explaining board functions in East Asian companies (see Young, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton, & Chan, 2001 for detail). Following a similar line of argument, Hillman 
and Dalziel (2003) and Nicholson and Kiel (2007) among others suggest that 
agency theory should be complemented by resource dependence theory in studies 
on corporate governance.  
As mentioned in Subsection 1.1.2 of Chapter 1, most prior corporate governance 
research has focused on the US or UK markets and has primarily applied the 
principal–agent model which ignores moderating effects of national governance 
mechanisms (Filatotchev et al., 2013). As a consequence, this approach cannot 
give a full grasp of the effectiveness of corporate governance strategies in 
different institutional settings (Kumar & Zattoni, 2013).  
Recent literature in corporate governance has made attempts to re-examine the 
non-contextualised, traditional agency framework to understand contexts outside 
the Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, especially in the Asian region where highly 
concentrated ownership is the norm (Filatotchev et al., 2013). Based on 
institutional corporate governance framework, the emerging literature recognises 
that national governance mechanisms, such as legal system, rule of law, or 
investor protection, have the potential to influence the effectiveness of corporate 
governance strategies (Filatotchev et al., 2013). In recent studies, Kumar and 
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Zattoni (2013) and Filatotchev et al. (2013), among others, have called for the 
consideration of the interactive impact of country-level and firm-level variables in 
corporate governance research. 
Based on the abovementioned arguments, this study uses a multi-theoretical 
orientation in which agency theory, resource dependence theory, and institutional 
theory are collectively employed as the foundation for hypothesis development 
and result discussions. The next three Subsections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3 briefly 
introduce these important theories. 
2.2.1 Agency theory 
An agency relationship is defined as “a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 5). This implies that the separation between 
control functions (of agents) and ownership (of principals) in contemporary public 
corporations is a potential source of interest confliction between agents and 
principals, called the principal-agent problem.  
According to Eisenhardt (1989), the principal-agent relationship arises from three 
primary assumptions about people, organisations, and information. 
Correspondingly, it is assumed that (i) both owners and managers are 
opportunistic, rational, and risk-antipathetic individuals; (ii) the goals of members 
in an organisation are dissimilar and information asymmetry exists between 
owners and managers; and (iii) information is regarded as a purchasable 
commodity.  
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Agency theory, therefore, is generally concerned with aligning the interest 
conflictions between principals and agents. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) among others argue that managers, who are inherently 
opportunistic, tend to abuse a firm’s resources to pursue their own egocentric 
benefits rather than those of the owners. Agency theory suggests that firms should 
establish appropriate governance structures to monitor behaviours of managers 
and prevent owners from such abuses, i.e. mitigate the principal-agent problem 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) also suggest that 
establishing these governance structures generates three different types of cost 
which shareholders have to bear: monitoring costs, bonding costs, and agency 
costs. However, the impacts of those costs can be minimised and firm financial 
performance may be enhanced provided that firms can establish effective 
governance mechanisms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
2.2.2 Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theorists take the view that a firm is an open social entity 
which is closely connected with the conditions of its environment, such as human 
resource, capital resource, and information (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer, 1973). In this 
regard, resource dependence theory suggests that the board of directors plays a 
crucial role in linking the firm and those social resources (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer, 
1973). More specifically, the function of the board is to not only monitor 
managerial behaviours (as mentioned by agency theory), but also provide 
essential resources8 that are needed to enhance firm performance and/or ensure 
                                                 
8 Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) assert that board’s provision of essential resources 
includes: “(i) advice and counsel; (ii) legitimacy; (iii) channels for communicating 
information between external organisations and the firm; and (iv) preferential access to 
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those resources via connections with the external environment (Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). 
In other words, apart from the monitoring function, the board also serves as a 
resources provider. Hillman and Dalziel (2003, p. 383) refer to the ability of the 
board to bring essential resources to the firm as “board capital” including “human 
capital (experience, expertise, reputation) and relational capital (network of ties to 
other firms and external contingencies). They also state that the question 
examined by resource dependence theory is how such board capital can lead to a 
board’s provision of resources and subsequent firm performance. In summary, 
resource dependence theory offers two important implications regarding the 
board: (i) environmental pressures and demands may have impacts on board 
composition, and (ii) differences in board composition may result in various firm 
performance (Boyd, 1990). 
2.2.3 Institutional theory and its role in cross-national 
comparative studies of corporate governance  
The theory of institution is drawn from various domains of social science, such as 
economics, sociology, and political science (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). These 
domains are categorised as two major branches by Ahrens et al. (2011), that is: (i) 
political science and economics oriented institutional theory; and (ii) sociology 
and organisation oriented institutional theory. From the perspective of economics 
and political science, ‘institution’ is defined as “the humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of informal 
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and 
                                                                                                                                     
commitments or support from important elements outside the firm” (as cited in Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003, pp. 385-386). 
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formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (North, 1991, p. 97). In short, 
institutions may be seen as rules and constraints designed to direct and justify the 
interactive behaviours of individuals and organisations.  
With regard to the role of institutional theory in studying corporate governance, 
some studies (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Ahrens et al., 
2011) support the general view that the implementation of corporate governance 
mechanisms in a country is influenced by its institutional environment. In other 
words, the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms may vary from 
country to country. It is suggested that the factors within a national institutional 
environment, such as culture, financial system, corporate ownership patterns, 
legal tradition, and economic situation (Davies & Schlitzer, 2008; Zattoni & 
Cuomo, 2008) are important determinants in analysing different models of 
organisation and their different levels of performance (Millar, Eldomiaty, Choi, & 
Hilton, 2005), as well as creating diverse national corporate governance practices 
(Davies & Schlitzer, 2008).  
For instance, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), by 
investigating the relationship between legal tradition and corporate governance for 
a sample of 49 countries, show that the investor protection and the capital market 
development of civil law countries are weaker than those of common law 
countries, and as a result, the corporate governance codes of common law 
countries concentrate on protecting the shareholders’ rights. Similarly, Love 
(2011), in a comprehensive review paper, has reported that corporate governance 
structures have more influence on firm valuation in countries where legal 
protection is weak (Love, 2011). Moreover, in countries with incomplete legal 
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systems and weak legal enforcement, corporate governance mechanisms may be 
adopted for legitimate target rather than for firm performance (Lynall, Golden, & 
Hillman, 2003). In this regard, corporate governance practice is a purely formal 
matter rather than a fact (Chuanrommanee & Swierczek, 2007; Love, 2011).  
The above examples illustrate the impacts of national institutional characteristics 
on corporate governance practices as well as their importance to cross-country 
comparisons of corporate governance and firm performance. Ahrens et al. (2011, 
p. 323) argue that: 
Agency problems may vary across different national settings and implies 
that researchers should integrate the agency framework with institutional 
analysis to generate robust predictions. Future research should expand on 
this concept and seek to more explicitly examine the nature of agency 
conflicts and their implications in different institutional settings. 
For this reason, cross-country comparisons of corporate governance and firm 
performance, whether at firm level or at country level, must take into account the 
national institutional factors. In general, although there is a growing consensus of 
opinion on the role of national institutions in corporate governance practices, 
cross-national comparative research on the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship is still in the early stages of development (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003). Examining what institutional factors matter and how they affect 
corporate governance, therefore, is considered the primary objective of 
comparative studies of corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Ahrens 
et al., 2011).  
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2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND FIRM 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
It is well-documented in corporate governance literature that shareholders can rely 
on at least two broad strategies, that is, external and internal governance 
mechanisms, to ensure them some return on their investment (Heugens et al., 
2009). The external governance mechanisms, such as legal system or takeover 
markets, play a disciplinary role in monitoring managerial behaviour to mitigate 
agency problems and thus help to increase performance (Gillan, 2006).  
Alternatively, shareholders may also use internal corporate governance 
mechanisms (also known as corporate governance structures) to mitigate agency 
problems raised by the separation of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Therefore, as mentioned in Section 2.1, this study follows Gillan (2006) 
and considers capital structure, ownership structure, and board structure 
(including the diversity, composition, leadership structure, and size of board) to be 
the most important internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
Subsection 2.3.1 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relationship between board structure and firm financial performance. Accordingly, 
the hypotheses on the performance effects of board diversity, board composition, 
board leadership structure, and board size will be developed in this subsection. 
The theory-based hypotheses on the performance impacts of ownership structure 
and capital structure are established in Subsections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, respectively. It 
is noteworthy to repeat that these hypotheses are framed from the combined 
perspective of agency theory and resource dependence theory, which provides for 
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a breadth of explanatory variables9. Accordingly, the board of directors, on behalf 
of the shareholders, actively and independently provides the shareholders with: (i) 
a monitoring of managerial behaviours (agency theory); and (ii) a linkage between 
firm and externally essential resources (resource dependence theory). 
2.3.1 Board structure and firm financial performance 
Board of directors (hereafter referred to as the BOD) is one of the vital 
determinants of internal corporate governance mechanisms (Fama & Jensen, 
1983), and its relationship to financial performance has attracted many scholars 
for a long time (Lynall et al., 2003). Although the relationship between board 
structure and performance is explained and predicted by agency theory and/or 
resource dependence theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), empirical findings of the 
performance influence of the board structure remain inconclusive (Bhagat & 
Bolton, 2008; Daily et al., 2003).  
2.3.1.1 Board diversity and firm financial performance 
Theoretically, the link between board gender diversity and firm performance is 
not predicted directly by any single theory, including agency theory and resource 
dependence theory10 (Carter et al., 2010). However, both these theories do provide 
insight into the link and imply the possibility that board gender diversity affects 
firm value (Carter et al., 2010). In fact, there is a small but developing literature 
                                                 
9 In addition, this study also considers prior empirical evidence in order to adjust the 
hypotheses to each country’s contexts. 
10 Therefore, “until a theoretical framework that predicts the nature of the relationship is 
developed”, examining the board gender diversity–firm performance relationship is an 
empirical issue (Carter et al., 2003, p. 38). Nevertheless, among several theories from 
various fields, resource dependence theory provides “the most convincing theoretical 
arguments for a business case for board diversity” (Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2010, p. 398). 
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documenting that female board representation matters for firm outcomes (Adams 
& Funk, 2012). 
According to agency theory, the monitoring function of the BOD plays an 
extremely important role in mitigating principal-agent conflicts, which ultimately 
affect firm performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Recent empirical studies suggest that greater gender diversity on boards has the 
potential to strengthen this monitoring function. For example, Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) and Adams et al. (2011) reported that female directors tend to have better 
monitoring abilities because they are able to think independently and are not 
affected by the so-called old-boys’ club syndrome.  
Greater gender diversity on boards may also provide better monitoring since 
female director representation helps to improve managerial accountability, such as 
improving board meeting attendance and chief executive officer’s (CEO) 
responsibility (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). As a result, female directors may act as 
additional independent directors who help to improve the monitoring function of 
the BOD (Adams & Ferreira, 2009).  
However, it is worth noting that even if boards with more gender diversity do 
improve the monitoring function of the BOD, it does not necessarily follow that 
this improvement will result in better firm performance. A plausible reason could 
be that the potential effect of gender diversity on firm performance is contingent 
upon the quality of firm governance. Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggested that 
weakly governed companies may benefit from including more women on their 
boards, enhancing additional monitoring and improving firm value. In support, 
Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011, p. 314) argue that greater gender diversity on boards 
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acts as a “substitute mechanism for corporate governance that would be otherwise 
weak”, and this in turn may lead to improved performance. Conversely, board 
gender diversity seems to have a detrimental effect on the firm performance of 
well-governed firms because of unnecessary, excessive monitoring (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). 
Resource dependence theory suggests that the security of firms’ vital resources as 
well as the linkage between firms and their external environment can be improved 
by an increase in the size and diversity of the BOD (Goodstein, Gautam, & 
Boeker, 1994; Pfeffer, 1973). In other words, firms with larger and/or more 
diverse boards may have advantages when obtaining and maintaining their 
important resources, including: (i) the human capital of board members 
(knowledge, skills, and talent); (ii) advice and counsel; (iii) channels of 
communication; and (iv) legitimacy (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003). Indeed, it is documented in the corporate governance literature 
that more gender-diverse boards may help to extend these firms’ vital resources 
(Liu, Wei, & Xie, 2014). Hillman, Cannella, and Harris (2002) have argued that 
diversifying the BOD by adding more women would help companies to gain 
legitimacy as gender equality becomes increasingly one of the widely accepted 
social norms.  
In a similar vein, female directors may broaden the human capital and channels of 
communication of the BOD by offering additional insight into firms’ strategic 
issues, especially those that relate to female employees, consumers, and business 
partners (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 1999). It follows that female representation in 
boardrooms should improve information processing, leading to higher quality 
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decisions and ultimately better firm performance (Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Rose, 
2007). However, greater boardroom gender diversity may not necessarily result in 
more effective boards (Carter et al., 2003). More specifically, greater board 
gender diversity may lead to several difficulties in reaching a consensus on 
strategic decisions and in implementing monitoring functions effectively, since 
the greater diversity may generate greater potential for conflicts of interest among 
board members (Goodstein et al., 1994).  
In summary, although both theories suggest that the relationship between board 
gender diversity and firm performance appears to be a real possibility (Carter et 
al., 2010), the nature of the relationship remains unclear (Carter et al., 2010; 
Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Rose, 2007). The empirical question that needs 
to be answered is, if the relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
performance does exist, does female director representation make the difference?  
Prior empirical studies on this topic, predominantly conducted in developed 
markets, provide us with inconclusive evidence (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 
2008; Rose, 2007). Some researchers argue that the relationship between gender 
diversity and performance is positive (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et 
al., 2003; Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Erhardt et al., 2003), or negative (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012), while others see evidence of no 
significant relationship at all (Carter et al., 2010; Rose, 2007). It is argued that 
such mixed empirical evidence reflects the differences in research contexts and 
econometric techniques used. For instance, given that women tend to work for 
better performing companies (Farrell & Hersch, 2005), studies that link gender 
diversity to firm performance should treat gender diversity as an endogenous 
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variable (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010; Dezsö & Ross, 2012). This 
implies that ignoring the endogenous nature of the gender diversity–firm 
performance connection makes empirical estimations problematic. 
Given that the extant theoretical framework and prior empirical findings do not 
suggest a clear outcome for the board gender diversity–firm performance 
association, this study’s analysis will be based on the Vietnamese and 
Singaporean corporate governance contexts. Accordingly, if the performance 
effect of greater gender diversity on boards appears to be more pronounced in 
firms with weak governance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011), it is 
plausible to infer that Vietnamese firms, characterised by underdeveloped 
governance practices, may greatly benefit from adding female directors to their 
boards.  
In other words, it is argued that if female directors provide greater monitoring 
expertise, which is more valuable in a weak corporate governance environment 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Adams et al., 2011; Gul et al., 2011), it may be 
expected that Vietnamese listed companies11  with more gender-diverse boards 
will enjoy better financial performance. On the contrary, the performance impact 
of board gender diversity is expected to be negative for companies in the 
Singaporean market where the quality of corporate governance practices is high. 
Based on these arguments, the first pair of hypotheses for this study is proposed as 
follows: 
HVN1: Board gender diversity has a positive effect on financial 
performance of Vietnamese listed companies. 
                                                 
11 The terms “publicly listed companies”, “listed companies”, and “companies” are used 
interchangeably in this thesis. 
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HSG1: Board gender diversity has a negative effect on financial 
performance of Singaporean listed companies. 
2.3.1.2 Board composition and firm financial performance 
Board composition, often defined as the proportion of non-executive directors on 
boards, is one of the measures of board independence (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
The performance effect of board composition is predicted by both agency theory 
and resource dependence theory as presented below. 
Agency theory suggests that a higher proportion of non-executive directors will 
lead to greater monitoring by the board (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). It is assumed that non-executive 
directors may exercise their monitoring function better than executive directors as 
they are less dependent on management and more interested in protecting their 
reputation in the external labour market (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
Nicholson and Kiel (2007) argue that if the monitoring functions of the board are 
implemented effectively, the chance for managers to gain self-interest at the 
expense of shareholders will be minimised, and as a result, shareholders will 
obtain larger benefits. This view is compatible with the perspective of resource 
dependence theory. Daily et al. (2003) argue that non-executive directors provide 
the link to vital resources required by companies and therefore a higher proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board may have a positive impact on firm 
performance. 
Empirically, extant literature provides more than twenty different measures for 
board composition, such as, the proportion of executive directors, or non-
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executive directors, or affiliated directors, or interdependent directors (Dalton, 
Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). Because each of these measures reflects only 
a specific aspect of board independence (Dalton et al., 1999), prior research 
evidence provides inconsistent findings regarding the relationship between board 
composition and firm performance. For example, there is evidence supporting the 
view that board composition is either negatively related to (Bhagat & Bolton, 
2008) or insignificantly associated with (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003) operating 
performance (measured by return on total assets – ROA). It is also evident that 
board composition is either insignificantly correlated to (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008, 
2009) or significantly linked to (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003) market-based 
performance (Tobin’s Q). Whereas, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Laing 
and Weir (1999) have suggested that board composition does not matter at all.  
For the Vietnamese market, Nguyen (2008) reports that most directors of 
Vietnamese listed firms (including the board chairperson) are majority 
shareholders, and therefore, they are elected as executive managers for their 
company. Consequently, in fact, the boards not only play a vague role in 
monitoring managerial actions, but are also deeply involved in daily business 
management instead of their long-run strategic role (Nguyen, 2008). This fact 
may suggest that better board composition of Vietnamese firms is not necessary to 
result in better monitoring and/or managerial effectiveness.  
In a similar vein, for Singaporean companies, Mak (2007) states that there is a 
relatively small pool from which non-executive directors are chosen. It is argued 
that the shortage of non-executive directors may make seeking high profile 
candidates and ensuring the real independence of potential directors more 
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difficult. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the non-executive directors play 
a vague role in determining performance in Singapore. Based on the 
aforementioned consideration, the second pair of hypotheses of this study is 
proposed as follows: 
HVN2: Board composition has no effect on financial performance of 
Vietnamese listed companies. 
HSG2: Board composition has no effect on financial performance of 
Singaporean listed companies. 
2.3.1.3 Board leadership structure and firm financial performance 
Board leadership structure refers to duality; i.e. whether a company has one 
position combining the duties of the CEO with those of the board chairperson 
(CEO duality) or these positions are filled by different people (CEO non-duality) 
(Elsayed, 2011; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). The effect of board leadership structure 
on firm performance forecasted by agency theory is presented below. 
According to agency theory, CEO duality hinders boards from implementing a 
monitoring function because “the impartiality of the board is compromised” 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991, p. 51), and the power of monitoring tends to be 
abused for self-interest reasons. Daily et al. (2003) argue that CEO non-duality 
has the potential to result in better monitoring of any self-interested behaviour of 
managers. Therefore, it is assumed that CEO non-duality may diffuse and separate 
managerial decisions from control decisions, and consequently may help diminish 
agency problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
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International empirical research on the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance offers conflicting results (Bhagat & Bolton, 2009). Some have 
shown that the relationship is positive (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), or 
insignificant (Laing & Weir, 1999). Meanwhile, others have reported mixed 
results depending on whether accounting-based or market-based measures of 
performance are employed (negatively associated with ROA but insignificantly 
related to Tobin’s Q) (Bhagat & Bolton, 2009).  
Within the East Asian context, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) have indicated a 
statistically significantly negative relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance (ROA), implying that the separation of BOD chairperson and CEO 
may lead to better firm performance. However, the shortcoming of the study 
undertaken by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) is that it does not take into account the 
endogeneity of corporate governance variables, thus resulting in spurious 
correlations. Nowland (2008), using data from Singapore and six other East Asian 
countries, reported that CEO non-duality has a positive linkage with operating 
performance (ROA) and market value (Tobin’s Q). Although the study by 
Nowland (2008) offers fascinating insights into the nature of the board 
independence–firm financial performance relationship, it only focuses on the 
largest firms in Singapore, and therefore its findings may not be significantly 
generalised to the whole country.  
It is argued that a high concentration of managerial and monitoring functions in a 
group of major shareholders (including members who are both board directors and 
senior executive managers) may pose serious challenges in terms of protecting the 
interests of other minority shareholders and maintaining an effective monitoring 
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function. In other words, such a board leadership structure may facilitate self-
interest behaviour among majority shareholders which in turn may reduce firm 
performance. Based on the aforementioned literature and as predicted by agency 
theory, the third pair of hypotheses of this study is proposed as follows: 
HVN3: Board leadership structure has a negative effect on financial 
performance of Vietnamese listed companies. 
HSG3: Board leadership structure has a negative effect on financial 
performance of Singaporean listed companies. 
2.3.1.4 Board size and firm financial performance 
Dalton et al. (1999) argue that the size of boards is one of the most essential 
characteristics of board functionality. However, there is no consensus among 
scholars about whether board size has an effect on firm performance (Dalton et 
al., 1999). Agency theory predicts an inverse relationship between board size and 
performance (Jensen, 1993) while resource dependence theory suggests it is 
positive (Dalton et al., 1999).  
From the perspective of agency theory, Jensen (1993) argues that firm 
performance could be enhanced if the board is kept small, and suggests that the 
optimal size should be no more than eight. This is backed up by Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992); Sonnenfeld (2002); and Yermack (1996), among others. One of 
the plausible explanations for this opinion is that an organisation tends to function 
less efficiently when its quantity of members increases (Jensen, 1993). The 
benefits obtained from having more members cannot compensate for troubles in 
terms of corporation and procedure (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Muth and 
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Donaldson (1998) explain that if the board size is large, it takes CEOs more time 
and effort to convince various directors to consent to managerial decisions. To the 
contrary, the proponents of resource dependence theory (e.g., Dalton et al., 1999) 
argue that a large board leads to better firm financial performance. Likewise, 
Firstenberg and Malkiel (1994) take the view that a small board cannot provide 
diverse managerial experience, gender, or nationality, which in turn may restrict 
its own capabilities in terms of stimulating various perspectives.  
Empirically, the linkage between board size and firm financial performance in the 
extant literature is inconclusive. Some researchers have estimated a positive 
relationship (e.g., Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2006), while others 
(e.g., Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Yermack, 1996) have reported a negative 
relationship. The third alternative is found by Reddy, Locke, and Scrimgeour 
(2010); Schultz et al. (2010); Wintoki et al. (2012) who, among others, have 
documented an insignificant relationship between board size and financial 
performance after controlling for endogeneity issues.  
Within the Asian context, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), using a sample of 347 
Malaysian listed companies, have reported that the direction of the board size and 
financial performance relationship may change over from positive to negative 
when the measures of performance change from accounting-based (ROA) to 
market-based measures (Tobin’s Q). For the Singaporean market, Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005) document that there is an inverse relationship between board size 
and firm value (as measured by Tobin’s Q). Mak and Kusnadi (2005) also argue 
that their finding is consistent with the findings from other markets, such as 
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) for the US market. 
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They suggest that the negative relationship between board size and firm value can 
be generalised to various corporate governance systems.  
However, one of the primary limitations of the abovementioned studies within the 
East Asian context is that they use an OLS regression without taking into account 
the endogeneity of corporate governance variables. In that case, such regression 
results may introduce spurious relationships (Bhagat & Jefferis, 2002; Reddy et 
al., 2010). In summary, the theoretical and empirical direction of the board size 
and financial performance relationship is inconclusive. The empirical evidence of 
this relationship within the context of East Asia is mixed and, as mentioned 
above, maybe the consequence of spurious regressions.  
Given the conflicted prediction about the board size–firm performance 
relationship between agency theory and resource dependence theory, this study 
adjusts the fourth pair of hypotheses based on the empirical suggestions of prior 
studies. Accordingly, it is plausible to hypothesise that there is no relationship 
between board size and financial performance for Vietnamese listed companies 
given that boards in emerging economies play a vague role and are often 
ineffective (Chen, Li, & Shapiro, 2011; Young et al., 2008). In line with Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005), board size is expected to have a negative effect on the financial 
performance of Singaporean listed companies. Based on the aforementioned 
arguments, the fourth pair of hypotheses of this study is proposed as follows: 
HVN4: Board size has no effect on financial performance of Vietnamese 
listed companies. 
HSG4: Board size has a negative effect on financial performance of 
Singaporean listed companies. 
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2.3.2 Ownership structure and firm financial performance 
As suggested by agency theory, ownership concentration is a key corporate 
governance mechanism that helps to limit agency problems arising from the 
separation of ownership and control (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The central 
premise of arguments regarding the ownership concentration–performance 
relationship is the potential trade-off between the monitoring effect and 
expropriation effect of concentrated ownership (Filatotchev et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, predictions of the positive performance effect of ownership 
concentration are based on its effective monitoring effect. Owning a large 
proportion of shares, controlling shareholders have strong incentives to actively 
monitor and real power to discipline and/or influence management (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). This helps to mitigate the agency problems which, in turn, leads to 
improved performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In markets where external 
corporate governance mechanisms are under-developed, the monitoring effect of 
ownership concentration is even more important (Filatotchev et al., 2013). This is 
because in the absence of external managerial discipline, shareholders are forced 
to actively involve themselves in monitoring management, which can only be 
effective if ownership is concentrated (Heugens et al., 2009).  
In contrast, predictions of the negative performance effect of ownership 
concentration are based on its expropriation effect. As argued by La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), the nature of agency problems varies significantly 
between firms with and without large shareholders. In the presence of highly 
concentrated ownership, the agency problem is likely to shift from traditional 
principal–agent conflict to principal–principal conflicts (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 
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2010; Young et al., 2008). In other words, ownership concentration may increase 
the conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Filatotchev et al., 2013).  
Empirically, it has long been voiced by Demsetz (1983) that ownership structure 
is endogenously determined by the profit-maximisation process of shareholders as 
well as observable and unobservable firm characteristics. As a consequence, 
variations in ownership structure should not be systematically related to variations 
in firm performance (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). A number of empirical 
studies have emphasised and/or confirmed this endogenous relationship (e.g., 
Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; Lemmon & 
Lins, 2003)  
However, another source of endogeneity, namely dynamic endogeneity, has been 
recently recognised in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship 
(Yabei & Izumida, 2008) as well as in the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship in general (Wintoki et al., 2012). The dynamic nature of 
the corporate governance structures–firm performance relationship means that the 
current corporate governance structure and firm performance are influenced by 
past performance (Wintoki et al., 2012).  
In particular, the dynamic nature of the ownership structure–firm performance 
relationship can be explained in two ways. If returns on stocks are the concern of 
large shareholders, they are more likely to concentrate their ownership in 
companies that have performed well to obtain more control over these companies 
or to take advantage of extra profit in the future given the persistence of profit 
(Yabei & Izumida, 2008). This implies a positive impact of past performance 
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upon ownership concentration. In a similar vein, if a company performs poorly 
and large shareholders think that their company is over-priced and their ownership 
is at risk, they may reduce the size of their concentrated ownership (at high prices) 
to achieve more diverse personal portfolios (Yabei & Izumida, 2008). In this 
situation, a negative impact of past performance on ownership concentration is 
expected. As mentioned later in Subsection 4.3.1 of Chapter 4, the dynamic nature 
of the corporate governance–firm performance relationship has significant 
implications for choosing a suitable empirical approach.  
Prior empirical studies on the ownership concentration–firm performance 
relationship for Asian markets have provided inconclusive findings. For example, 
some studies have reported a positive relationship (Xu & Wang, 1999), while 
others have found the relationship to be either negative (Hu, Tam, & Tan, 2010) 
or mixed (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). It should be noted that although these studies 
have taken other sources of endogeneity into consideration, they have ignored the 
dynamic endogeneity.  
However, recent empirical studies in the Australasian region, which take into 
account the dynamic endogeneity, have also reported inconclusive results. Some 
studies have reported that the relationship is insignificant for the Australian 
market (Pham et al., 2011; Schultz et al., 2010), but significant for the Japanese 
market (Yabei & Izumida, 2008). Based on the conflicted predictions of agency 
theory and the above-mentioned arguments, this study proposes a significant 
linkage between ownership concentration and performance but does not establish 
any direction for this relationship. The fifth pair of hypotheses in this thesis is 
proposed as follows: 
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HVN5: Ownership concentration has a significant effect on financial 
performance of Vietnamese listed companies. 
HSG5: Ownership concentration has a significant effect on financial 
performance of Singaporean listed companies. 
2.3.3 Capital structure and firm financial performance 
Capital structure of a firm is considered a key internal corporate governance 
mechanism (Gillan, 2006). According to agency theory, the nature of the agency 
problem and thus the performance impact of corporate governance structure may 
be affected by capital structure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Using debt in capital 
structure acts as a mechanism for solving agency problems (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). In more detail, capital structure is supposed to have an effect on firm value 
because it can help to discourage managers’ over-investment of free cash flow 
(Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, & Yermack, 2012).  
In other words, “debt can act as a self-enforcing governance mechanism; that is, 
issuing debt holds managers’ feet to the fire by forcing them to generate cash to 
meet interest and principal obligations” (Gillan, 2006, p. 388). Therefore, using 
debt in capital structure helps to alleviate the potential agency costs of free cash 
flow (Jensen, 1993). In support, Black et al. (2014) argue that capital structure is 
mechanically associated with Tobin’s Q because debt financing helps to reduce 
income tax and free cash flow problems. Given the prediction of agency theory 
regarding the positive linkage between capital structure and firm financial 
performance, the sixth pair of hypotheses of this study is proposed as follows: 
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HVN6: Capital structure has a positive effect on financial performance of 
Vietnamese listed companies. 
HSG6: Capital structure has a positive effect on financial performance of 
Singaporean listed companies. 
2.4 NATIONAL GOVERNANCE QUALITY AND FIRM 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
As mentioned earlier, the performance of firms may be driven not only by firm-
level or industry-level characteristics, but also by country-level specific 
environments within which firms operate. Recent empirical evidence also 
supports the proposition that country-level specific effects matter in firm 
performance. Ngobo and Fouda (2012, p. 435) argue that “good [national] 
governance can reduce uncertainty, transaction, search and production costs, and 
ultimately affect firm performance”. More specifically, better national governance 
quality may help to mitigate the degree of variability in firms’ profitability, 
leading to high-return and low-risk investments (Ngobo & Fouda, 2012). Based 
on the abovementioned arguments, the seventh hypothesis in this study is 
proposed as follows: 
HVN_SG7: National governance quality has a significant effect on financial 
performance of Singaporean and Vietnamese listed companies. 
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2.5 MODERATING EFFECT OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
QUALITY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
The moderating role of national governance quality in the corporate governance–
firm performance relationship has become the subject of an important and 
ongoing debate in the corporate governance literature. Emerging literature on 
comparative corporate governance has highlighted how variations in national 
governance quality lead to variations in the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship across countries (see Kumar & Zattoni, 2013 for a brief 
review). Indeed, recent studies (see e.g., Aslan & Kumar, 2014; Van Essen, 
Engelen, & Carney, 2013) suggest that the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship is influenced by the efficiency of the national 
governance system in which firms operate.  
In support, Aslan and Kumar (2012) argue that national governance quality has 
strong effects on the agency-principal conflicts at firm-level. In other words, firm 
performance is not only driven by industry conditions, corporate governance 
mechanisms and other firm-specific characteristics, but also by the governance 
quality of the country in which firms are embedded (Anderson & Gupta, 2009; 
Ngobo & Fouda, 2012). La Porta et al. (1999); and Love (2011) have documented 
that corporate governance mechanisms have greater influences on firm 
performance in countries with weak legal protection. For example, the effect of 
concentrated ownership on firm performance is likely to be influenced by the 
national-level governance characteristics that are beyond the control of the 
companies.  
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In support, a meta-analysis for 18 emerging markets undertaken by Wang and 
Shailer (2015) documents that the effect of ownership concentration on 
performance tends to be weaker in countries where investor protection is better. A 
similar finding is reported by Heugens et al. (2009), who also used meta-analysis 
of the Asian markets and argued that ownership concentration is an effective 
corporate governance mechanism in markets with weak legal protection of 
minority shareholders. Based on the arguments mentioned above, the eighth 
hypothesis in this study is proposed as follows: 
HVN_SG8: The relationship between corporate governance structures and 
financial performance of firms in Singapore and Vietnam is significantly 
influenced by national governance quality. 
2.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter reviews the literature of corporate governance. Six pairs of theory-
based hypotheses on the relationship between corporate governance structures and 
financial performance, denoted from [HVN1 – HSG1] to [HVN6 – HSG6], have been 
developed for the Singaporean and Vietnamese markets. In addition, the 
hypothesis on the performance impact of national governance quality [HVN_SG7], 
and the hypothesis on the moderating effect of national governance quality 
[HVN_SG8] have been also established. Table 2.1 summarises these hypotheses, 
together with the predicted signs. Chapter 4 will develop empirical models to test 
these hypotheses. Using the separate datasets for each market, Chapters 5 and 6 
respectively report empirical results and discussions obtained from testing the 
pairs of hypotheses from [HVN1 – HSG1] to [HVN6 – HSG6]. Empirical evidence 
supporting HVN_SG7 and HVN_SG8 is reported in Chapter 7.   
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Table 2.1: Summary of research hypotheses 
Hypotheses Tested relationships 
Predicted signs 
Vietnam Singapore 
HVN1 – HSG1 
Board gender diversity–firm 
performance  
+ – 
HVN2 – HSG2 
Board composition–firm 
performance  
  
HVN3 – HSG3 
Board leadership structure–firm 
performance  
– – 
HVN4 – HSG4 Board size–firm performance   – 
HVN5 – HSG5 
Ownership concentration–firm 
performance  
+/– +/– 
HVN6 – HSG6 Capital structure–firm performance  + + 
HVN_SG7 
National governance quality–firm 
performance  
+/– +/– 
HVN_SG8 
Moderating effect of national 
governance quality on the 
corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship  
+/– +/– 
Note: Symbols (+), (–) and () represent positive, negative, and no significant relationships, 
respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN SINGAPORE AND VIETNAM  
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the contexts of corporate governance in Singapore and 
Vietnam, which are the research backgrounds for the empirical analyses 
implemented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The remainder of this chapter is structured 
as follows. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 introduce the corporate governance contexts in 
the Singaporean and Vietnamese markets, respectively. The corporate governance 
regulatory systems and monitoring agencies in each market are also briefly 
presented. A comparative analysis regarding the similarities and differences in the 
corporate governance systems between the two markets is presented in 
Section 3.3. Finally, Section 3.4 provides a summary of institutional environments 
in Singapore and Vietnam. 
3.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SINGAPORE 
3.1.1 Corporate governance regulatory system in Singapore 
According to the Asian Development Bank (2013), the regulatory system of 
corporate governance for publicly listed companies in the Singaporean market 
includes a number of corporate governance rules, principles, and recommended 
practices, all of which are administered by some primary regulatory bodies, 
including: (i) the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority; (ii) the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore; and (iii) the Singapore Exchange Limited 
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(SGX). The primary sources of corporate governance rules, principles, and 
recommended practices are presented below12. 
(i) Companies Act of 1967 (and subsequent amendments). According to 
the Singapore Ministry of Finance (2012), the Companies Act applies 
to all companies incorporated in Singapore, and contains provisions 
relating to the life-cycle of companies, from incorporation to 
management to winding up. The Act also contains some provisions 
that apply only to publicly listed companies and branches of foreign 
companies that are operating in Singapore. 
(ii) Securities and Futures Act of 2001 (and subsequent amendments) 
(iii) Listing Requirements (the Rulebook). To be listed in the stock 
exchange market, the companies must comply with the Listing 
Requirements issued by the SGX. The SGX provides two types of 
exchange market with different listing requirements, namely 
Mainboard and Catalist. The Catalist is a secondary board with lower 
listing requirements. 
(iv) The Code of Corporate Governance of 2001 (and subsequent 
revisions). This Code provides most of the principles and 
recommended practices for good corporate governance for publicly 
listed companies in Singapore. 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that for the sampling period 2008–2011 of this study, the companies 
in the sample are governed by the Companies Act (the 2006 revised edition), the 
Securities and Futures Act (the 2009 revised edition), and the Code of Corporate 
Governance (the 2005 revised edition). 
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The Code of Corporate Governance was first promulgated by the Singapore 
Corporate Governance Committee in 2001, was reviewed in 2005 and became 
effective from 2007 (hereafter the Singaporean Code)13. The Singaporean Code 
was most recently revised in May 2012, and a number of major changes in 
corporate governance requirements were introduced into the listing rules.  
The Singaporean Code takes the principle-based approach (also known as 
‘comply or explain’ approach). It means that compliance with the Singaporean 
Code is voluntary, but under the Listing Requirements, publicly listed companies 
are required to disclose their corporate governance practices and explain non-
compliance in their annual reports. Therefore, it will imply that the company is 
following the recommendations of the Singaporean Code if non-compliance is not 
mentioned (Mak, 2007). It is argued that the Singaporean corporate governance 
system, due to its strict discipline and effective implementation, is considered to 
be better structured than many other East Asian countries (Lim, 2010). 
3.1.2 The context of corporate governance in Singapore 
Singapore is recognised as having the best corporate governance system in the 
Asia region (CLSA, 2010). In fact, Singapore has the highest average country 
score of corporate governance when compared with the rest of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (see, Chuanrommanee & Swierczek, 2007 for 
more details). Furthermore, a recent survey undertaken by CLSA (2012)14 shows 
that corporate governance practices in Singapore achieve top ranking across the 
Asia region. Although the legal and corporate governance system of Singapore 
                                                 
13 The Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Singapore Exchange Limited have 
supervised the implementation of the Singaporean Code since September 2007. 
14 The Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
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has been borrowed from Western jurisdictions, there remain some important 
differences between Singapore and developed Western countries regarding the 
institutional environment, including: 
(i) There is a high concentration of ownership in Singapore (Kimber, 
Lipton, & O’Neill, 2005; Mak & Li, 2001; Witt, 2012), but the rights 
of minority shareholders are still well protected (Witt, 2012; World 
Bank, 2013). 
(ii) Singapore has a weak market for corporate control (Mak & Li, 2001). 
It is reported that although friendly mergers sometimes happen, the 
takeover market is generally inactive in Singapore (Mak, 2007; Mak & 
Li, 2001; Phan & Yoshikawa, 2004; Witt, 2012). Therefore, unlike the 
US and the UK, the market for corporate control in Singapore is not an 
effective external corporate governance mechanism. 
(iii) The Singaporean government plays the role of a significant block 
holder in the business sector (Ang & Ding, 2006; Kimber et al., 2005; 
Mak, 2007; Witt, 2012).  
3.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN VIETNAM 
3.2.1 Corporate governance regulatory system in Vietnam 
The corporate governance regulatory system in Vietnam comprises a number of 
corporate governance regulations, and several primary regulatory bodies (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013). The primary regulatory bodies of corporate 
governance in the Vietnamese market comprise: (i) the Vietnamese Ministry of 
Finance (MOF); and (ii) the Vietnamese State Securities Commission (SSC). The 
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SSC governs two corporate governance regulatory sub-bodies for Vietnamese 
publicly listed companies, including the Ho-Chi-Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) 
and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), which are two stock markets, in southern 
and northern Vietnam 15 , respectively. The primary corporate governance 
regulations in the Vietnamese market include: (i) the Law on Enterprises of 2005; 
(ii) the Law on Securities of 2006; (iii) the Model Charter of 2007; (iv) the HOSE 
and HNX Listing Requirements, and (v) the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies of 2007 (hereafter the Vietnamese Code). 
Specifically, the Law on Enterprises was enacted in 2005 and became officially 
binding as of July 2006 (hereafter the LOE 2005), marking a turning point in the 
development of business freedom and the legal framework of corporate 
governance practices in Vietnam (Bui & Nunoi, 2008). According to Le and 
Walker (2008), the LOE 2005 is heavily based on the legal principles of Anglo-
American jurisdictions, and aims to establish an effective corporate governance 
system as well as improve public awareness regarding corporate governance. 
Under the LOE 2005, the MOF promulgated the Vietnamese Code in March 2007, 
updated in July 201216, reflecting most of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (the OECD Principles)17. However, it is noteworthy that while the 
OECD Principles are a flexible, principle-based approach to governance, the 
                                                 
15 From 2009, Vietnamese joint-stock companies can also trade their securities on the 
Unlisted Public Company Market (UPCoM), organized by the HNX. 
16 The issuance of the Vietnamese Code in March 2007 is under Decision 12/2007/QD-
BTC. The Vietnamese Code was revised in July 2012 under Circular 121/2012/TT-BTC. 
17 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were approved by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development Ministers in 2004 and have since become 
an international benchmark of corporate governance practices for policy makers 
worldwide. 
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Vietnamese Code is mandatory for all publicly listed companies in Vietnam (Le & 
Walker, 2008)18. 
3.2.2 The context of corporate governance in Vietnam 
Corporate governance is a new concept for Vietnam and there is also no 
equivalent Vietnamese terminology that fully explains the meaning of the term 
‘corporate governance’. This term is translated as ‘quản-trị-công-ty’, similar in 
meaning to ‘company administration’ (OECD, 2006). The corporate governance 
system in Vietnam is in its initial stages of development19 (World Bank, 2006a) 
and the current situation can be characterised as follows:  
(i) Corporate governance regulations are underdeveloped (World Bank, 
2006a);  
(ii) Public awareness regarding corporate governance is poor (Freeman & 
Nguyen, 2006);  
(iii) The role of the state sector is predominant (Le & Walker, 2008; 
Nguyen, 2008; World Bank, 2006a); 
(iv) The protection of private property rights is weak (Le & Walker, 2008; 
Nguyen, 2008; World Bank, 2006a);  
                                                 
18 The question of whether a flexible principle-based governance approach or a rule-
based one is more suitable for emerging markets and/or mature markets has no definitive 
answer. In my view, implementing a compulsory code of corporate governance is 
suitable for the Vietnamese market where the public awareness of corporate governance 
is poor. This may help to improve the effectiveness and enforcement of the Vietnamese 
Code. 
19 The OECD (2006, p. 27) comments that: “there is a strong need for raising awareness 
on corporate governance in Vietnam is underlined by the fact that the Vietnamese 
language equivalent of ‘corporate governance’ itself is a confusing term because of 
which ‘governance’ is sometimes wrongfully understood to be the same as 
‘management’”. 
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(v) Both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms are 
limited (Le & Walker, 2008; Nguyen, 2008; World Bank, 2006a). 
In complying with the LOE 2005 (National Assembly, 2005) and the Vietnamese 
Code (MOF, 2007), the typical governance structure of a Vietnamese listed 
company follows a two-tier model and consists of four governance bodies: (i) a 
general meeting of shareholders (GMS); (ii) a board of directors (BOD); (iii) a 
chief executive officer (CEO); and (iv) a board of supervisors (BOS, also referred 
to as ‘a control committee’).  
The GMS, the most powerful body of a publicly listed company, establishes the 
company’s constitution and elects the members of both the BOD and BOS. In 
accordance with the company’s constitution, the BOD chairperson may be elected 
by either BOD members or the GMS. As stipulated by the LOE 2005, the BOD—
consisting of three to eleven members—is responsible for guiding and 
establishing the company’s business strategies as well as monitoring managerial 
decisions. Specifically, the LOE 2005 clearly stipulates four major duties of the 
BOD: (i) making decisions regarding management strategies; (ii) nominating the 
CEO and approving senior executive positions; (iii) monitoring daily managerial 
operations; and (iv) proposing matters for the consideration of the GMS. 
Compared to the German internal corporate governance model, the BOD of 
Vietnamese companies has a more direct role in monitoring daily management 
(Le & Walker, 2008).  
The LOE 2005 provides that a BOS must be established in companies which have 
more than eleven individual shareholders or at least one institutional shareholder 
holding more than 50% of the company’s equity. The membership of a BOS must 
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range from three to five members who need not be shareholders or employees of 
the company. Unlike the one-tier board structure in Anglo-American jurisdictions 
where a supervisory committee is composed and nominated by the BOD, the 
members of a Vietnamese BOS are elected by the GMS and function 
independently from the BOD (Bui & Nunoi, 2008). According to the LOE 2005, 
more than half of the BOS’s membership must reside permanently in Vietnam and 
at least one member must be an accountant or auditor.  
The major role of the BOS is to make an internal assessment of the annual 
financial statements and supervise the performance of both the BOD and CEO. 
However, the LOE 2005 does not stipulate what specific form of supervision is 
required and how the BOS should implement its decisions (Bui & Nunoi, 2008). 
The absence of clear legal guidance for the BOS in Vietnamese companies on 
what and how to supervise the BOD means the BOS’s supervisory role is largely 
ineffective (World Bank, 2006a). As a consequence, the BOS in Vietnamese 
companies, in reality, appears to exist in form rather than in substance (Bui & 
Nunoi, 2008).  
Despite the efforts made by the government to improve the standard of 
governance practiced by publicly listed companies, the corporate governance 
system in Vietnam still remains underdeveloped. Indeed, Vietnam is ranked 166th 
out of 183 economies for the strength of investor protection (World Bank, 2012). 
The most recent corporate governance scorecard for 2011, conducted by the IFC 
(2012), reported that the average corporate governance score in Vietnam is only 
42.5%, which is much less than those of other markets across the Asia region. For 
55 
 
example, the average scores of Thailand (in 2011), Hong Kong (in 2009), and the 
Philippines (in 2008) are 77%, 73% and 72%, respectively (IFC, 2012). 
3.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SINGAPORE AND 
VIETNAM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Following Weimer and Pape (1999), this section compares seven characteristics 
of the corporate governance systems between Singapore and Vietnam, including: 
(i) the type of systems of corporate governance; (ii) the board system; (iii) the 
legal system; (iv) the characteristics of external market for corporate control; (v) 
the concentration of ownership structure; (vi) the approach of corporate 
governance practices; and (vii) the corporate governance practice. These seven 
comparative characteristics are summarised in Table 3.1. 
With regard to the type of systems of corporate governance, it is argued that the 
corporate governance systems in Singapore and Vietnam appear to be 
characterised by a combination of family-based and government-based systems of 
corporate governance (IFC, 2010; Mak, 2007; Nguyen, 2008; World Bank, 
2006a). The type of corporate governance systems in Singapore and Vietnam is 
therefore different from the market-based corporate governance in the US, the 
bank-based corporate governance in Japan and Germany, or the family-based 
corporate governance in Hong Kong. 
With regard to the board system, Maassen (2002) argues that the organisation of 
BOD can be categorised as two primary models: (i) the Anglo-Saxon one-tier 
board model; and (ii) the continental European two-tier board model20. The one-
tier board model refers to a type of organisational structure in which executive 
                                                 
20 These prototypical models have several variants. See Maassen (2002) for more details. 
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and non-executive directors operate together. Meanwhile, there are two 
organisational layers in the two-tier board model, including a BOS (in charge of 
control decisions) and a BOD (in charge of managerial decisions). In this regard, 
the two-tier board model obviously separates the executive function of the 
management board from the control function of the supervisory board (Maassen, 
2002) 
Table 3.1: The comparison of corporate governance systems between 
Singapore and Vietnam 
No 
Comparative 
characteristics 
Singapore Vietnam 
1 
Type of corporate 
governance system 
Mix between family-
based and government-
based system 
Mix between family-
based and government-
based system 
2 Board system 
One-tier: executive and 
non-executive board 
Two-tier: board of 
directors and board of 
supervisors 
3 Legal system Anglo-American Anglo-American 
4 
External market for 
corporate control 
Rather weak Weak 
5 
Ownership 
concentration 
High High 
6 
Corporate 
governance 
approach 
Voluntary 
 
Mandatory 
 
7 
Corporate 
governance practice 
Very good Poor 
Note: The comparative characteristics from 1 to 5 are based on the taxonomy of corporate 
governance systems of Weimer and Pape (1999). The sixth and seventh characteristics are added 
by the author, based on the statements presented in Subsections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2. 
Under the one-tier board model, it is recommended by the OECD (2004) that 
some important committees, such as audit, remuneration, and nomination 
committees be established to enhance the level of independence of the BOD 
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through effectively implementing monitoring functions. As mentioned in 
Subsection 3.2.1 that although the Vietnamese Code follows the two-tier board 
model, it does allow Vietnamese listed companies to establish subcommittees 
such as remuneration, nomination, or strategic planning subcommittees to assist 
their BOD’s activities. On the contrary, the organisation of the BOD in 
Singaporean companies follows a one-tier model in which the audit, nomination 
and remuneration committees should be established. Mak (2007) indicates that all 
of Singapore’s listed corporations have established audit committees, and most of 
them (over 93%) have nomination and remuneration committees. In fact, the 
presence of these subcommittees appears to have positive influences on the 
quality of financial reporting and auditing effectiveness in Singapore (Goodwin & 
Seow, 2002).  
With regard to the legal system, as a former British colony, Singapore’s legal 
system is based on common law. It is argued that the Companies Act and 
corporate governance system of Singapore are similar to those of Australia, New 
Zealand, and the UK. This implies that the Anglo-American model21 is the origin 
of Singapore’s legal system which has a significant influence on the development 
of the Singaporean market economy and business sector. For example, the 
                                                 
21 In general, there are two major corporate governance systems in the extant literature, 
including the Anglo-American corporate governance system and Continental-European 
one. The former is characterised by short-run equity finance, dispersed ownership, strong 
shareholder rights, active markets for corporate control, flexible labour markets, little 
direct government intervention, and minimal legal rights for stakeholders (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003; Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). In addition, Aguilera et al. (2008) argue that 
the Anglo-American system should be complemented by some other attributes such as 
independent directors, executive pay incentives, and information disclosure.  
Meanwhile, the Continental-European system is characterised by long-run debt finance, 
concentrated ownership, weak shareholder rights, inactive markets for corporate control, 
and inflexible labour markets (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). 
With regard to jurisdiction, Anglo-American model refers to the system of common law 
jurisdiction with legal foundations and principles originating from the UK (Kimber et al., 
2005). 
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Companies Act of Singapore is derived from the UK Companies Act 1945 and the 
Australian Companies Code 1961 (Kimber et al., 2005). For the Vietnamese 
market, the Western jurisdictions, especially the Anglo-American pattern, is a 
major inspiration for the Vietnamese lawmakers to promulgate the LOE 2005 (Le 
& Walker, 2008). Thus, both Singaporean and Vietnamese corporate governance 
systems are influenced by the Anglo-American pattern.  
Regarding the characteristics of external market for corporate control, Singapore 
has a weak market for corporate control (Mak & Li, 2001), characterised by an 
inactive takeover market (Mak, 2007; Mak & Li, 2001; Phan & Yoshikawa, 2004; 
Witt, 2012). Likewise, the market for corporate control in Vietnam is not an 
external corporate governance mechanism at all (Le & Walker, 2008; Nguyen, 
2008; World Bank, 2006a). In summary, it appears unlikely that the markets for 
corporate control in Singapore and Vietnam are effective external corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
In regard to the concentration of ownership structure, it is observed that highly 
concentrated ownership and government participation in the business sector as a 
block-holder of numerous companies are two noticeable characteristics of the 
corporate governance systems in Singapore and Vietnam (Kimber et al., 2005; 
Mak & Li, 2001; World Bank, 2006a). Indeed, the Vietnamese corporate 
governance system is characterised by a concentrated ownership structure (IFC, 
2010). Most of the listed companies are equitized state-owned enterprises22 of 
which the significant proportion of capital, approximately 26% on average, is held 
by the government (World Bank, 2006a).  
                                                 
22 The predecessors of these companies are the state-owned enterprises transformed 
through the so-called ‘equalisation process’ which is privatisation by nature. 
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Similarly, for the Singaporean market, Anwar and Sam (2006) document that 
Singapore pursues a model of state directed capitalism and employs the so-called 
‘government-linked corporations’ to join in the economy. Consequently, a 
common type of state-owned firms in Singapore is ‘government-linked 
companies’ (hereafter the GLCs), which are mostly controlled by the government 
and dominate the Singaporean economy (Claessens & Fan, 2002). According to 
Ang and Ding (2006), the GLCs account for approximately 24% of the stock 
market’s total capitalisation and control over 10% of the economic output of the 
country.  
3.4 NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN SINGAPORE AND 
VIETNAM 
3.4.1 National governance quality in Vietnam and Singapore 
Because corporate governance practices are affected by the institutional 
characteristics, legal systems, and the stages of development of a country, every 
corporate governance study must take these factors into consideration (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2010; Claessens & Fan, 2002; Klapper & Love, 2003). For that reason, 
this subsection briefly introduces some differences and similarities between 
Singapore and Vietnam in terms of the abovementioned factors.  
Vietnam is a Marxist-Leninist one-party state, (governed by the Vietnam 
Communist Party) but pursues a ‘market economy with socialist orientation’ in 
which: (i) the role of the state sector is predominant; (ii) the protection of private 
property rights is poor; (iii) most of the essential economic resources (such as 
natural resources, land) are under public ownership; and (iv) government 
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intervention in the economy is strong (Abonyi, 2005; Bui, 2006; Le & Walker, 
2008; World Bank, 2006a).  
While Vietnam is an emerging market23 with per capita GNI about US$ 1,110 in 
2010, Singapore is considered the most advanced economy in the region with the 
highest level of GNI per capita about US$ 41,430 in 201024. Also being situated in 
the East Asian region, Singapore is one of the most active and successful 
economies in the world. Indeed, Singapore was not only the second-most 
competitive economy in the world in 2011, and has remained in first position 
among Asian economies for many years, it also leads the world in terms of 
financial market development (World Economic Forum, 2011). Singapore is also 
ranked the best for government efficiency and the least for corruption in the world 
(World Economic Forum, 2011). 
Recent studies (see e.g., Aslan & Kumar, 2014; Van Essen et al., 2013) suggest 
that the corporate governance–firm performance relationship is influenced by the 
efficiency of the national governance system in which firms operate. Globerman, 
Peng, and Shapiro (2011, p. 1) emphasise that:  
[...] One needs to understand the institutional framework in which 
organisations operate in order to understand the rationale for and 
consequences of specific corporate governance models, as well as the 
                                                 
23 The World Bank divides economies into four groups according to 2010 GNI per 
capita: (i) low income, $1,005 or less; (ii) lower middle income, $1,006–$3,975; (iii) 
upper middle income, $3,976–$12,275; and (iv) high income, $12,276 or more. 
Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund divides the world into two major groups: 
(i) advanced economies, and (ii) emerging and developing economies. Singapore is 
listed in the former group and Vietnam belongs to the latter one. 
24 GNI per capita is the gross national income, converted to US dollars using the World 
Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. The data are provided by World 
DataBank of The World Bank, retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/. 
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likelihood that specific governance reforms will be adopted and prove 
effective. 
This implies that the quality of corporate governance practice at firm level is 
likely to be dependent on the quality of country governance. Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2011) claim that the governance quality of a country is measured 
by six factors: Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and 
Control of Corruption.  
Table 3.2: The governance indicators (percentile ranks) of East Asia-Pacific 
region, OECD, Singapore, and Vietnam in 2013 
Governance Indicator 
2013 
Percentile Rank (0-100) 
Singapore Vietnam 
East Asia-
Pacific 
Average 
OECD 
Regional 
Average 
Voice and Accountability 52.1 11.8 53.8 87.0 
Political Stability 95.7 55.9 63.2 75.8 
Government Effectiveness 99.5 44.0 49.4 87.5 
Regulatory Quality 100.0 28.2 46.5 87.6 
Rule of Law 95.3 39.3 56.4 87.2 
Control of Corruption 96.7 36.8 53.4 84.7 
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. The methodology used to 
calculate the governance indicators was developed by  Kaufmann et al. (2011).  
Note: The list of countries in the East Asia-Pacific region is available at http://go.worldbank.org/. 
The list of 34 member countries worldwide of the OECD is available at http://www.oecd.org/. 
Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below the selected 
country. Higher values indicate better national governance ratings. 
Table 3.2 provides the national governance indicators for the East Asia-Pacific 
region, OECD, Singapore, and Vietnam in 2013. It shows that the national 
governance ranking of Vietnam regarding all governance indicators is lower than 
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the average ranking of other countries in the East Asian-Pacific region. Vietnam 
also lags far behind Singapore and the OECD countries in all national governance 
indicators. This suggests that the Vietnamese national governance system is 
underdeveloped. 
In contrast, Singapore is the best benchmark in terms of national governance 
quality among the East Asia-Pacific and OECD economies, suggesting that the 
Singaporean national governance system is well-established. As reported in Table 
3.2, Singapore occupies the first position for five among six governance indicators 
in 2013, notably in governance effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of 
corruption. Noticeably, the level of corruption in Singapore is very low when 
compared with the other countries. It is argued that “strong government 
effectiveness coupled with low levels of corruption can be expected to translate 
into relatively effective corporate governance” (Robertson, 2009, p. 623). 
3.4.2 Gender-related institutional environment in Vietnam 
This subsection highlights the gender-related institutional environment in 
Vietnam. This is essential to strengthen the background of the empirical analysis 
implemented in Chapter 5, regarding the potential effect of board gender diversity 
on firm performance. This is also in line with Grosvold and Brammer (2011), who 
recommend that the national institutional environment should be considered in 
studies on boardroom diversity. According to Grosvold and Brammer (2011), 
national institutional systems, such as the socio-economic and political structure, 
legal background, governance system, and cultural foundation, among others, 
constitute important antecedents for female representation in boardrooms as well 
as opportunities for women to advance in their careers.  
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UNIDO (2010) argues that Vietnam was strongly influenced by Confucian gender 
ideologies in which women are subordinated to men. However, Vietnamese 
companies nowadays enjoy an advanced gender-related institutional environment 
in which women’s rights and gender equality are constantly promoted. As a 
Marxist-Leninist one-party state, Vietnam has pursued ‘a socialist-oriented 
market economy’ in which the state sector rather than market forces plays the 
decisive role in controlling the economy. In such an economic structure, the 
government intervenes strongly and directly in the economy in order to achieve 
the socialist ideals of citizens’ equality and, to a lesser extent, gender equality.  
Gender equality, therefore, is considered to be one of the central goals of this 
communist state’s socio-economic development strategies (Knodel, Vu, Jayakody, 
& Vu, 2004). Since 1945, the Vietnam Communist Party has been strongly 
committed to achieving this goal by adopting gender-based interventions. In 2002, 
for example, the Vietnamese government proclaimed a National Strategy for the 
Advancement of Women to 2010 that identifies high priorities for achieving equal 
rights for women in labour, employment, education, health, and economic 
participation (Asian Development Bank, 2005). The National Strategy on Gender 
Equality 2011-2020, adopted in 2010, also specifies objectives for the 
participation of women in leadership and management (World Bank, 2011).  
Through concerted efforts for gender equality, Vietnam has achieved key gender 
equality indicators extremely well in comparison with other East Asian countries 
at a similar, or even higher, level of GDP per capita (World Bank, 2011). For 
instance, the World Bank (2006b) assessed Vietnam as one of the countries in the 
world that had achieved the highest rate of economic participation by women and 
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the highest participation of women in state power structures, such as parliament, 
in the East-Asian region. More recently, the World Bank (2011) reported that the 
participation rate of Vietnamese women in the labour force ranked among the 
highest for countries in the region and that the gender gap in earnings was lower 
in Vietnam than in many other East Asian countries.  
Vietnam has also made considerable progress in reducing gender-related 
hindrances in the business environment for female entrepreneurs (UNIDO, 2010). 
More specifically, UNIDO (2010, p. 12) reported that this organisation “did not 
find any significant difference in perceived gender-based bias of male and female 
entrepreneurs in getting collateral, entering networks, acquiring new contracts, 
employing workers and dealing with authorities”. This situation may facilitate 
economic participation and promotion opportunities for Vietnamese women, 
which in turn may help to extend the pool of qualified women from which the 
most suitable candidates for director will be chosen.  
In summary, the institutional environment in Vietnam, on the one hand, is 
remarkable for its underdeveloped corporate governance system and on the other 
hand, is characterised by advanced gender-related institutions. Together, these 
distinctive institutional features make Vietnam an interesting case to study the 
performance effect of board gender diversity. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter provides the backgrounds on corporate governance practices, laws 
and regulations in the Singaporean and Vietnamese markets. It is observed that 
while Vietnam is characterised by an under-developed corporate governance 
system, Singapore has a well-developed corporate governance system and 
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constitutes a benchmark for good corporate governance practices. Singapore and 
Vietnam both are located in East Asia, which is one of the most dynamic growing 
regions in the world, attracting international attention. For this reason, a 
comparative study on the corporate governance–firm performance relationship 
between the two countries has the potential to offer insights into better 
understanding of the corporate governance–firm performance relationship within 
the contexts of emerging and mature markets. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHOD 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the method and data used in the current study. The chapter 
is organised as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the conceptual framework for this 
research. Section 4.2 describes the criteria of sample selection, data and data 
sources. In order to provide the foundation for the choice of appropriate research 
method, Subsection 4.3.1 discusses the endogeneity and the dynamic nature of the 
corporate governance–firm performance relationship. Subsection 4.3.2 introduces 
the dependent and independent variables employed in the current study, all of 
which are suggested by the extant corporate governance literature. 
Subsection 4.3.3 in turn presents model specifications used for the Vietnamese 
market, the Singaporean market, and for the combined sample of both countries. 
Multiple regression techniques, especially the rationale for using the System 
GMM estimator, are discussed in Subsection 4.3.4. Section 4.4 provides a 
summary of the chapter. 
4.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This section, based on Chapter 2, provides a conceptual framework for the current 
research. On the left-hand side of Figure 4.1 are corporate governance structure 
variables suggested by the extant literature. They include board gender diversity, 
board composition, board leadership structure, board size, ownership 
concentration, and capital structure. These corporate governance structure 
variables are linked to firm financial performance (Tobin’s Q ratio), presented on 
the right-hand side of Figure 4.1. 
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Prior studies have used a non-contextualised approach and have ignored potential 
effects of country-level governance mechanisms (Filatotchev et al., 2013). The 
current research explicitly examines the moderating influences of national 
governance quality on the relationship between corporate governance structures 
and firm performance. As presented in Figure 4.1, the relationship between 
corporate governance structure variables and firm performance is moderated by 
national governance quality measured by Regulatory Quality, Governance 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law, or Investor Protection25. Furthermore, the potential 
direct effects of these national governance quality variables on firm performance 
are also empirically examined. 
While prior studies have investigated the corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship in a static framework, this study takes into account the dynamic 
nature of the linkage. Accordingly, this study uses past financial performance as 
an explanatory variable to control for the potential effect of unobserved historical 
factors on both current corporate governance structures and financial 
performance. The conceptual framework of this research also includes various 
control factors suggested by the extant literature. Particularly, industry-specific 
effects, time-specific effects, unobservable firm fixed-effects, and other 
observable firm-specific characteristics, such as firm size and firm age, are fully 
controlled.  
                                                 
25 For the empirical analysis purposes of the current study, these national governance 
quality variables will be combined to form an aggregate national governance quality 
index (see Subsection 4.3.2.3 for more details). 
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Figure 4.1: A conceptual framework for corporate governance–financial 
performance relationship 
 
4.2 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
4.2.1 Data sources 
4.2.1.1 Data sources for Vietnam 
As introduced in Subsection 3.2.1 of Chapter 3, the HOSE and the HNX are two 
stock markets in southern and northern Vietnam, respectively. The list of publicly 
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listed companies on these two markets, classified according to the ICB 26 , is 
provided by the StoxPlus Corporation27. In order to ensure the exactness of data 
used, the list of firms is cross-checked against the lists provided by the HNX and 
HOSE official websites. The financial data of companies listed on these two 
bourses is sourced from Thomson One Banker (Worldscope database).  
Data on ownership structure are extracted from Thomson One Banker (Ownership 
module) and the companies’ annual reports. Data on board structure are collected 
manually from the firms’ annual reports which are downloaded directly from 
FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway28 and Vietstock29. Where necessary, 
any additional data or information is directly gathered from annual reports and/or 
companies’ websites. 
4.2.1.2 Data sources for Singapore 
As mentioned in Subsection 3.1.1 of Chapter 3, the SGX – the regulatory body for 
publicly listed companies in Singapore – provides two types of exchange market 
with different listing requirements, namely Mainboard and Catalist. The list of 
companies listed on the SGX Mainboard is obtained from the SGX website30. 
This list is matched against the list provided by Thomson One Banker 
(Worldscope database) which is classified into ten industries based on the ICB.  
                                                 
26 According to the ICB, there are ten industries including Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, 
Industrials, Consumer Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, 
Utilities, Finance, and Technology. However, the StoxPlus Corporation classifies the 
Finance industry’s companies into two categories, namely Banks and Financials, 
resulting in a category of eleven industries. 
27 The StoxPlus is a leading company providing financial information, market data, and 
investing tools for institutional and individual investors in Vietnam. Its website is at 
http://stoxplus.com/ 
28 http://ezsearch.fpts.com.vn/Services/EzData/ 
29 http://finance.vietstock.vn/ 
30 http://www.sgx.com 
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The corporate governance data are extracted manually from the companies’ 
annual reports directly downloaded from the SGX website. In addition, financial 
data are obtained from Thomson One Banker (Worldscope database). Ownership 
structure data are extracted from Thomson One Banker (Ownership module) as 
well as firms’ annual reports. Where necessary, the data are supplemented and 
verified consulting the annual reports and the official websites of companies. 
4.2.1.3 Data sources for national governance quality variables 
The quality of national governance is measured by the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGIs) developed by Kaufmann et al. (2011) and the Investor 
Protection Index (IPindex) developed by Doing Business Project (World Bank, 
2012, 2013). The data on the WGIs are available at the website of the World 
Bank31. The data on IPindex are downloaded from the website of Doing Business 
Project of the World Bank32. 
4.2.2 The criteria for data collection 
In this study, the following criteria will be employed to guide the choice of the 
sample of companies: (i) the companies must be listed on the SGX Mainboard 
(for the case of Singapore), or the HOSE and the HNX (for the case of Vietnam); 
(ii) financial firms and banks are excluded from the sample; (iii) the companies 
must be locally incorporated; (iv) the firms’ annual reports for the period of 2008–
2011 are available; and (v) the firms’ corresponding financial data for the period 
of 2008–2011, including market-based data and accounting-based data, must be 
available on Thomson One Banker (Worldscope database). The companies have 
                                                 
31 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home  
32 http://www.doingbusiness.org/  
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to meet the abovementioned five criteria to be included in the final sample due to 
the following reasons. 
First, the basic reason for excluding firms listed on the UPCoM (Vietnam) and 
Catalist (Singapore) is that listing requirements of these two markets are different 
from those of main-board markets. For example, it is not compulsory for the 
Singaporean listing applicants on Catalist to meet any minimum quantitative entry 
criteria except for a sponsor’s acceptance. Whereas, a company can only list on 
the SGX Mainboard if it completely meets some strict requirements, including 
revealing pre-tax profits, market capitalisation, shareholding spread, operating 
track record, continuing listing obligations, accounting standards, and continuity 
of management33. 
Similarly, Vietnamese listing applicants on the HNX or HOSE must fulfil several 
conditions stipulated in Decree No. 14/2007/NÐ-CP34, while firms trading on the 
UPCoM need not meet such conditions. The differences in listing requirements 
between the main-board and the unlisted markets may lead to different impacts 
both on corporate governance and financial performance variables. Hence, it is 
reasonable to separate companies listed on the UPCoM and Catalist markets from 
those listed on main-board ones when studying the relationship between corporate 
governance structure and financial performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
Second, consistent with the previous literature, finance and banking industries are 
excluded from this study’s sample because their liquidity and governance can be 
                                                 
33 Further information can be seen at http://www.sgx.com 
34 Decree No. 14/2007/NÐ-CP, dated January 19, 2007, issued by the Vietnam Prime 
Minister. This Decree provides detailed instructions to implement some articles of the 
Law on Securities 2006. 
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influenced by different regulatory factors (Bauer, Frijns, Otten, & Tourani-Rad, 
2008; Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Schultz et al., 2010). For instance, financial 
firms and banks function under strict regulations that have different influences on 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as board structure (Yermack, 1996). In 
addition, they not only are governed by rules which do not apply to other 
commercial entities (Laing & Weir, 1999; Victoria, 2006), but are also subjected 
to specific accounting rules which may make the calculating of financial 
performance ratios difficult (Rose, 2007). Appendix 1 provides several 
illustrations of such differences in corporate governance regulations between 
financial industry and other industries in Vietnam and Singapore. Furthermore, 
given that many previous studies on corporate governance do not consider 
financial companies and banks (see e.g., Bauer et al., 2008; Dittmar & Mahrt-
Smith, 2007; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Ntim, Opong, & 
Danbolt, 2012; Schultz et al., 2010; Yermack, 1996 among others), excluding 
financial companies from the samples makes this study’s findings comparable. 
Third, given the international characteristic of the SGX market, it is the sample 
selection criterion that publicly listed companies in Singapore must be locally 
incorporated. Foreign companies listed on the SGX market should be excluded 
from the sample since they may be subjected to various corporate governance 
practices. In addition, the institutional environments within which such foreign 
companies operate may have different effects on their corporate governance–
financial performance relationships. Therefore, this criterion facilitates a 
consistent comparison between the two countries’ domestic companies. 
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Fourth, the criterion of a four consecutive years’ dataset implies that the 
companies included in the research sample should have fully required information 
covering a four-year consecutive period (2008–2011). This criterion meets the 
requirements of proposed robustness analyses for panel data and helps to obtain a 
balanced panel dataset. In the presence of endogenous variables, a balanced panel 
dataset facilitates the estimation of this study’s empirical models. This is because 
the combination of panel imbalance and endogeneity may induce extreme 
difficulty in estimating and inferring (Flannery & Hankins, 2013)35.  
Specifically, using the Monte Carlo simulation method, Flannery and Hankins 
(2013, pp. 13, 16) indicate that while the System GMM is likely “the most robust 
methodology for unbalanced panels with endogenous variables”, the root mean 
squared errors (RMSEs) of the endogenous variables are so much larger for 
unbalanced panels that it would be impossible to draw reliable inferences. For this 
reason, the choice of a balanced panel instead of an unbalanced one is an 
acceptable compromise between the sample representativeness and the estimation 
effectiveness, at least in this study. 
However, one concern is that this criterion may introduce potential survivorship 
bias into the sample (Ntim et al., 2012). Taking this concern into consideration, 
this research explicitly reports the number of delisted and/or inactive companies 
discovered in the sample selection process. Table 4.2 and Table 4.4 show that the 
number of delisted and/or inactive companies for the Vietnamese market (3 out of 
837) and for the Singaporean market (17 out of 773) accounts for relatively small 
                                                 
35 Flannery and Hankins (2013) used the Monte Carlo simulation to examine seven 
estimation methods under a variety of corporate finance dataset characteristics. The 
evidence and suggestions provided in their study may help empirical researchers in 
determining the most appropriate estimation method for the various features of datasets.  
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proportions of the initial population sizes. Moreover, the sample size of this study 
is far larger than that of previous studies36 which helps to eliminate the potential 
survivorship bias and ensure the generalisation of this study’s findings. For these 
reasons, it is plausible to argue that the potential survivorship bias, induced by the 
sample section criterion of the consecutive four-year period, may not be a 
problem in this study. 
Finally, the year 2008 is selected because it is one year after the promulgation of 
the new corporate governance guidelines/regulations in both countries. More 
specifically, the revised Singaporean Code was issued on 14 July 2005 and came 
into effect from 1 September 2007. Whereas, the Vietnamese Code was first 
released and became effective in March 2007. Given that the new corporate 
governance guidelines/regulations in both countries affect their companies’ annual 
reports in the next financial year, 2008 is thus an appropriate point of time to 
collect data for the comparative purpose of the current research. The sample ends 
in 2011 since it is the most recent year for which data were available at the time 
this study was conducted. Moreover, the time frame is kept the same in both 
markets to facilitate the comparative purposes of this study. 
4.2.3 Data sample 
Table 4.1 presents general information about the number of publicly listed 
companies in Vietnam and Singapore at the end of 2011. In the case of Vietnam, 
as at the end of 2011, there are 837 companies listed on the HNX, the HOSE, and 
                                                 
36 For example, the sample size for the Singaporean market is 257 firms covering a four-
year period from 2008 to 2011, giving a total of 1028 firm-year observations. This 
sample size is nearly five times as many as the sample size of 230 observations used in 
the study of Mak and Kusnadi (2005) for the Singaporean market.  
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the UPCoM. In the case of Singapore, as at the end of 2011, there are a total of 
773 firms listed on the SGX Mainboard and the SGX Catalist.  
Table 4.1: The number of publicly listed companies in Vietnam and 
Singapore at the end of 2011 
The Vietnamese market  The Singaporean market 
HNX 396  SGX Mainboard 637 
HOSE 310  SGX Catalist 136 
UPCoM 131    
Total 837   773 
Source: The Vietnamese data are tabulated from data directly provided by 
StoxPlus Corporation. The Singaporean data are tabulated from data available on 
the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company as at the end of 2011. 
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the sample selection procedure for the 
Vietnamese market. Applying the abovementioned criteria, 131 firms listed on the 
UPCoM and 114 financial firms and banks listed on the HNX and HOSE are 
excluded from the sample. The selection process yielded a research population 
size of 592 companies. Of these 592 remaining companies, 122 companies have 
relatively full information on key corporate governance variables during a four-
year period from 2008 to 2011. Hence, a panel dataset comprising 488 firm-year 
observations is used as the initial dataset for the Vietnamese market. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of the sample selection procedure for Vietnam 
All firms listed on the three stock exchanges as at the end of 2011   837 
Subtract firms listed on the UPCoM 131   
=   706 
Subtract banks and financial firms 114   
=   592 
Subtract firms which data are unavailable on the Thomson One 74   
=   518 
Subtract delisted firms 3   
=   515 
Subtract firms listed after 2008 243   
=   272 
Subtract firms with some years' financial data missing 58   
=   214 
Subtract firms which annual reports are not fully available 92   
Total sampled firms with full data   122 
Source: This table is based on data directly provided by StoxPlus Corporation and/or downloaded 
from Thomson One Banker Database, and/or extracted from companies’ annual reports which are 
downloaded from FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in 
December 2011). 
Table 4.3 shows the industrial composition of sampled companies in Vietnam 
covering a four-year period from 2008 to 2011. The number of firm-year 
observations operating in Consumer Goods and Industrials is respectively 30 and 
53, which accounts for approximately 68% of the entire final sample’s 
observations.  
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Table 4.3: The industrial structure of sampled firms in Vietnam 
Industry categories 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Basic Materials  19 19 19 19 76 
Consumer Goods  30 30 30 30 120 
Consumer Services  6 6 6 6 24 
Health Care  4 4 4 4 16 
Industrials  53 53 53 53 212 
Oil & Gas  1 1 1 1 4 
Technology  3 3 3 3 12 
Utilities  6 6 6 6 24 
Total of firm-year observations 122 122 122 122 488 
Source: This table is based on data directly provided by StoxPlus Corporation and/or 
downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database (accessed in December 2011). 
Table 4.4 summarises the sample selection procedure for the Singaporean market. 
Using the abovementioned criteria, 136 firms listed on the SGX Catalist, 214 
overseas companies and 69 financial firms and banks listed on the SGX 
Mainboard are excluded from the sample. This provides a research population 
size of 354 companies among which 257 companies have relatively full 
information on key corporate governance variables during a four-year period from 
2008 to 2011. Therefore, a panel dataset comprising (257 × 4) = 1028 firm-year 
observations is used as the initial dataset for the Singaporean market.   
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Table 4.4: Summary of the sample selection procedure for Singapore 
All firms listed on the two stock exchanges as at the end of 2011   773 
Subtract firms listed on the SGX Catalist 136   
=   637 
Subtract overseas companies 214   
=   423 
Subtract banks and financial firms 69   
=   354 
Subtract firms listed after 2008 25   
=   329 
Subtract firms which data are unavailable on the Thomson One 38   
=   291 
Subtract inactive firms 17   
 =   274 
Subtract firms which annual reports are not fully available 17   
Total sampled firms with full data   257 
Source: This table is based on data downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database and the 
website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company, including companies’ annual reports (accessed in 
December 2011). 
Table 4.5 presents the industrial composition of sampled companies in the 
Singaporean market covering a four-year period from 2008 to 2011. The number 
of firm-year observations operating in Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, 
Industrials, and Technology is respectively 144, 128, 544 and 104, all of which 
accounts for approximately 89% of the entire final sample’s observations.  
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Table 4.5: The industrial structure of sampled firms in Singapore 
Industry categories 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Basic Materials 14 14 14 14 56 
Consumer Goods  36 36 36 36 144 
Consumer Services  32 32 32 32 128 
Health Care  4 4 4 4 16 
Industrials  136 136 136 136 544 
Oil & Gas 2 2 2 2 8 
Technology  26 26 26 26 104 
Telecommunications 5 5 5 5 20 
Utilities 2 2 2 2 8 
Total of firm-year observations 257 257 257 257 1028 
Source: This table is based on data downloaded from Thomson One Banker 
Database and the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company (accessed in 
December 2011). 
4.3 RESEARCH METHOD 
4.3.1 Endogeneity and the dynamic of corporate governance–
financial performance relationship 
One of the biggest challenges in corporate governance empirical studies is how to 
deal with the endogeneity of corporate governance variables. The endogeneity 
problem arises when the explanatory variables are correlated to the error term in a 
regression leading to biased and/or inconsistent estimations (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Therefore, ignoring the endogeneity inherent in the corporate governance–
financial performance relationship may result in unreliable causality inferences. 
According to Roberts and Whited (2013, p. 494), endogeneity leads to “biased 
and inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually 
impossible”. 
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It is well documented in the corporate governance literature that the endogeneity 
may arise from at least two potential sources37: (i) unobserved heterogeneity; and 
(ii) simultaneity (Wintoki et al., 2012). Unobserved heterogeneity across 
companies (also usually referred to as ‘omitted variable bias’) occurs when the 
identified relationship is affected by one or more unobserved factors that drive 
both governance and performance (Roberts & Whited, 2013; Wintoki et al., 
2012). In the context of the corporate governance–financial performance 
relationship, these unobserved factors may be firm-specific characteristics such as 
managerial ability, managerial risk aversion, company culture, or employee 
capability, all of which are unobservable and constant over time. Because one is 
not sure whether the explanatory variables included in an empirical model can 
capture all relevant (observable and unobservable) firm characteristics, a fixed-
effects estimator must be employed to eliminate omitted variable bias (Roberts & 
Whited, 2013). 
Simultaneity may arise when at least one independent variable is determined 
concurrently with the dependent variable in a model (Wooldridge, 2009). For 
instance, greater gender diversity in the boardroom may result in better 
monitoring which ultimately improves firm financial performance (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). Nevertheless, high-performing companies may have more female 
directors on their boards because females have a tendency to work for better 
performing companies (Farrell & Hersch, 2005). This means that boardroom 
gender diversity and firm performance may be jointly determined, that is, each 
variable affects the other simultaneously.  
                                                 
37 Another possible source of endogeneity in the domain of empirical corporate finance 
is measurement error. It is defined as the difference between unobservable or difficult to 
quantify variables and their proxies employed in a model (Roberts & Whited, 2013).  
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In addition, there is another source of endogeneity inherent in the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance, namely dynamic 
endogeneity. Recent empirical studies (e.g., Pham et al., 2011; Schultz et al., 
2010; and Wintoki et al., 2012) suggest that the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance is dynamic in nature. That is, current 
corporate governance characteristics and firm performance are affected by firms’ 
past performance (Wintoki et al., 2012). This empirical finding is consistent with 
the theoretical arguments of Harris and Raviv (2008); Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998); and Raheja (2005) about the dynamic nature of the corporate governance–
firm performance relationship. Schultz et al. (2010); and Wintoki et al. (2012), 
among others, argue that if the dynamic relationship between current corporate 
governance and past firm performance does exist, then the causal relationships 
uncovered by previous studies using the OLS or FE estimators appear to be 
spurious. This implies that if the dynamic endogeneity problem inherent in the 
corporate governance–firm performance relationship is not fully controlled, it is 
impossible to make causal interpretations from the econometric estimations.  
Empirical findings of Wintoki et al. (2012), among others, provide an important 
and useful guidance for determining model specifications and selecting 
appropriate estimation approaches for the current research. Schultz et al. (2010); 
and Wintoki et al. (2012), among others, suggest that the appropriate empirical 
model for the corporate governance–firm performance relationship should be a 
dynamic model, in which lagged performance is used as one of the explanatory 
variables, rather than a static model applied by prior studies. In the context of 
corporate governance literature, the dynamic modelling approach has recently 
been applied in studies on the board structure–performance relationship (e.g., 
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Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2015; Wintoki et al., 2012), determinants of board 
structure (e.g., Chen, 2014), or corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship (e.g., Munisi & Randøy, 2013; Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2014). 
Therefore, taking the dynamic endogeneity into consideration, this study adopts a 
dynamic modelling approach to investigate the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship in Singapore and Vietnam38. By doing so, this study 
responds to the recent calls from Flannery and Hankins (2013); Wintoki et al. 
(2012); and Zhou et al. (2014) for using dynamic panel models in corporate 
finance and corporate governance research. 
4.3.2 Variables 
4.3.2.1 Dependent variables 
This study employs Tobin’s Q, originally defined as the ratio of the market value 
of a company and the replacement cost of its assets (Chung & Pruitt, 1994), to 
measure firm financial performance. Companies that achieve Tobin’s Q larger 
than one are considered to be utilising scarce resources effectively. In contrast, 
those with Tobin’s Q less than one are judged to be poorly exploiting their 
resources (Lewellen & Badrinath, 1997).  
Although Tobin’s Q is widely accepted as a measure of firm performance 
(Lewellen & Badrinath, 1997), estimating the replacement cost of companies’ 
assets is not an easy task given data unavailability. Indeed, several estimations of 
Tobin’s Q suggested in corporate finance literature (see e.g., Lindenberg & Ross, 
                                                 
38 The econometric estimation technique used to implement this dynamic approach can 
also control for the two other sources of endogeneity, including unobserved 
heterogeneity and simultaneity. See Subsection 4.3.4 for more details. 
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1981) are too complicated and time-consuming (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). For this 
reason, Chung and Pruitt (1994) developed an alternative formula for 
approximating Tobin’s Q that allows utilising the readily-available data from 
financial reports to obtain relatively accurate values of Tobin’s Q with minimal 
computational effort. As documented by Chung and Pruitt (1994), this simplified 
version of Tobin’s Q is highly correlated with other mathematically more 
complex and theoretically more representative measures of Tobin’s Q. Following 
Chung and Pruitt (1994), this study computes an approximation of Tobin’s Q as 
the market value of equity plus the book value of debt, all divided by the book 
value of total assets. Besides, natural logarithmic transformation is applied on 
Tobin’s Q (denoted as lnq) to improve the normality of this variable. 
Using Tobin’s Q as a market-based proxy for financial performance has some 
advantages over using accounting-based counterparts in at least four critical 
aspects. First, Tobin’s Q, by construction, is less sensitive to accounting practices 
than other accounting-based measures thus mitigating the potential effects of 
accounting practices and standards on calculating corporate performance 
(Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). This characteristic of Tobin’s Q is therefore 
particularly valuable when examining the corporate governance–performance 
relationship in a comparative context between two markets with different 
accounting conventions.  
Second, unlike accounting-based performance measures, Tobin’s Q is able to 
capture the market value of firm-specific intangible assets, such as high quality 
managers and growth opportunities, which are supposed to be a reflection of ‘the 
results of performance’ (Perfect & Wiles, 1994). 
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Third, while accounting-based performance measures are backwards-looking, 
Tobin’s Q reflects the market predictions about what firms will achieve (Demsetz 
& Villalonga, 2001). In other words, Tobin’s Q is capable of capturing the long-
run effects of corporate actions (Yabei & Izumida, 2008). Finally, given that it is 
the convention in corporate governance literature to use Tobin’s Q ratio to 
measure firm financial performance (Coles, Lemmon, & Felix Meschke, 2012), 
use of Tobin’s Q facilitates comparing the findings of the current study and those 
of relevant prior research.  
Moreover, using Tobin’s Q facilitates checking a market’s reaction to the change 
of firms’ board and ownership structures. For instance, as mentioned by Shan and 
McIver (2011), if investors favour the independence of boards as a way to reduce 
agency cost and improve performance, then any change in a firm’s board structure 
leading to a more independent board will be reflected in the positive change of 
Tobin’s Q. 
4.3.2.2 Firm-level explanatory variables 
This study employs six firm-level explanatory variables to control for corporate 
governance characteristics39 which are well-documented in the literature. They 
consist of: (i) board gender diversity; (ii) board composition; (iii) board leadership 
structure; (iv) board size; (v) ownership concentration; and (vi) capital structure. 
The theoretical framework for including these variables has been mentioned in 
Chapter 2. The following subsections discuss in turn how they are calculated.  
                                                 
39 In this study, the terms ‘corporate governance structures’, ‘corporate governance 
characteristics’, and ‘corporate governance mechanisms’ are all interchangeable with 
each other. 
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 Board gender diversity 
This research uses gender diversity as a proxy for board diversity. According to 
Walt and Ingley (2003), board diversity comprises the various characteristics of 
boards that are associated with decision-making and other administrative 
processes within the board. These characteristics are categorised as: (i) observable 
characteristics such as ethnicity, nationality, gender and age; and (ii) unobservable 
characteristics such as knowledge, educational and professional background, 
industry experience, among others (Erhardt et al., 2003). 
According to Erhardt et al. (2003), the recent empirical studies on the relationship 
between board diversity and financial performance have concentrated on 
observable demographic characteristics, including gender and ethnicity. 
Therefore, there is a lack of consensus among researchers regarding what board 
diversity actually is. In line with prior studies (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Ahern & Dittmar, 2012), this research uses gender diversity as a proxy for board 
diversity. This is also consistent with the suggestion of Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 
(2011) that research about the relationship between board governance and firm 
performance should consider explicitly female director representation. 
As mentioned in Subsection 2.3.1.1 of Chapter 2, both agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and resource dependence theory (Goodstein et al., 1994; Pfeffer, 
1973) imply that board gender diversity is value-relevant (Carter et al., 2010). 
However, prior empirical studies on this relationship provide inconclusive results 
due to differences in the way corporate governance empiricists deal with the 
endogenous nature of the board diversity variable. Following Adams and Ferreira 
(2009); and Dezsö and Ross (2012), this research treats the board gender diversity 
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variable, defined by the percentage of female directors on BOD (female)40, as an 
endogenous variable. 
 Board composition and board leadership structure 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, board composition and board leadership structure are 
key characteristics of board independence. It is common in corporate governance 
literature to separately use the percentage of independent directors or the 
percentage of non-executive directors as alternative proxies for board 
composition. In line with prior research, this study uses the percentage of non-
executive directors (denoted as nonexe) as a main proxy for board composition of 
companies in both the Singaporean and Vietnamese markets.  
Given that the Singaporean Code (2005) distinguishes between non-executive 
directors and independent directors41, it would be expected that the presence of 
independent directors on corporate boards will have a different impact on board 
effectiveness and firm performance. For this reason, and to check the robustness 
of the findings, this study also uses the percentage of independent directors 
(denoted as indep) as an alternative proxy for board composition of Singaporean 
companies.  
However, data on independent directors are not available for the Vietnamese 
market for the sampling period because the Vietnamese Code 2007 (MOF, 2007) 
does not distinguish between non-executive directors and independent directors. 
                                                 
40 Additionally, three other proxies for board gender diversity are included in the model 
designed for the Vietnamese market. See Subsection 4.3.3.2 for more details. 
41 The Guideline 2.1 of the Singaporean Code (2005, p. 2) defines that “an independent 
director is one who has no relationship with the company, its related companies or its 
officers that could interfere, or be reasonably perceived to interfere, with the exercise of 
the director’s independent business judgment with a view to the best interests of the 
company”. 
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For comparative purposes, the current study does not differentiate between 
independent and non-executive directors in comparative analyses implemented in 
Chapter 7. Accordingly, board composition – in Chapter 7 – is measured as the 
percentage of independent and/or non-executive directors (denoted as 
indep_nonexe).  
Board leadership structure is defined by whether the roles of CEO and board 
chairperson are separated (non-dual leadership structure) or combined (dual 
leadership structure). To measure board leadership structure, this study uses a 
dummy variable (denoted as dual) that takes a value of one if the chairperson of 
BOD is also the CEO, and zero otherwise. Following Schultz et al. (2010); 
Wintoki et al. (2012), this study considers board composition and board 
leadership structure variables endogenous. 
 Board size  
Board size is measured by the total number of directors on the board. The natural 
logarithmic form of board size (denoted as lnbsize) is used in the models. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, from the perspective of agency theory, good governance 
prescriptions assume smaller boards are more effective (Yermack, 1996) and thus 
may contribute positively to firm performance (Jensen, 1993). However, resource 
dependence theorists suggest that larger board size is positively related to 
performance (Dalton et al., 1999). Prior empirical evidence is mixed, and hence, 
no consensus has been reached. As suggested by Schultz et al. (2010); Wintoki et 
al. (2012), among others, board size is treated as an endogenous variable in this 
study.  
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 Ownership structure  
Following Holderness (2009); Munisi, Hermes, and Randøy (2014); and 
Thomsen, Pedersen, and Kvist (2006), among others, this research defines 
ownership concentration as the percentage of common stocks held by 
shareholders who own at least 5% of the total number of a firm’s common stocks 
(denoted as block). As argued in Subsection 2.3.2 of Chapter 2, ownership 
concentration is treated as an endogenous variable.  
Given data availability, this study follows Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour, and 
Gunasekarage (2008) in using another proxy for ownership concentration of 
Singaporean listed companies to check the robustness of the results. Specifically, 
this proxy is measured by the ratio of ordinary shares held by twenty largest 
shareholders to the total number of ordinary shares of a company, named as 
‘ownership concentration top 20’ (denoted as blockktop20). 
 Capital structure  
This study also takes account of the potential performance effect of financial 
leverage (denoted as lev), measured by total debt over total assets. According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), the nature of the agency problem and thus the 
performance impact of ownership structure may be affected by capital structure. 
In more details, leverage is supposed to have an effect on firm value because it 
can help to discourage managers’ over-investment of free cash flow (Hoechle et 
al., 2012). In support, Black et al. (2014) also argue that leverage is mechanically 
associated with Tobin’s Q by its effects on reducing income tax and free cash 
flow problems. In line with Antoniou et al. (2008), capital structure is considered 
to be an endogenous variable in the current research. 
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4.3.2.3 National governance quality variables 
In order to capture the potential performance effects of country-level governance 
characteristics, three country-level explanatory variables regarding national 
governance quality are included in the empirical models designed for the 
combined dataset of the Singaporean and Vietnamese markets. The quality of 
national governance is measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGIs) developed by Kaufmann et al. (2011) and the Investor Protection Index 
developed by Doing Business Project (World Bank, 2012, 2013).  
The WGIs are considered the primary and most widely-used indicators in multi-
country comparative studies (Ngobo & Fouda, 2012). Reporting six broad 
dimensions of national governance quality for over 200 countries and territories 
since 1996, the WGIs facilitate meaningful cross-country and over-time 
comparisons (Kaufmann et al., 2011). These six dimensions of national 
governance quality include: Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/Terrorism; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; 
Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2011).  
Following a similar approach undertaken by Knudsen (2011) and Van Essen et al. 
(2013), the current research focuses narrowly on the measures of country-level 
governance quality which are most relevant to firm operations. Accordingly, of 
the six dimensions, three indicators of national governance namely Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Rule of Law are singled out. According to 
Kaufmann et al. (2011, p. 4), these indicators are defined as follows. 
Government Effectiveness index captures the quality of public services, the 
quality the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
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pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
Regulatory Quality index captures the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development. 
Rule of Law index captures the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
These indicators are all acknowledged to have potential effects on firm 
performance since they are essential to firms’ successful business operations 
(Krivogorsky & Grudnitski, 2010; Ngobo & Fouda, 2012). The indicators are 
displayed in standard normal units ranging approximately from –2.5 to +2.5, of 
which a larger value indicates better national governance quality (Kaufmann et al., 
2011).  
Consistent with Globerman and Shapiro (2002), the current study finds that these 
indicators are highly correlated with each other as evidenced by their significantly 
high correlation coefficients 42 . Thus, it is hard to use them all in a single 
regression as their collinearity is highly likely to make empirical estimations 
problematic. For this reason, in line with Knudsen (2011), these three individual 
indices are combined to form an aggregate national governance index (denoted as 
NGindex), i.e., NGindex = Government Effectiveness + Regulatory Quality + Rule 
                                                 
42 The results are not reported to save space, but available from the author upon request. 
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of Law. As an alternative solution, the current study follows Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002) and uses factor analysis technique to construct another robust and 
aggregate proxy for national governance quality [denoted as NGindex(a)] by 
extracting the first principal component of the three abovementioned indicators of 
national governance quality.  
Besides the WGIs, comparative corporate governance research typically employs 
several different proxies for national governance quality. Therefore, in order to 
check the robustness of the main findings, this study follows Van Essen et al. 
(2013) and utilises another proxy for national governance quality, namely Investor 
Protection Index (denoted as IPindex), developed by Doing Business Project 
(World Bank, 2012, 2013). IPindex captures the strength of legal protection 
against the misuse of firm assets by insiders and major shareholders for their self-
interests (World Bank, 2012, 2013). The metric scale is from zero to ten, and a 
larger score indicates better protection of investors. In line with Aslan and Kumar 
(2014), the current study assumes that national governance quality variables are 
exogenously determined. 
4.3.2.4 Other control variables 
In an attempt to alleviate the potential bias caused by omitted variables, this 
research controls for unobservable historical factors, other general firm-specific 
characteristics (including firm age and firm size), industry-specific effects, and 
time-specific effects. By doing so, there is confidence that this study has included 
most of the control variables identified in corporate governance literature that 
have potential effects on firm financial performance.   
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 Firm size 
Firm size (denoted as fsize) is measured by the natural logarithm transformation of 
the book value of total assets43. This variable is used to account for the potential 
effect of economies of scale on Tobin’s Q (Black et al., 2014; Yabei & Izumida, 
2008). For example, larger firms tend to be more transparent firms and thus are 
able to more easily access the debt market at lower cost and/or borrow more to 
maximise their benefit of a tax shield (Antoniou et al., 2008). As a result, the 
financial performance of firms appears to be influenced by the advantage or 
benefit gained by their scale.  
It is also crucial to note that the size of a firm should be considered endogenous 
(Roberts & Whited, 2013). Given that larger firms are harder to manage, and thus 
need more highly-qualified managers (Gabaix & Landier, 2008), managerial 
capability – which is an unobserved component in the error terms of the models – 
would be correlated with firm size. The endogeneity problem is therefore 
introduced if firm size is included as an independent variable in the models 
(Roberts & Whited, 2013). 
 Firm age 
Firm age (denoted as lnfage) is the natural logarithm of the number of years from 
the time a company first appears on the SGX Mainboard (for the Singaporean 
market) or on the HOSE or HNX (for the Vietnamese market). Firm age should be 
controlled in the current study’s models because younger firms tend to have 
higher market values as they grow faster and are more intangible-asset intensive 
                                                 
43 In Chapters 5 and 6, the book values of total assets are in local currency. For the 
comparative purposes in Chapter 7, the book values of total assets of companies in both 
markets are in US dollars corrected by price index. 
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(Black et al., 2014). In addition, international operations and innovative capacity 
of a firm may be affected by its age (Chen & Yu, 2012). As suggested by Wintoki 
et al. (2012), firm age is treated as an exogenous variable in this study.  
 Industry dummy variables 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) argue that industry should be taken into account 
when modelling the performance effects of ownership structure. The possible 
reasons are: (i) industry may have a direct impact on the frequency of corporate 
ownership; and (ii) the level of profitability, growth, and free cash flow of firms 
are likely to be influenced by variances in the competition and maturity of the 
industry in which firms operate (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).  
For this reason, the potential impacts of industry-specific characteristics are 
controlled in this study by employing [0, 1] industry dummy variables (where 
appropriate)44, in which industries are classified by the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB). Specifically, nine industry dummy variables are employed for 
each of nine industries45, including: Basic Materials; Consumer Goods; Consumer 
Services; Health Care; Industrials; Oil & Gas; Technology; Telecommunication; 
and Utilities. One industry dummy variable is treated as the benchmark category 
to avoid dummy variable trap. Following Wintoki et al. (2012), industry dummies 
are considered to be exogenously determined.  
                                                 
44 By construction, industry dummies cannot be included in the models estimated by the 
fixed-effects (within-groups estimator) and the System GMM techniques. 
45 Because there are no listed companies in Telecommunications industry for the 
Vietnamese market, the number of industry dummy variables for this market is eight. 
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 Year dummy variables 
Year dummy variables are included in all of the models to account for time-
specific effects. The year dummy variables capture macroeconomic circumstances 
or market fluctuations (e.g., inflation rate, demand shocks and other 
macroeconomic conditions) which are common to all companies and can change 
through time. More specifically, four year dummy variables are employed for four 
years (from 2008 to 2011) of which one year dummy variable is treated as the 
benchmark category to avoid dummy variable trap. Following Wintoki et al. 
(2012), year dummies are considered to be exogenously determined. 
 Lagged dependent variable 
Finally and importantly, this study employs the natural logarithm transformation 
of one-year lagged Tobin's Q (laglnq) as an explanatory variable to control for the 
dynamic nature of the corporate governance–financial performance relationship as 
suggested by Wintoki et al. (2012). Using the lagged dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable allows corporate finance empiricists to control for potential 
dynamic panel bias (Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Wintoki et al., 2012). In addition, 
it also allows non-trivially mitigating omitted variable biases by taking into 
account the impacts of inherently unobservable historical factors on the current 
dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2009). It is important to emphasize that even 
“when coefficients on lagged dependent variables are not of direct interest, 
allowing for dynamics in the underlying process may be crucial for recovering 
consistent estimates of other parameters” (Bond, 2002, p. 142). 
The detailed definitions and acronyms of the variables used in this study are 
summarised in Table 4.6. Based on the theoretical frameworks and prior empirical 
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findings discussed in Chapter 2, the predicted signs of the estimated coefficients 
on the explanatory variables in the current study’s empirical models are presented 
in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.6: Definition of variables  
Variables Acronyms 
Employed in samples 
Definitions 
Vietnam Singapore Aggregate 
Dependent variable        
Tobin's Q ratio lnq       
The natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
plus the book value of debt, all divided by the book 
value of total assets. 
Board structure variables      
Percentage of female directors (%) female       The percentage of female directors on boards. 
Blau index for gender blau     
Blau index for gender = 1- ∑ 𝑃𝑖
22
𝑖=1 , where i = (1, 
2) is the number of gender categories (two), Pi is 
the proportion of board members in each category. 
This variable is used for robustness checks. 
Dummy variable for gender 
diversity (1) 
d1women     
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if there 
is at least one female director, and zero otherwise. 
This variable is used for robustness checks. 
  
98 
 
 
Table 4.6: Definition of variables (cont.) 
Variables Acronyms 
Employed in samples 
Definitions 
Vietnam Singapore Aggregate 
Dummy variable for gender 
diversity (2) 
d2women     
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if there 
are at least two female directors, and zero 
otherwise. This variable is used for robustness 
checks. 
Percentage of non-executive 
directors (%) 
nonexe      
The ratio of non-executive directors to total 
number of directors. 
Percentage of independent 
directors (%) 
indep     
The ratio of independent directors to total number 
of directors. This variable is used for robustness 
checks. 
Percentage of non-executive 
and/or independent directors (%) 
indep_nonexe     
The percentage of non-executive and/or 
independent directors. 
Duality dual       
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if BOD 
chairperson is also CEO, and zero otherwise. 
Board size lnbsize       
The natural logarithm of the total number of 
directors on BOD. 
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Table 4.6: Definition of variables (cont.) 
Variables Acronyms 
Employed in samples 
Definitions 
Vietnam Singapore Aggregate 
Ownership structure variables        
Ownership concentration (%) block       
The percentage of common stocks held by 
shareholders who own at least 5% of total number 
of a firm’s common stocks. 
Ownership concentration top 20 
(%) 
blocktop20     
The ratio of ordinary shares held by twenty largest 
shareholders to the total number of ordinary shares 
of a company. This variable is used for robustness 
checks. 
Capital structure variable      
Leverage (%) lev       The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
National governance quality 
variables 
     
Aggregate national governance 
index 
NGindex     
NGindex = Government Effectiveness + Regulatory 
Quality + Rule of Law. All components of this 
index are developed by Kaufmann et al. (2011). 
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Table 4.6: Definition of variables (cont.) 
Variables Acronyms 
Employed in samples 
Definitions 
Vietnam Singapore Aggregate 
Alternative aggregate national 
governance index 
NGindex(a)     
NGindex(a) is constructed by extracting the first 
principal component of Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, and Rule of Law using factor 
analysis technique. This variable is used for 
robustness checks. 
Investor protection index IPindex     
IPindex is developed by Doing Business Project 
(World Bank, 2012, 2013). This variable is used 
for robustness checks. 
Other control variables        
Firm age lnfage       
The natural logarithm of the number of years from 
the time the company first appears on stock-
exchange markets. 
Firm size fsize       
The natural logarithm of the book value of total 
assets. 
Lagged dependent variable laglnq       
The natural logarithm of one-year lagged Tobin's Q 
ratio. 
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Table 4.6: Definition of variables (cont.) 
Variables Acronyms 
Employed in samples 
Definitions 
Vietnam Singapore Aggregate 
Industry dummy variables industry       
Nine dummy variables for nine industries defined 
by IBC categories, namely Basic Materials; 
Consumer Goods; Consumer Services; Health 
Care; Industrials; Oil & Gas; Technology; 
Telecommunication; and Utilities. 
Year dummy variables year       
Four year dummies for four years from 2008 to 
2011. 
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Table 4.7: Predicted signs of the estimated coefficients on explanatory variables  
Explanatory variables [Acronyms] Relevant hypotheses 
Predicted relationships 
Vietnam Singapore 
Board structure variables    
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] HVN1 – HSG1 + – 
Blau index for gender [blau] HVN1 + N/A 
Dummy variable for gender diversity (1) [d1women] HVN1 + N/A 
Dummy variable for gender diversity (2) [d2women] HVN1 + N/A 
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] HVN2 – HSG2   
Percentage of independent directors (%) [indep] HSG2 N/A  
Percentage of non-executive and/or independent directors (%) [indep_nonexe] HVN2 – HSG2   
Duality [dual] HVN3 – HSG3 – – 
Board size [lnbsize] HVN4 – HSG4  – 
Note: Symbols (+), (–) and () represent positive, negative, and no significant relationships, respectively. Notation (N/A) stands for ‘not applicable’. 
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Table 4.7: Predicted signs of the estimated coefficients on explanatory variables (cont.) 
Explanatory variables [Acronyms] Relevant hypotheses 
Predicted relationships 
Vietnam Singapore 
Ownership structure variables    
Ownership concentration (%) [block] HVN5 – HSG5 +/– +/– 
Ownership concentration top 20 (%) [blocktop20] HSG5 N/A +/– 
Capital structure variable    
Leverage (%) [lev] HVN6 – HSG6 + + 
National governance quality variables    
Aggregate national governance index [NGindex] HVN_SG7 +/– +/– 
Alternative aggregate national governance index [NGindex(a)] HVN_SG7 +/– +/– 
Investor protection index [IPindex] HVN_SG7 +/– +/– 
Interaction term(s) between film-level and country-level governance variables HVN_SG8 +/– +/– 
Note: Symbols (+), (–) and () represent positive, negative, and no significant relationships, respectively. Notation (N/A) stands for ‘not applicable’. 
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4.3.3 Model specifications 
4.3.3.1 The general model 
As mentioned in Subsection 4.3.1, the theoretical arguments postulated by Harris 
and Raviv (2008); Hermalin and Weisbach (1998); and Raheja (2005) imply that 
the relationship between corporate governance structures and firm performance is 
dynamic in nature; that is, current corporate governance characteristics and 
performance are affected by firms’ past performance. Several recent empirical 
studies conducted by Schultz et al. (2010); Wintoki et al. (2012) have confirmed 
that this is indeed the case, and suggest that the appropriate empirical model for 
the corporate governance–financial performance relationship should be a dynamic 
one, in which lagged performance is used as one of the explanatory variables. 
In view of that, the model specification for estimating the corporate governance–
financial performance relationship in a dynamic framework can be described as an 
autoregressive panel model. A general specification for first-order autoregressive 
[AR(1)] panel models can be expressed as the following equation (4.1): 
0 1 , 1 ,
1
it i t k k it i t it
k
Y Y X     

     
   (4.1) 
where, Yit is Tobin’s Q which is a proxy for financial performance of firm i in year 
t; 0  is the constant; 1  and k  are unknown estimated coefficients; X is a vector 
of the explanatory variables used in the model, including board structure, 
ownership structure, capital structure, national governance quality, and other firm-
level control variables. The definitions of these variables are as mentioned in 
Subsection 4.3.2 and also summarised in Table 4.6; i represents unobserved firm 
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fixed-effects; t represents time-specific effects that are time-variant and common 
to all companies, such as the effects of GDP growth, inflation rates, market 
fluctuations or other macroeconomic conditions; it is the classical error term 
which is assumed to be independent and identically distributed. 
In equation (4.1), the subscripts (i) and (t) respectively stand for individual firms 
(cross-sectional dimension) and time dimension, both of which are the 
characteristics of a panel data approach. Having both cross-sectional and time 
dimensions, this approach helps, on the one hand, to increase the number of 
observations and the degrees of freedom, and on the other hand, decrease the 
collinearity among explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2002). As a result, this 
approach helps to improve the reliability of estimations and inferences of this 
research compared to prior studies which have mostly employed cross-sectional 
data46.  
It is noteworthy that how many lags of dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) should be 
used on the right-hand side of equation (4.1) is an empirical question. Prior 
corporate governance studies employed AR(1) structure (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; and Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Munisi & Randøy, 2013; Nguyen et al., 2014, 
2015) or AR(2) structure (e.g., Pham et al., 2011; and Wintoki et al., 2012) to 
control for the potential effects of the autoregressive process on the stochastic 
term. Recognising that financial performance is typically path-dependent, i.e., the 
performance that a firm has at any point in time depends in part on the 
                                                 
46 Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven (2011) have reported in a recent comprehensive 
review article that the earlier studies in corporate governance literature usually adopted 
the OLS method to cross-sectional data to estimate the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. This approach, based on a very strict assumption that 
corporate governance variables are exogenously determined, ignores the fact that all 
corporate governance structure variables are, in nature, endogenous (Brown et al., 2011; 
Wintoki et al., 2012). 
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performance that it had at an earlier time (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999), it is plausible to 
expect that performance beyond the first lag may have a material effect on current 
performance. This implies that the general first-order autoregressive AR(1) 
structure used in this study’s model may not completely capture the dynamic 
nature of the corporate governance–firm performance relationship.  
Following Wintoki et al. (2012), this research confirms the model specification 
displayed in equation (4.1) by estimating an OLS regression of Yit on Yit-1 ; Yit-2 
and Xit. Using separate datasets for the Vietnamese market, the Singaporean 
market, and the combined dataset of the two countries47 , this study finds no 
statistical evidence on the effect of Yit-2 on Yit. This suggests that one-year lagged 
Tobin’s Q appears to be adequate to capture all influence of the past on the current 
realisations of performance. This is in line with Zhou et al. (2014) who argue that 
given the limitation of the time dimension in corporate finance panel datasets, an 
AR(1) panel model seems to be unavoidable in almost empirical corporate finance 
studies. Subject to data availability and the analysis purposes, the general model 
(4.1) is modified appropriately for each market. Subsections 4.3.3.2; 4.3.3.3; 
and 4.3.3.4 introduce the model specifications for the Vietnamese market, the 
Singaporean market, and the combined dataset of both markets, respectively. 
4.3.3.2 The model specification for the Vietnamese market 
Using the measures of corporate governance mechanisms and other firm-level 
characteristics mentioned in Subsection 4.3.2, the general equation (4.1) can be 
displayed in more details for the Vietnamese market as equation (4.2).  
                                                 
47 The results are not reported because of space limitations, but available from the author 
upon request. 
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   (4.2)  
As will be mentioned in Chapter 5, it is observed that board gender diversity 
(measured by female) has a significantly positive effect on financial performance 
of Vietnamese listed companies. Since the matter is important (as mentioned in 
Subsection 1.2 of Chapter 1), the author has signalled this by including three 
further alternative proxies for board gender diversity in equation (4.2). 
Subsequently, the variable female in this model is replaced in turn by the variables 
blau ; d1women ; d2women to empirically check the robustness of the relationship 
between board gender diversity and firm performance. 
More specifically, this study follows Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) and 
employs two alternative proxies for gender diversity: (i) a gender diversity 
dummy variable (d1women); and (ii) the Blau index for gender (blau). The 
variable d1women, which distinguishes companies with at least one female 
director on their boards from those without, allows answering the question of 
whether the presence of women in boardrooms in itself has an impact on firm 
performance.  
Meanwhile, the variable female enables examination of the effect that board 
gender balance has on firm performance. The Blau index for gender combines 
both of the above aspects of diversity, that is, the gender variety (measured by 
d1women) and the gender balance (measured by female) (Campbell & Mínguez-
Vera, 2008). Following Blau (1977), as cited in Harrison and Klein (2007), this 
study calculates the Blau index for gender as (1- ∑ 𝑃𝑖
22
𝑖=1 ), where i = (1, 2) is the 
number of gender categories (two); Pi is the proportion of board members in each 
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category. The minimum and maximum values of the Blau index for gender are 
zero (perfectly homogeneous boards) and 0.5 (perfectly heterogeneous boards), 
respectively. Moreover, in order to capture the potential effect of the number of 
female directors, this study follows Liu et al. (2014) in employing a dummy 
variable (denoted as d2women) that takes a value of one if there are at least two 
female directors and zero otherwise.  
4.3.3.3 The model specification for the Singaporean market 
Equation (4.2) is also used for the Singaporean market. However, as mentioned in 
Subsection 4.3.2.2, given that the Singaporean Code (2005) differentiates between 
non-executive directors and independent directors, it would be expected that 
independent director representation on BOD will also have an effect on board 
effectiveness and firm performance. For this reason and in order to check the 
robustness of the finding regarding the relationship between board composition 
and firm performance in the Singaporean market, this study employs the 
percentage of independent directors as an alternative proxy for board composition.  
In view of that, equation (4.2) is re-estimated by replacing the percentage of non-
executive directors (nonexe) with the percentage of independent directors (indep). 
In a similar vein, to check the robustness of the result concerning the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance in the Singaporean 
market, the variable ownership concentration (block) is replaced by another proxy 
for concentrated ownership structure, namely ownership concentration top 20 
(blocktop20).  
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4.3.3.4 The model specification for the combined dataset of both markets 
The base-line model specification for the combined dataset of both markets is 
established as follows: 
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  (4.3) 
As mentioned in Subsection 4.3.2.2, the current study, for comparison purposes, 
does not differentiate between independent and non-executive directors in 
comparative analyses using the combined dataset of both markets. Therefore, the 
proxy for board composition in equation (4.3) is the percentage of independent 
and/or non-executive directors (denoted as indep_nonexe). 
Following Antoniou et al. (2008); and Krivogorsky and Grudnitski (2010), the 
empirical models for the combined dataset of the two countries are developed 
from the base-line equation (4.3) via a two-step procedure. First, the effects of 
firm-level governance structures on financial performance will be investigated by 
estimating equation (4.3). This step allows the current study to determine which 
corporate governance mechanisms are significantly correlated with financial 
performance of listed companies in the two markets. Subsequently, taking 
country-specific institutional characteristics into consideration, the second step 
examines the direct effect of national governance quality on financial performance 
of listed companies in the two countries. The current research also explores the 
potential interaction between national governance quality and those corporate 
governance mechanisms which are significantly related to financial performance 
as evidenced by the findings obtained from the first step. By doing so, the author 
can step-by-step empirically test the two research hypotheses with regards to the 
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performance effect of national governance quality HVN_SG7, as well as its 
moderating influence on the corporate governance–firm performance relationship 
HVN_SG8. 
To test hypothesis HVN_SG8, equation (4.3) is re-estimated with a country dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if a company operates in Singapore and zero 
otherwise. Given that only the concentrated ownership variable (block) has a 
significant effect on firm performance 48 , one interaction term between the 
concentrated ownership variable and country dummy variable is added to equation 
(4.3) to initially check whether the ownership concentration–firm performance 
relationship is influenced by country-level specific characteristics. It would 
suggest that country-specific characteristics matter if the estimated coefficients on 
this country dummy variable and the interaction term are statistically significant 
(Antoniou et al., 2008; Mallin et al., 2015).  
It is found that the coefficients on the country dummy variable and the interaction 
term are statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively, thus 
suggesting that the role of ownership concentration in determining firm 
performance is expected to vary across countries49. It is, therefore, necessary to 
investigate this further by focusing in details on the country-level governance 
characteristics which may have an effect on the relationship between ownership 
concentration and financial performance. For this purpose, equation (4.3) is 
modified by including an aggregate national governance quality variable 
(measured by NGindex) and an interaction term between NGindex and the existing 
                                                 
48 See Subsection 7.2.3 of Chapter 7 for more details. 
49 The result is not reported to save space, but available from the author upon request. 
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concentrated ownership variable (measured by block). Therefore, equation (4.3) is 
rewritten as follows50: 
 
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If the coefficient on the NGindex variable (𝛿) is statistically significant, it will 
suggest that national governance quality matters. A positive value for the 
coefficient on the interaction term (𝜑) would imply that the higher the NGindex is, 
the stronger the effect of block on firm performance will be. On the contrary, a 
negative value for (𝜑) would be inferred that the higher the NGindex is, the 
weaker the effect of block on firm performance will be. In estimating equation 
(4.4), the current study follows Aslan and Kumar (2014) and assumes that 
national governance quality variables are exogenous to the choices made by firms. 
4.3.4 Estimation approaches 
This subsection introduces the estimation approaches used in the current research 
and explains why the estimation techniques including the OLS; FE; and 
traditional instrumental variable (IV) methods are undesirable for this study. Also, 
this subsection clarifies why the BB two-step system GMM (System GMM) is the 
most feasible approach to examine the corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship in a dynamic framework. 
                                                 
50 The subscript (j) on NGIndexjt indicates country jth (j =1, 2) 
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the most problematic issues in corporate 
governance literature relates to the credibility of causal inferences regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance structures and firm performance 
(Brown et al., 2011). Previous corporate governance research has highlighted that 
it is not only the ownership structure variable, but also board structure variables 
that are considered to be endogenously determined by, and dynamically correlated 
with, past firm performance (e.g., Wintoki et al., 2012; Yabei & Izumida, 2008). 
Therefore, a regression of the performance variable on the ownership structure 
and board structure variables in which other firm-specific characteristics are 
controlled should be examined in a dynamic modelling framework, as displayed 
in the general equation (4.1).  
However, the presence of the AR(1) structure and endogenous explanatory 
variables in equation (4.1) introduces serious estimation biases (Flannery & 
Hankins, 2013). It is well-documented in econometric literature that estimating 
equation (4.1) via the OLS method yields biased and inconsistent coefficients 
because the OLS ignores the time-invariant unobserved individual effects (𝜇𝑖) and 
the endogeneity of Yit-1 (Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Wintoki et al., 2012). To 
address endogeneity concerns, including unobserved heterogeneity and/or 
simultaneity, the FE and/or IV methods are usually employed in corporate 
governance literature (Brown et al., 2011).  
The FE approach wipes out 𝜇𝑖, but it also produces inconsistent parameters if T is 
fixed, regardless of the size of N because it still does not deal with the 
endogeneity of Yit-1 (Nickell, 1981). Specifically, the estimated coefficient on 
lagged dependent variable (Yit-1) produced by the FE estimator is inconsistent and 
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biased because of the correlation between Yit-1 and the time-invariant component 
of the error term (Nickell, 1981). It should be emphasised that even if the 
coefficient on Yit-1 is not the major concern of the scholars, its bias makes the 
other estimated parameters in the regression model highly questionable (Flannery 
& Hankins, 2013).  
Similarly, although IVs approach is commonly used to mitigate the simultaneity 
concern, it is not designed to deal with dynamic endogeneity which very likely 
arises in the board structure–firm performance relationship (Wintoki et al., 2012), 
and in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship (Yabei & Izumida, 
2008). Schultz et al. (2010); and Wintoki et al. (2012) emphasise that ignoring the 
dynamic nature of the corporate governance–firm performance relationship may 
lead to inconsistent estimations. As a consequence, all of the OLS, FE, and IV 
approaches appear to be undesirable, at least in the current study. 
Two other econometric techniques, which can correct the inconsistency caused by 
the presence of the AR(1) structure and endogenous explanatory variables in 
equation (4.1) if T is fixed, are: (i) the AB difference GMM estimator proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991); and (ii) the BB system GMM estimator recommended 
by Blundell and Bond (1998). As documented by Blundell and Bond (1998), the 
AB difference GMM estimator may seriously suffer from finite-sample bias and 
perform poorly on highly persistent data due to weak instruments51. Whereas, the 
System GMM is testified to be more efficient and less small-sample biased when 
compared with its AB difference GMM counterpart (Blundell & Bond, 1998). In 
                                                 
51 Some recent studies on corporate governance–firm performance relationship have 
employed the AB difference GMM approach. However, given that corporate governance 
structures change slowly over time, applying the AB difference GMM estimator to such 
highly persistent series is particularly likely problematic (Bond, 2002).  
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addition, the System GMM estimator, by construction, mitigates the influence of 
the high persistence of corporate governance variables, which in turn helps to 
improve the power of estimations (Antoniou et al., 2008; Hoechle et al., 2012).  
This study employs a dataset that has the following characteristics: (i) a panel 
with moderate length (T = 4); (ii) low-within-firm variation in almost all corporate 
governance variables; (iii) board structure and ownership structure are all 
considered to be endogenous; (iv) corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship is, by nature, dynamic; and (v) financial performance (dependent 
variable) may be driven by individual fixed effects which are unobservable. As 
evidenced by the simulation analyses recently undertaken by Flannery and 
Hankins (2013); and Zhou et al. (2014), the BB system GMM emerges as the 
best-performing estimator across all the above-mentioned dataset conditions.  
Therefore, this study uses the System GMM as the primary estimation technique 
to alleviate the concerns about dynamic panel bias, simultaneously, and time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2012). Moreover, this 
estimation technique can control for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the 
error term (Antoniou et al., 2008). This econometric technique has recently been 
employed in several corporate governance studies (see e.g., Munisi & Randøy, 
2013; Nguyen et al., 2014, 2015; Wintoki et al., 2012).  
Basically, the System GMM technique involves a system of equations in 
differences and in levels, and allows treating all the explanatory variables in 
equation (4.1) as endogenous variables (Roodman, 2009a) 52 . This estimation 
technique allows empiricists to use internal instrumental variables available 
                                                 
52 Following Wintoki et al. (2012), firm age (lnfage) and year dummies are considered to 
be exogenously determined. 
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within the panel itself (Blundell & Bond, 1998). More specifically, while lagged 
levels of explanatory variables can be employed as instruments in the first 
differenced equation, the lagged first differences of explanatory variables can be 
used as instrumental variables for the levels equation (Blundell & Bond, 1998; 
Roodman, 2009a). 
This study also employs a finite-sample corrected estimate of variance, suggested 
by Windmeijer (2005), to take into account the concern raised by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) regarding the downward-biased tendency of standard errors 
estimated by the System GMM approach for small samples. Windmeijer (2005, p. 
25) documents that “estimated asymptotic standard errors of the efficient two-step 
GMM estimator can be severely downward biased in small samples”. As 
documented by Windmeijer (2005), implementing the finite-sample correction for 
the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators will help to achieve 
more accurate inference. 
Additionally, in order to check the robustness of the findings across different 
econometric estimation techniques and to facilitate comparing the findings of the 
current study with those of prior relevant studies, the empirical models in this 
study are also estimated by alternative estimators, including the pooled OLS, and 
FE estimators. This estimation practice is in line with the suggestion of Bond 
(2002) that the consistent System GMM estimator should be compared with 
simpler estimators such as the pooled OLS or FE estimators to detect potential 
biases in empirical studies. 
When implementing the pooled OLS, and FE estimators, this study does take into 
account three key assumptions about: (i) the conditional variances of the 
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disturbances ( it ); (ii) the correlation between any two ( it ); and (iii) the perfect 
collinearity among independent variables (Xit). Accordingly, this study reports t-
statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors corrected for potential 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term (within each firm) to 
ensure the assumptions (i) and (ii) are taken into consideration. The assumption 
(iii) that there are no perfect linear relationships among the independent variables 
in the models is diagnosed through the use of variance inflation factors (VIFs). 
4.3.5 Specification tests for the System GMM model 
4.3.5.1 Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity of regressors 
When the independent variables are actually exogenous, the OLS and FE 
approaches can obtain more efficient estimations than those of the System GMM 
(Schultz et al., 2010). Therefore, it is important to test for the endogeneity of the 
regressors in the models, i.e., test whether those regressors are correlated with the 
error term, before proceeding with the System GMM estimator. To do so, this 
study performs the DWH test for endogeneity of all regressors as a group. The test 
is under the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors may be actually 
treated as exogenous variables (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007). Test statistics 
follow a Chi-squared (Chi-sq) distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of explanatory variables checked for endogeneity. Following Schultz 
et al. (2010), this study performs the test based on the equation (in levels) of firm 
performance and corporate governance variables.  
For the convenience of the readers, the information about the test will be 
described in more details in the Subsections 5.2.2.1 of Chapter 5; 6.2.2.1 of 
Chapter 6; and 7.2.3.2 of Chapter 7. 
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4.3.5.2 Testing over-identifying restrictions 
It is worth noting that the consistency of the System GMM estimator greatly 
depends on the validity of instrumental variables used. It is therefore important to 
diagnose whether the instruments are valid, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the 
error term. According to Arellano and Bond (1991), there are three alternative 
tests for the validity of instrumental variables, including: (i) Arellano-Bond test 
for second-order serial correlation [the AB AR(2)] in the first differences of 
residual series; (ii) Hansen-J test of over-identifying restrictions; and (iii) 
Hausman specification test.  
Among them, this study employs the Hansen-J test of over-identifying restrictions 
for two reasons. First, since the AB AR(2) test statistic is only defined if min T ≥ 
5 (Arellano & Bond, 1991), this test cannot be used in the current study’s 
circumstance in which T = 4 years. Second, while the power of the Hausman 
specification test is questionable, especially in the presence of outliers (Arellano 
& Bond, 1991), the Hansen-J test is considered as a standard test for joint validity 
of the instrumental variables after the System GMM estimation (Baum, 2006; 
Roodman, 2009a). 
For those reasons, two following sets of specification tests are employed to check 
if the selected sets of lagged level and first-differenced values of the explanatory 
variables used as the instruments in the regressions are econometrically 
exogenous. First, the joint validity of the instruments is tested by the standard 
Hansen-J-test of over-identifying restrictions (also referred to as Hansen-J-test for 
the joint validity of instruments). Second, as recommended by Roodman (2009a, 
2009b), the difference-in-Hansen tests for the subsets of System GMM-type 
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instruments, and for standard instrumental variables for the levels equation will be 
conducted (also referred to as different-in-Hansen test for the validity of subsets of 
instruments).  
For the convenience of the readers, the information about these tests will be 
described in more details in the Subsections 5.2.2.2 of Chapters 5; 6.2.2.2 of 
Chapter 6; and 7.2.3.2 of Chapter 7. 
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the research framework, model specifications, variables, 
and data for the empirical analyses of the thesis. Given the dynamic nature of the 
corporate governance–financial performance relationship, the empirical models in 
this study are established in a dynamic modelling framework. Accordingly, the 
one-year lagged dependent variable is employed as an explanatory variable in the 
empirical models which are estimated by the System GMM method to take into 
account the potential dynamic panel bias, time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity, and simultaneity. 
Six firm-level explanatory variables are used to control for corporate governance 
characteristics which are well-documented in the corporate governance literature. 
One country-level independent variable is employed to examine the direct effects 
of national governance quality on firm performance, as well as the moderating 
influence of national governance quality on the corporate governance structures–
firm performance relationship. Additionally, this study also employs seven 
alternative proxies for the firm-level and country-level characteristics to check the 
robustness of the empirical findings. 
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Furthermore, firm-, industry-, and time-specific effects on the corporate 
governance–firm performance relationship are also controlled. Firms in the 
sample are drawn from those that are locally incorporated and listed on the SGX 
Mainboard (for Singapore), or the HOSE and the HNX (for Vietnam). The choice 
of the sample is primarily guided by the availability of firms’ annual reports and 
corresponding financial data for a four-year period from 2008 to 2011.  
The rest of this thesis flows as follows. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will provide the 
empirical results for the relationship between corporate governance structures and 
financial performance of publicly listed companies in the Vietnamese market and 
the Singaporean market, respectively. Taking into account the country-specific 
institutional characteristics, Chapter 7 will discuss cross-country evidence on the 
corporate governance–financial performance relationship from a comparative 
perspective 53 . Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, clarifies the limitations, and 
provides recommendations for potential future research.  
                                                 
53 More specifically, the six pairs of hypotheses denoted from [HVN1 – HSG1] to [HVN6 – 
HSG6] will be tested by estimating equations (4.2), using the separated datasets of the 
Vietnamese and Singaporean markets (please refer to Subsection 4.3.3). Furthermore, 
equations (4.3) and (4.4) will be applied to the combined sample of both markets to 
empirically verify the two hypotheses HVN_SG7 and HVN_SG8. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND 
FIRM PERFORMANCE IN VIETNAM54 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
Estimating equation (4.2) for the Vietnamese market, this chapter provides 
empirical evidence to test the six hypotheses on the relationship between 
corporate governance structures and financial performance of Vietnamese listed 
companies [denoted as HVN1 – HVN6]. The empirical findings provided by this 
chapter contribute to the understanding of the causal effects of the corporate 
governance structures on firm performance in the Vietnamese market.  
It should be noted that both Chapters 5 and 6 address the first research question of 
the thesis: does the causal relationship between corporate governance structures 
and financial performance persist when the dynamic nature of this relationship is 
fully controlled? Therefore, in order to avoid duplicate analyses and 
interpretations of similar variables and hypotheses in both chapters, the most 
interesting point in each chapter will be intentionally highlighted.  
Specifically, the causal effect of board gender diversity on financial performance 
of Vietnamese listed companies is emphasised in Chapter 5. This topic is 
interesting because female representation on boards has recently become a central 
focus of corporate governance rejuvenation efforts around the world, with 
                                                 
54 A version of this chapter has been published as a scholarly article in International 
Review of Economics and Finance, vol 37(C), pp.184-202, under the title ‘Does 
boardroom gender diversity matter? Evidence from a transitional economy’. The content 
of this chapter is reproduced from the article with permission from Elsevier (License 
number: 3524690936334 | Date: December 09, 2014). 
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companies being encouraged to appoint female directors to their boards55 (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009). Importantly, the Vietnamese market, characterised by an 
underdeveloped corporate governance system, provides a unique empirical 
research setting where the benefits of board gender diversity may be more 
pronounced56. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1 begins by 
presenting preliminary data analyses, including descriptive statistics, correlation 
matrix and multi-collinearity diagnostic. Additionally, the slow-changing 
characteristic of the corporate governance variables is discussed in 
Subsection 5.1.3. In doing so, the current study confirms that the nature of data 
has been taken into account to select the most appropriate estimation technique. 
Section 5.2 provides in turn empirical evidence obtained from estimating equation 
(4.2) through the use of the OLS, FE, and System GMM estimators. Section 5.3 
concludes the chapter. 
5.1 PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
It is necessary to recall that the dataset for the Vietnamese market includes 488 
firm-year observations which have relatively full information on key corporate 
governance variables covering a four-year period from 2008 to 2011 (Table 4.3). 
Following Balatbat, Taylor, and Walter (2004); Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, and 
                                                 
55 For example, in 2004 Norway adopted a mandatory gender quota law requiring 40% 
of positions on the boards of listed companies to be reserved for women (HKEC, 2012). 
This initiative has motivated many countries in Europe to follow suit, including Belgium 
(2011), Finland (2005), and Spain (2007). 
In the Australasian region, Australia (2009), Hong Kong (2012) Malaysia (2011), New 
Zealand (2012) and others have revised their corporate governance codes to include new 
“comply or explain” provisions. The new provisions require listed companies to report 
measurable goals for diversity in their boardrooms, as well as progress in attaining those 
goals (see e.g., Catalyst, 2012b; HKEC, 2012 for more details).  
56 See Subsection 3.4.2 of Chapter 3 for more details. 
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Tehranian (2007); Schultz et al. (2010) and Giroud and Mueller (2010), among 
others, this study drops nine firm-year observations within the first and beyond 
the 99th percentiles in order to ensure that the empirical findings are not driven by 
the outliers of Tobin’s Q. As a consequence, the final sample for the Vietnamese 
market includes 479 firm-year observations.  
It is worth noting that univariate and bivariate analyses, including descriptive 
statistics and t-test for equality of the population means, are reported based on 
individual samples. This means that the full available data of each variable will be 
employed to maximise the obtainable sample sizes and to provide the best 
possible statistics of corporate governance structures and firm performance in the 
Vietnamese market. Meanwhile, a common sample including 448 firm-year 
observations will be used to run static multiple regression models 57.  
Similarly, this research uses a common sample with 352 firm-year observations to 
explore the corporate governance–financial performance relationship in formal 
dynamic multiple regression models58. The common sample sizes for the other 
robustness check models are reported either in the relevant result tables or in the 
footnotes. Table 5.1 summarises the sample sizes employed in alternative analyses 
for the Vietnamese market. 
  
                                                 
57 The common sample is not different from individual samples unless missing values 
exist in the dataset. The common sample can be obtained by removing all firm-year 
observations in which there is one (or more) missing value in any variables used in the 
models. In this case, the number of the firm-year observations with missing values 
removed from the final sample is 31. 
58 This is because using one-year lagged Tobin’s Q as an explanatory variable in the 
right hand side of dynamic models results in losing 121 observations. In addition, six 
missing values in the variables used in the models are removed as well. Consequently, 
the final sample is reduced from 479 to 352 firm-year observations. 
124 
 
Table 5.1: Sample sizes of alternative research models for Vietnam 
1 The initial sample size   488 
2 The number of outliers of Tobin's Q excluded 9  
3 The final sample size* (3) = (1) – (2)  479 
4 Panel A: For static models   
5 
The number of observations removed because of missing 
values in variables used in the static models 
31  
6 
The common sample size for the static models**  
(6) = (3) – (5) 
 448 
7 Panel B: For dynamic models   
8 
The number of observations lost due to using one-year 
lagged Tobin’s Q as an explanatory variable in the 
dynamic models 
121  
9 
The number of observations lost because of missing values 
in variables used in the dynamic models 
6  
10 
The common sample size for dynamic models**  
(10) = (3) – (8) – (9) 
  352 
Note: (*) individual samples' sizes may be various because of missing values. (**) For other 
models used for robustness checks, the common sample sizes are reported either in the relevant 
tables of results or in attached footnotes. This table is based on data directly provided by StoxPlus 
Corporation and/or downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database, and/or extracted from 
companies’ annual reports which are downloaded from FPT-Ez-search Online Information 
Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in December 2011). 
5.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the key dependent and independent 
variables used in equation (4.2). Tobin’s Q values range from 0.20 to 2.96, with 
an average value of 0.85. The median Tobin’s Q of 0.78 means that for half the 
observations, the Tobin’s Q is less than or equal to 0.78. Furthermore, the median 
Tobin’s Q of 0.78 is very close to the mean Tobin’s Q of 0.85, both of which are 
less than one. This suggests that in terms of central tendency, the market value of 
the listed companies during the sampling period is lower than the book value. On 
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the one hand, this result may reflect the negative expectation of investors in 
response to the ineffective use of scarce company resources. On the other hand, it 
may also reflect the variations of the Vietnamese stock exchange during the crisis 
period of 2008–2011.  
Appendix 2 demonstrates that the mean and median values of Tobin’s Q closely 
follow the fluctuations of the Vietnamese Stock Index (VNIndex) across the years 
from 2008 to 2011. It is also evident from Appendix 2 that the mean and median 
of Tobin’s Q ̶ on a year-by-year basis ̶ are smaller than one when the VNIndex 
annual growth rates are negative. Consequently, it is believed that the negative 
trend of the market during this crisis period is a possible explanation for why 
Vietnamese listed companies were undervalued by investors.  
The mean percentage of female directors is 12.06%, which is twice as many as 
that reported by Sussmuth-Dyckerhoff, Wang, and Chen (2012) for the Asian 
region (6%). Furthermore, as reported by Catalyst (2012a), the mean percentage 
of female directors in Vietnam is far larger than that of other countries in the 
region, such as China (8.50%), Hong Kong (9%), Indonesia (4.50%), Japan 
(0.90%), Malaysia (7.80%), Singapore (6.90%), South Korea (1.90%), and 
Thailand (8.70%). Given that the institutional environment has an important 
influence on the social role and boardroom representation of women (Grosvold & 
Brammer, 2011), the higher ratio of female directors in Vietnamese companies 
appears to be the direct outcome of a better, more gender-diverse institutional 
context, mentioned in Subsection 3.4.2 of Chapter 3.  
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics 
  Observations Mean Median SD Min Max 
Tobin's Q ratio 479 0.85 0.78 0.39 0.20 2.96 
Percentage of female directors (%) 472 12.06 9.09 13.76 0.00 66.67 
Dummy variable for gender diversity 472 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Blau index 472 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.50 
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) 479 48.91 42.86 20.76 0.00 100.00 
CEO duality 479 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Board size (person) 479 5.81 5.00 1.29 4.00 11.00 
Ownership concentration (%) 478 43.92 49.28 20.86 0.00 86.89 
Firm age (year) 479 3.34 3.00 2.04 0.00 11.00 
Firm size [Ln(Total assets)] 479 27.24 27.22 1.20 24.11 30.55 
Leverage (%) 479 29.22 28.00 20.27 0.00 75.69 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics based on individual samples of which the sizes may be various because of missing 
values. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. For interpretation purposes, the descriptive statistics of Tobin’s Q ratio, board size, 
and firm age are calculated on the basis of levels instead of logarithmic form. This table is based on data directly provided by 
StoxPlus Corporation and/or downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database, and/or extracted from companies’ annual reports 
which are downloaded from FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in December 2011). 
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The mean of the dummy variable for gender diversity (d1women) is about 0.51 
suggesting that 51% of companies in the sample (equivalent to 239 out of 472 
observations, as reported in Table 5.3) have at least one female director on their 
boards. Arguably, this proportion is much higher than that reported by Campbell 
and Mínguez-Vera (2008) for Spain (23.70%) and by CGIO (2011) for Singapore 
(40%). This result is a reflection of the high proportion of women in the labour 
force in Vietnam (World Bank, 2011), which may contribute to higher gender 
diversity in the boardroom than would otherwise be the case.  
Nevertheless, female representation in Vietnamese boardrooms is still low. As 
reported in Table 5.3, of 239 cases with at least one female director, only 75 (≈ 
31%) have two or more women on the board. The number of cases with at least 
three female directors is negligible (20 cases). Table 5.3 also provides detailed 
information about the frequency of female directors and percentage of female 
directorship by board size. It can be observed from Table 5.3 that cases with one 
or two female directors on the board tend to be those that have a board 
membership ranging from five to seven.  
On an average basis, non-executive directors account for about 49% of total 
directors, similar to the ratio found by the IFC (2011) for the Vietnamese market. 
The minimum percentage of non-executives is zero, although to ensure board 
independence (MOF, 2007), the Vietnamese Code requires that at least one-third 
of Vietnamese listed company directors must be non-executives. This situation 
reflects the fact that while one or more companies in the sample have failed to 
comply with the minimum level of non-executives on the BOD, the others have 
achieved well above the threshold. Among companies in the sample, only 32% of 
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the BOD chairpersons are also the CEOs, indicating that dual roles are less 
common in Vietnam. This ratio is in agreement with that reported by the IFC 
(2011) in its survey of the Vietnamese market. 
The average number of board directors is approximately six, similar to the ratio 
reported by the IFC (2011) and, as reported by The Korn/Ferry Institute (2012), 
much smaller than the average board size of other countries in the Asian region, 
such as China (11.60), Hong Kong (11.50), India (10.80), Malaysia (9.00), and 
Singapore (8.60). Table 5.3 shows there are between five and seven members on 
the boards of most companies in the sample. It can be seen that the board size of 
companies in Vietnam is: (i) in compliance with the requirement of the 
Vietnamese Code that the boards should have from three to eleven members; and 
(ii) within the optimal threshold of board size – no more than eight members as 
recommended by Jensen (1993) for board effectiveness. The mean value of firm 
age (the period of time from the IPO) is about 3.34 years, reflecting the fact that 
listed companies in the sample are very young. This can partly explain their lack 
of experience in dealing with corporate governance issues as pointed out in recent 
IFC reports (IFC, 2011, 2012). 
Notably, about 44% is the average percentage of ordinary shares held by 
shareholders who own at least 5% of the total number of a company’s common 
stocks. Although this number is lower than that of Singapore (60%) and Malaysia 
(47%) (see, Mak & Kusnadi, 2005), it is still much higher than that of western 
developed markets, such as the US and UK. This finding is in line with Chen and 
Huang (2014), who documented that many emerging markets are characterised by 
highly concentrated ownership structures.   
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Table 5.3: The frequency of female directors (panel A) and percentage of female directorship (panel B) by board size 
Board size (person) 
Panel A Panel B 
The number of female directors in boardroom (person) Percentage of female directorship (%) 
0 1 2 3 6 Total <20% =20% >20% Total 
4 1 5 0 0 0 6 0.21 0.00 1.06 1.27 
5 163 111 19 0 0 293 34.53 23.52 4.03 62.08 
6 14 8 17 5 0 44 4.66 0.00 4.66 9.32 
7 43 25 15 6 0 89 14.41 0.00 4.45 18.86 
8 3 3 1 5 0 12 1.27 0.00 1.27 2.54 
9 8 8 1 0 1 18 3.39 0.00 0.42 3.81 
10 1 0 2 3 0 6 0.21 0.42 0.64 1.27 
11 0 4 0 0 0 4 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.85 
Total 233 164 55 19 1 472 59.53 23.94 16.53 100.00 
Note: Board size is as defined in Table 4.6 
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While this may indicate that the ownership structure of listed companies in 
Vietnam is highly concentrated, it should be noted that this ratio varies 
considerably from zero to approximately 87%. 
Since board gender diversity is the variable of interest in this chapter, several 
further statistical explorations have been conducted to have a preliminary look at 
the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance. 
Accordingly, the t-test procedure is carried out to investigate whether there is a 
significant difference in the performance between companies with and without 
female directors. The differences in the mean values of Tobin’s Q between firms 
with and without women on their boards are presented in Figure 5.1. Intuitively, 
companies with female directors very likely performed better than those without 
women on their boards for all years from 2008 to 2011. The clearest evidence was 
from 2010 when, on average, the Tobin’s Q of companies with female directors 
was 20.40% higher than that of their counterparts. Overall, the graph demonstrates 
that gender diversity in the boardroom might have a positive relation to firm 
financial performance, which is consistent with the correlation coefficient 
between the two variables as reported in Table 5.5.  
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Figure 5.1: The average values of Tobin’s Q of Vietnamese companies with 
and without female directors 
Across the full sample, the average value of the Tobin’s Q ratio of companies 
with female board directors was 15.30% higher than that of those without, and the 
difference was statistically significant at the 1% level. The results reported in 
Table 5.4 indicate that the null hypothesis of equal population means59 should be 
rejected in the years 2009, 2010, 2011, and across the full sample. It is plausible 
that in the years when the Vietnamese companies have female directors on their 
BOD, they tend to achieve better financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q. 
This finding tentatively supports the hypothesis HVN1 that board gender diversity 
will have a positive impact on financial performance of Vietnamese listed 
companies. Since the t-test procedure does not account for other factors that may 
                                                 
59 To capture both cross-sectional and time variances, this study follows Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) in comparing the means of Tobin’s Q not only within the cross section 
but also across firm-year observations. In order to check the robustness of the results, 
this study follows prior studies (e.g., Chen, Guo, & Tay, 2010) and conducts the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in medians of Tobin’s Q. The (unreported) 
results obtained from this non-parametric test show that the conclusions obtained from 
the t-test procedure are robust, even after taking the non-normality of the data into 
consideration. 
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interact with the board gender diversity–firm performance relationship, it is 
difficult to draw causal inferences. Section 5.2 will present a further exploration 
of this relationship through multiple regression analyses. 
Table 5.4: The t-test for equal population means with unequal variances 
Year Observations 
The average values of Tobin's Q 
Without female 
directors 
With female 
directors 
Difference 
2008 119 0.77 0.84 -0.07 
2009 118 0.97 1.15 -0.19** 
2010 119 0.80 0.97 -0.16*** 
2011 116 0.60 0.69 -0.09* 
Full sample 472 0.79 0.91 -0.12*** 
Note: Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). 
5.1.2 Correlation matrix and multi-collinearity diagnostic 
Table 5.5 reports the pair-wise correlation coefficients between the variables 
employed in equation (4.2). The correlation coefficients are based on various 
individual samples in which all available observations are employed to compute 
each pair-wise correlation without considering whether variables outside that pair 
are missing. The correlation coefficient of 0.15 shows that the Tobin’s Q is 
positively related to the percentage of female directors. Although this is only a 
weak positive linear relationship, it tentatively supports the hypothesis HVN1 of 
this study. The significantly positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and the one-
year lagged Tobin’s Q is described by a correlation coefficient of 0.58. This 
supports the proposition that the proper empirical model for the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance should be considered in a 
dynamic framework rather than a static one (Wintoki et al., 2012).  
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With the exception of the variables nonexe and lev, the other explanatory variables 
are significantly correlated with the regressant. As can be seen from Table 5.5, the 
highest significant correlation coefficient among independent variables is 0.36. As 
suggested by Damodar (2004), unless correlation coefficients among regressors 
exceed 0.80, multi-collinearity will not be a serious problem for multiple analysis. 
Thus, there may be no problem of multi-collinearity among the regressors 
included in this chapter’s regression models. In an additional analysis, variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) are employed to formally diagnose the multi-collinearity 
problem among independent variables used in the estimation models. As indicated 
in the last column of Table 5.5, all of the VIFs are below the acceptable cut-off 
point of 10 suggested by Chatterjee and Hadi (2012, p. 236). This indicates the 
absence of a multi-collinearity problem in the estimated models of this chapter.  
To check the sensitivity of the correlation coefficients to data missing, a case-wise 
correlation matrix which is based on the common sample of 352 firm-year 
observations is also displayed in Appendix 3. Unlike the pair-wise correlation 
matrix, the case-wise correlation matrix is calculated on the basis of excluding all 
observations that have missing data in at least one of the selected variables. By 
doing so, the correlation coefficients can be obtained from the same set of 352 
firm-year observations. It is evident from Table 5.5 and Appendix 3 that the 
correlation coefficients in both matrices are qualitatively the same. Thus, the 
abovementioned interpretations on the correlations between the selected pairs of 
variables still hold even after the potential effect of missing data on computing 
correlation coefficients is taken into consideration. 
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Table 5.5: Pair-wise correlation coefficients and variance inflation factor coefficients 
  lnq female nonexe dual lnbsize block lnfage fsize lev laglnq VIFs 
lnq 1.00                     
female 0.15*** 1.00                 1.05 
nonexe -0.07 -0.05 1.00               1.17 
dual 0.11** 0.12*** -0.30*** 1.00             1.15 
lnbsize 0.13*** 0.09* -0.13*** 0.10** 1.00           1.18 
block 0.13*** -0.07 0.10** -0.14*** -0.26*** 1.00         1.12 
lnfage -0.19*** -0.04 0.14*** -0.04 0.05 -0.04 1.00       1.21 
fsize 0.21*** 0.04 -0.08* 0.01 0.23*** 0.10** -0.00 1.00     1.36 
lev 0.07 -0.09** -0.11** -0.10** 0.04 0.10** -0.14*** 0.36*** 1.00   1.28 
laglnq 0.58*** 0.13** -0.03 0.07 0.12** 0.12** 0.08 0.25*** -0.04 1.00 1.71 
Note: This table presents pair-wise correlation coefficients which are based on various individual samples. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) are based on the common 
sample of 352 firm-year observations. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). This table is based on 
data directly provided by StoxPlus Corporation and/or downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database, and/or extracted from companies’ annual reports which are 
downloaded from FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in December 2011). 
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5.1.3 The slow-changing characteristic of corporate governance 
variables 
Flannery and Hankins (2013) suggest that the within-firm variance of independent 
variables should be thoroughly investigated before the economic impact of those 
independent variables on dependent variable is assessed. Following this 
suggestion, this subsection discusses the explanatory variables’ within-firm 
variance and suitable analysis procedures which can be used to deal with the 
slow-changing characteristic of corporate governance variables. 
Table 5.6 reports that the variation in the ratio of female directors within firms 
(5.34%) is lower than that across firms (12.85%). This result suggests that the 
percentage of female directors does not vary greatly over time. In other words, 
female is a slow-changing variable, given that if a variable does not vary across 
time, the within-standard deviation will be zero. The remaining corporate 
governance variables, including nonexe, dual, lnbsize, and block, share a similar 
characteristic. These findings are consistent with Brown et al. (2011), who 
reported that most corporate governance variables do not change over time, which 
leads to a reduction in the statistical power of corporate governance research. 
Taking into account the slow-changing feature of these variables, this study 
employs the System GMM as the main approach. As mentioned in 
Subsection 4.3.4, the reason for this is that the System GMM, by construction, is 
superior to other estimators (e.g., the FE or AB Difference GMM) in dealing with 
the highly persistent characteristic of the explanatory variables (Antoniou et al., 
2008; Hoechle et al., 2012).  
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Table 5.6: Overall, between and within standard deviations of the corporate 
governance variables for the Vietnamese market  
Variables Standard Deviations 
  overall between within 
Percentage of female directors (%) 13.76 12.85 5.34 
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) 20.76 18.93 8.46 
CEO duality 0.47 0.42 0.21 
Board size (person) 1.29 1.19 0.50 
Ownership concentration (%) 20.86 18.71 9.11 
Note: This table reports overall, between and within standard deviations of the corporate 
governance variables for the Vietnamese market based on various individual samples. The 
variables are as defined in Table 4.6. For interpretation purposes, the standard deviations of 
board size are calculated on the basis of levels instead of logarithmic form. This table is based 
on data directly provided by StoxPlus Corporation and/or downloaded from Thomson One 
Banker Database, and/or extracted from companies’ annual reports which are downloaded from 
FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in December 2011). 
However, using the lagged values of these slow-changing variables as instruments 
in the System GMM estimation procedure may be questionable. More 
specifically, if slow-changing explanatory variables are endogenous, then the 
lagged values of these variables used as instruments will suffer as much from the 
endogeneity issue as do the current ones (Brown et al., 2011). This raises doubts 
about the validity of the instrumental variables employed in the model. For this 
reason, this study follows the suggestion of Roodman (2009a, 2009b) and 
carefully tests the joint validity of the instruments as well as the validity of the 
subsets of System GMM-type instruments, and the standard instruments for the 
equation in levels60.   
                                                 
60 See Subsection 5.2.2.2 for more details. 
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5.2 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
5.2.1 Static vs. dynamic models: Pooled OLS and FE estimations 
In this subsection, equation (4.2) will be estimated in static and dynamic 
frameworks through the use of the pooled OLS and FE approaches. For the ‘static 
framework’, the coefficient on lnqit-1 (1) in equation (4.2) is assumed to be zero. 
The remainder of the subsection proceeds as follows.  
First, Subsection 5.2.1.1 commences with an OLS estimation of equation (4.2) 
from a static perspective to provide a preliminary look at the data. Then, the FE 
method will be applied to equation (4.2) with the assumption that 1 is equal to 
zero in order to see how the results obtained from the pooled OLS method are 
driven by unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics.  
Finally, Subsection 5.2.1.2 employs the OLS and FE methods to estimate equation 
(4.2) in a dynamic framework. These dynamic estimations will show how 
including a one-year lagged dependent variable as an independent variable 
improves the explanatory power of the model. Furthermore, as mentioned in 
Subsection 4.3.4, applying the OLS and FE methods to estimate the parameters of 
equation (4.2) from a dynamic perspective will help to detect biases in empirical 
analyses of this study. 
5.2.1.1 The static models 
Initial multiple regression results, conducted by using the pooled OLS approach, 
are reported in column 1 of Table 5.7. It is evident that the percentage of female 
directors in boardrooms (female) is positively significantly related to Tobin’s Q at 
the 10% level (p = 0.053), thus providing support for hypothesis HVN1. The 
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coefficient on female (𝛽 = 0.003) means that if the percentage of female directors 
in boardrooms increases by one percentage point, the predicted Tobin’s Q will 
increase, on average, by approximately 0.30%, holding all other factors fixed.  
It should be noted that such a percentage change is economically large, given that 
the size of boards in Vietnamese listed companies ranges between three and 
eleven members. For example, a change from a board with one woman and seven 
men to a board with three women and five men leads to a 25 percentage point 
change. Consequently, the predicted Tobin’s Q will increase by approximately 
25×0.30% = 7.50% or, more exactly, by 100×[exp(0.003×25) – 1] ≈ 7.79%. This 
finding is consistent with that reported by prior studies including Reddy et al. 
(2008) in the New Zealand market, Carter et al. (2003) and Adams and Ferreira 
(2009, p. 305, column 1 of table 9) in the US market, but contrasts with the 
findings of Rose (2007) in the Danish market.  
In a similar vein, it is observed from column 1 of Table 5.7 that the percentage of 
non-executive directors has no significant effect on firm performance, thus 
supporting hypotheses HVN2. Ownership concentration appears to be significantly 
positively correlated with firm performance, thus providing support for hypothesis 
HVN5.  
The estimated coefficient on the variable dual is insignificant, thus not supporting 
hypothesis HVN3. From column 1 of Table 5.7, it is also observed that there is no 
statistical evidence to support hypotheses HVN4 and HVN6. It should be noted that 
the OLS estimator cannot control for potential omitted variable bias caused by the 
effects of unobserved features of firms which are invariant over time and/or across 
firms. In consequence, further exploration is necessary.  
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Table 5.7: The relationship between corporate governance structures and 
performance of Vietnamese listed companies: Static models61 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] OLS FE 
  b/[p] b/[p] 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -2.180*** -0.272 
  [0.000] [0.883] 
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] 0.003* 0.002 
  [0.053] [0.470] 
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] 0.000 -0.001 
  [0.968] [0.624] 
Duality [dual] 0.061 0.119** 
  [0.146] [0.024] 
Board size [lnbsize] 0.178** 0.263* 
  [0.046] [0.098] 
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.003*** 0.003** 
  [0.001] [0.013] 
Firm age [lnfage] 0.007 -0.011 
  [0.860] [0.888] 
Firm size [fsize] 0.052*** -0.031 
  [0.006] [0.659] 
Leverage (%) [lev] 0.001 0.007*** 
  [0.292] [0.001] 
Industry dummy variables [industry] yes no 
Firm fixed-effects no yes 
Year dummy variables [year] yes yes 
Number of observations 448 448 
R-squared 0.351 0.588 
F statistic 14.816*** 36.561*** 
Note: This table reports the result of static OLS (column 1) and static FE (column 2) regressions of 
firm performance (lnq) on corporate governance structure variables and other control variables. 
The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 
1% (***). The p-values are reported in brackets and are based on cluster-robust standard errors 
(cluster on firm) corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. 
Industry and year dummy variables are not reported. 
  
                                                 
61 It should be noted that industry dummies are not included in the static OLS model 
reported in another version of this chapter, which has been published as a scholarly 
article in International Review of Economics and Finance (2015), vol 37(C), pp.184-
202, under the title ‘Does boardroom gender diversity matter? Evidence from a 
transitional economy’.  
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As shown in column 2 of Table 5.7, when firm fixed-effects62 are taken into 
account to address the concern of unobserved heterogeneity in equation (4.2), the 
positive relationship between female and Tobin’s Q is no longer significant (𝛽 = 
0.002, p = 0.470), which is consistent with the result obtained by Carter et al. 
(2010) in the US market. The estimated coefficients on other variables, including 
dual, fsize, and obtained from the static FE approach are qualitatively different 
from those obtained from the static OLS one. This indicates that the relationship 
uncovered by the static OLS model may be driven by omitted variable biases.  
However, it is noteworthy that the FE approach is implemented under the 
assumption of strict exogeneity which implies that the corporate governance 
variables and control variables are not correlated with the error term in the model. 
The assumption of strict exogeneity is criticised for its unreliability when the 
other sources of endogeneity, including simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity, 
are highly likely to arise in the board structure–firm performance relationship in 
general (Wintoki et al., 2012), or in the gender diversity–firm performance 
relationship in particular (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), and in the ownership 
structure–firm performance relationship (Yabei & Izumida, 2008). This suggests 
that while the FE method in this study produces better estimations, it cannot take 
into account other potential sources of endogeneity. As a consequence, it is hard 
to make reliable causal inferences from the results of equation (4.2), thus 
suggesting that the static FE model appears to be undesirable, at least in this 
study. 
                                                 
62 The Hausman test for a comparison between the fixed-effects and random-effects 
models was performed. The null hypothesis that the preferred model is random-effects is 
rejected, (χ2(9) = 624.10, p = 0.00), suggesting that the fixed-effects estimator should be 
employed. 
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5.2.1.2 The dynamic models 
In another effort to capture unobserved heterogeneity, this study considers the 
one-year lagged performance variable as an explanatory variable63. As shown in 
Table 5.8, the estimated coefficient on female is statistically different from zero at 
the 5% level (𝛽 = 0.003, p = 0.011), thus providing support for the hypothesis 
HVN1. Notably, it shows that past performance can significantly explain the 
variation in current performance (𝛽 = 0.698, p = 0.00). This is consistent with 
Wintoki et al. (2012), who showed the importance of using lagged performance 
variables to control for the dynamic nature of the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship. 
However, the coefficients of corporate governance variables in the dynamic OLS 
model are considerably smaller than those of the static OLS model. According to 
Wintoki et al. (2012), such a substantial reduction in the magnitude of the 
estimated parameters of key corporate governance variables in the dynamic model 
suggests that the current corporate governance variables are correlated with past 
firm performance. This again confirms the dynamic relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. It is important to notice that the R2 in 
the dynamic model (0.693) is over twice as many as the R2 in the static model 
(0.351). This indicates that including the past performance variable in the right-
hand side of the model helps to improve considerably the explanatory power of 
the model, which in turn helps to explain more effectively the variation in the 
                                                 
63 In a preliminary analysis, it is found that all the coefficients on industry dummy 
variables included the dynamic OLS model are statistically insignificant at the 5% level. 
This suggests that industry dummies should not be included in this model. In order to 
confirm this, the Wald test is performed under the null hypothesis that the coefficients on 
all industry dummies are jointly equal to zero. The test result indicates that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at any conventional levels of significance (p = 0.310). For 
this reason, industry dummies are excluded from the official dynamic OLS estimations. 
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current performance. Although the dynamic OLS estimator is an improvement 
over the static models and although the findings are consistent with previous 
studies, they appear to be driven by endogenous biases, such as simultaneity, 
which cannot be controlled by the pooled OLS method. In addition, the presence 
of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors makes the OLS estimated 
parameters biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2002). 
The reason for applying the OLS and FE techniques to estimate equation (4.2) in a 
dynamic framework is that the estimates obtained from these two techniques can 
help to indicate whether the System GMM model is well-specified. It is 
documented in empirical econometric that the estimated coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable (1) obtained from the OLS and FE methods are in turn 
considered to be the upper and lower bounds of a reasonable System GMM 
estimation (Bond, 2002). Therefore, the estimates made by the System GMM 
should be compared with those made by the OLS and FE estimators to detect 
potential biases in empirical studies (Bond, 2002). 
This is because in the presence of the first-order autoregressive [AR(1)] structure 
in equation (4.2), the OLS estimates will be upward biased and inconsistent 
because of the correlation between lagged dependent variable and the time-
invariant component of the error term (Nickell, 1981). Meanwhile, the traditional 
FE (within-groups) estimates will be downward biased and inconsistent (Nickell, 
1981). This implies that to be a reasonable estimator, the System GMM must be 
able to produce an estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (1) 
which should range between these two lower and upper bounds (Bond, 2002).  
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For this reason, as mentioned above, the empirical relationship between corporate 
governance structures and firm performance in a dynamic framework is 
undertaken by using the OLS, FE64, and system GMM approaches. This facilitates 
the comparison not only between the results of this study and those of previous 
studies, but also among the three models from which the most reasonable 
estimation will be confirmed.  
As presented in Table 5.8, Table 5.9, and Table 5.11, the coefficient on one-year 
lagged Tobin’s Q (laglnq) obtained from the System GMM estimator is 
significantly positive (1 = 0.611) and lies between the ones obtained from the 
OLS (1  = 0.698) and the FE estimators (1  = –0.057). This suggests that the 
estimates obtained from the System GMM appear to be reasonable. As mentioned 
in Subsection 4.3.4, the bias of the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable makes the other estimated parameters in the regression model using the 
OLS or FE methods highly questionable (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). Therefore, 
no further interpretation is provided for the results obtained from the FE approach 
(reported in Table 5.9).   
                                                 
64The Hausman test for a comparison between the FE and RE estimators was performed 
under the null hypothesis that the preferred technique is the RE. It is found that the null 
hypothesis cannot be accepted (Chi-sq(9) = 698.78; p = 0.00), thus suggesting that the 
FE estimation procedure should be employed. 
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Table 5.8: The relationship between corporate governance structures and 
performance of Vietnamese listed companies: A dynamic OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (t) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -0.685* (-1.921) 
  [0.056]  
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.698*** (15.733) 
  [0.000]  
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] 0.003** (2.546) 
  [0.011]  
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] -0.001 (-1.058) 
  [0.291]  
Duality [dual] 0.037 (1.266) 
  [0.206]  
Board size [lnbsize] 0.135** (2.212) 
  [0.028]  
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.001* (1.710) 
  [0.088]  
Firm age [lnfage] 0.051 (1.587) 
  [0.113]  
Firm size [fsize] -0.005 (-0.375) 
  [0.708]  
Leverage (%) [lev] 0.001** (1.970) 
  [0.050]  
Industry dummy variables [industry] no 
Firm fixed-effects no 
Year dummy variables [year] yes 
Number of observations 352 
R-squared 0.693 
F statistic 54.300*** 
Note: This table reports the result of dynamic OLS regression of firm performance (lnq) on 
corporate governance structure variables and other control variables. The variables are as defined 
in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses and are based on cluster-robust standard errors (cluster on firm) 
corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. The p-values are 
presented in brackets. It should be noted that industry dummy variables are not included in this 
dynamic OLS model. Year dummy variables are included in the regression but not reported.  
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Table 5.9: The relationship between corporate governance structures and 
performance of Vietnamese listed companies: A fixed-effects estimation 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (t) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept 1.465 (0.526) 
  [0.600]  
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] -0.057 (-1.027) 
  [0.306]  
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] 0.003 (1.022) 
  [0.309]  
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] -0.000 (-0.196) 
  [0.845]  
Duality [dual] 0.143** (2.051) 
  [0.042]  
Board size [lnbsize] 0.150 (0.839) 
  [0.403]  
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.004** (2.300) 
  [0.023]  
Firm age [lnfage] 0.245** (2.215) 
  [0.029]  
Firm size [fsize] -0.113 (-1.072) 
  [0.286]  
Leverage (%) [lev] 0.008*** (3.305) 
  [0.001]  
Industry dummy variables [industry] no 
Firm fixed-effects yes 
Year dummy variables [year] yes 
Number of observations 352 
R-squared 0.676 
F statistic 36.042*** 
Note: This table reports the result of fixed-effects regression of firm performance (lnq) on 
corporate governance structure variables and other control variables. The variables are as defined 
in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and are based on cluster-robust standard errors (cluster on firm) corrected 
for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. The p-values are presented 
in brackets. Year dummy variables are included in the regression but not reported. 
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5.2.2 Dynamic models: A System GMM estimation 
5.2.2.1 Testing for endogeneity of the regressors 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 and in Subsection 4.3.1, it is well-documented in 
corporate governance literature that all corporate governance variables used in 
equation (4.2) are endogenous variables. This subsection empirically checks the 
endogeneity of the regressors before proceeding with the System GMM 
specification. Accordingly, the DWH test for endogeneity of all the regressors is 
executed under the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors may be actually 
treated as exogenous variables (Baum et al., 2007). Test statistics follow a Chi-
squared (Chi-sq) distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
suspected regressors (laglnq, female, nonexe, dual, lnbsize, block, fsize, and lev).  
This study follows Schultz et al. (2010) and conducts the test based on the levels 
equation of firm performance and corporate governance variables in which one-
year lagged differences of the regressors are employed as instrumental variables. 
The industry dummies and lnfage are included in the test specification and treated 
as exogenous variables. It is found that the null hypothesis cannot be accepted at 
any conventional levels of significance (Chi-sq(8) = 24.621; p = 0.002), thus 
suggesting that the regressors cannot be treated as exogenous variables, and that 
the System GMM model will be superior in terms of consistency when compared 
with the OLS and FE models.  
5.2.2.2 The validity of the System GMM estimator 
As mentioned in Subsection 4.3.5.2, the consistency of the System GMM 
estimator is significantly contingent upon the validity of instrumental variables 
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employed. This subsection diagnoses empirically whether the instruments are 
valid, (i.e., they are exogenous) by using the Hansen-J test of over-identification 
and the difference-in-Hansen tests of the exogeneity of instrument subsets. As 
reported in the last row of Table 5.11, the Hansen-J test yields a p-value of 0.299, 
suggesting that the null hypothesis of the test cannot be rejected at any 
conventional levels of significance. In other words, this suggests that the 
instruments employed in the System GMM model are valid.  
This study also follows the recommendation of Roodman (2009b) about good 
practices in implementing the System GMM estimation and applies the 
difference-in-Hansen test to the subsets of System GMM-type instruments, as 
well as standard instrumental variables for the levels equation. Table 5.10 presents 
difference-in-Hansen tests of the exogeneity of instrument subsets, under the null 
hypothesis of joint validity of a given instrument subset. The results reported in 
Table 5.10 indicate that there is no statistical evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis, thus suggesting that the subsets of instruments are econometrically 
exogenous. Thus, the F-test statistic for the overall significance of the regression65 
(Table 5.11), and the results from Hansen-J test (Table 5.11), and difference-in-
Hansen tests (Table 5.10), all support the view that the System GMM model 
appears to be well-specified. 
5.2.2.3 Empirical results from the System GMM model 
Taking into account the concern of the dynamic nature of the board structure–firm 
performance relationship, this study follows Wintoki et al. (2012) in employing 
                                                 
65 Based on small-sample corrections, Chapters 5 and 6 report t-test instead of z-test 
statistics for the estimated coefficients. Likewise, F test statistics are reported for the 
overall fit of the System GMM models instead of Wald Chi-squared test statistics. 
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the System GMM estimator. The results reported in column 1 of Table 5.11 show 
that the percentage of female directors is positively and statistically significantly 
related to Tobin’s Q at the 5% level (p = 0.066), thus supporting hypothesis HVN1. 
To avoid duplication and save space, the empirical results reported in Table 5.11 
are not interpreted, while the empirical results obtained from the System GMM 
model will be interpreted in more detail in the next subsection 5.2.3.1. 
Table 5.10: Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets 
Tested instrument subsets 
Test 
statistics 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-
value 
Panel A: System GMM-type instruments       
Instruments for levels equation as a group 9.27 8 0.320 
lnqit-2 and lnqit-3 (for transformed equation) 2.05 2 0.359 
Δlnqit-1 (for levels equation) 2.86 1 0.091 
Instruments for board structure variables 6.07 12 0.913 
Instruments for other corporate governance 
and control variables 13.54 9 0.140 
Panel B: Standard instruments       
2009 and 2010 year dummies, and lnfage 7.63 3 0.054 
Note: This table presents difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets, under 
the null hypothesis of joint validity of a specific instrument subset. The variables are as defined 
in Table 4.6. The test statistics are asymptotically Chi-squared distribution with the degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of questionable instruments (Roodman 2009).  
GMM instrument subset used for levels equation includes one-year lagged differences of firm 
performance, board structure, ownership structure, capital structure, and control variables (Δlnqit-
1 ; Δfemaleit-1 ; Δnonexeit-1 ; Δdualit-1 ; Δlnbsizeit-1 ; Δblockit-1 ; Δfsizeit-1 ; and Δlevit-1). GMM 
instrument subset used for board structure variables includes lag 1 of the first differences; lags 2 
and 3 in levels of board structure variables (female; nonexe; dual and lnbsize).  
GMM instrument subset used for other corporate governance and control variables includes lag 1 
of the first differences; lags 2 and 3 in levels of these variables, including block, fsize, and lev. 
The subset of standard instruments for levels equation includes 2009 and 2010 year dummies, 
and lnfage. 2008 and 2011 year dummies are dropped due to collinearity. 
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5.2.3 Robustness checks 
5.2.3.1 The sensitivity of the results to the reduction of instruments 
The potential danger of the System GMM estimation implementation is 
instrument proliferation. Numerous numbers of instrumental variables in the 
System GMM estimator may bias the estimated coefficients towards those from 
non-IV estimators, such as the OLS, and have potential to severely weaken the 
power of the Hansen-J test in detecting the invalidity of the instruments employed 
(Roodman, 2009b). Therefore, it is essential to check whether the results are 
sensitive to the reduction of instrumental variables. 
It is obvious that 28 instruments used in the System GMM model (Table 5.11) are 
small relative to the total of 120 clusters. This suggests that instrument 
proliferation is unlikely to be the problem. More carefully, following good 
standard practices in using the System GMM approach suggested by Roodman 
(2009a, 2009b), this subsection checks the sensitivity of the results reported in 
Table 5.11 with the reduction in the number of instrumental variables. 
Specifically, the instrument count is reduced from 28 instruments (Table 5.11) to 
21 instruments (Table 5.12)66. As shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.12, the 
results generally remain unchanged, suggesting that the findings are robust to the 
instrument reduction.  
The results reported in Table 5.12 show that the percentage of female directors is 
positively and statistically significantly related to Tobin’s Q at the 5% level (p = 
                                                 
66 Besides using only one lag of each instrumenting variable rather than all available lags 
for instrumental variables, the author also applies a collapsing instruments approach to 
reduce the instruments’ count. See Roodman (2009b) for more details about the 
techniques for reducing the instrument count in the System GMM estimation. 
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0.037), thus supporting hypothesis HVN1. The coefficient on female (𝛽 = 0.021) 
means that a ten percentage point increase in the ratio of female directors will, on 
average, increase the predicted Tobin’s Q by approximately 21%, holding all 
other factors fixed. As mentioned in Subsection 5.2.1.1, this is an economically 
strong effect given that the board size of Vietnamese listed companies is small. 
This System GMM model result is consistent with those obtained by using both 
static and dynamic OLS models, thereby suggesting that the findings are robust to 
alternative econometric approaches.  
This result is also consistent with the findings of several prior studies that confirm 
the positive relationship between gender diversity and firm performance (e.g. 
Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Dezsö & Ross, 2012). This finding implies that 
board gender diversity seems to affect firm value, a point which is in general 
agreement with Adams et al. (2011, p. 31), who suggest that “shareholders may 
value female directors because they are better monitors and because they may 
alleviate value-decreasing stakeholder conflicts”.  
As reported in Table 5.12, the coefficient on one-year lagged Tobin’s Q is 
significantly positive at the 1% level (𝛽 = 0.633, p = 0.00), thus suggesting that 
past performance can help to control for the unobserved historical factors in the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. This empirical 
evidence strongly supports the arguments of Wintoki et al. (2012), among others, 
that the link between corporate governance and firm performance should be 
examined in a dynamic framework.  
Regarding the variable nonexe, the results obtained from the static OLS, FE, and 
dynamic OLS models show that the presence of non-executive directors has no 
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significant impact on firm performance, thus supporting the hypothesis HVN2. 
However, when moving to the System GMM model, the results reported in Table 
5.12 show that the relationship is significantly negative at the 5% level (𝛽 = –
0.019, p = 0.017). This conclusion is in line with Nowland (2008), who 
challenged agency theory’s viewpoint regarding the vital role of non-executive 
directors in monitoring managerial behaviours and in improving firm 
performance.  
Regarding the other corporate governance variables, it is observed that there is 
statistical evidence of a significantly positive link between concentrated 
ownership and firm performance (𝛽  = 0.014, p = 0.027), thus supporting the 
hypothesis HVN5. This result is consistent in all four models applied in this study 
and similar to that obtained by Victoria (2006) and Nguyen et al. (2014), among 
others. The positive relationship between concentrated ownership and 
performance is in agreement with the agency theory perspective that ownership 
concentration helps to reduce agency problems arising from the separation of 
ownership and control (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). This, in turn, is expected to 
improve firm performance.  
However, the significantly positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance, revealed by the static OLS, FE, and dynamic OLS models (Table 
5.7 and Table 5.8), disappears when dynamic endogeneity and simultaneity are 
controlled by using the System GMM approach (Table 5.11 and Table 5.12). This 
result, supporting hypothesis HVN4, accords with the findings of Pham et al. 
(2011); Schultz et al. (2010); and Wintoki et al. (2012), who argued that such 
significant links, estimated by the pooled OLS and FE models, may be the result 
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of spurious correlations. Similarly, the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance changes from significantly positive to insignificantly negative when 
the author moves from the static OLS and FE models to the System GMM model. 
Although this result does not support hypothesis HVN3, it does support the 
argument of Schultz et al. (2010); and Wintoki et al. (2012), among others, that 
taking the dynamic nature of the relationship between corporate governance 
structures and firm performance into consideration is essential to ensure the 
reliability of causal inferences. 
With regards to the capital structure variable leverage, it is evident from Table 
5.11 and Table 5.12 that the positive relationship between financial leverage and 
firm performance revealed by the FE and the dynamic OLS models disappears 
when the potential sources of endogeneity are taken into consideration. Several 
robustness checking models reported in Table 5.14 and Table 5.15 also confirm 
that the estimated coefficient on leverage is not statistically different from zero at 
any conventional levels of significance, suggesting that financial leverage has no 
impact on firm performance, thus not supporting hypothesis HVN6. Although this 
finding is consistent with that of Nguyen et al. (2014); Schultz et al. (2010) and 
others, the relationship between financial leverage and firm performance is not 
really clear in practice. The discussion below provides some possible explanations 
for this finding.  
A recent study undertaken by Jiraporn, Kim, Kim, and Kitsabunnarat (2012) 
suggested that debt financing and corporate governance mechanisms may 
substitute for each other to alleviate agency cost, whereby firm performance is 
improved. If that is the case, it is plausible to argue that the potential performance 
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effect of financial leverage in Vietnamese companies is likely to be replaced by 
the stronger effects of other corporate governance mechanisms, including 
ownership concentration (measured by block) and board gender diversity 
(measured by female). In consequence, the estimated coefficient on leverage 
should not be statistically different from zero.  
In a similar vein, González (2013) argued that the relationship between financial 
leverage and firm performance is likely to be contingent upon two contradictory 
antecedents: (i) the cost of financial distress; and (ii) the benefits of the 
disciplinary role of debt financing. A firm with higher financial leverage may 
suffer from higher costs of financial distress but may also benefit from the 
disciplinary role of debt financing, by which managers are forced to take value-
maximising decisions (González, 2013). Therefore, the net effect of financial 
leverage on firm performance can be neutralised if neither of these two 
antecedents is predominant.  
It is worth noting that Hansen-J test of over-identification and difference-in-
Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets have been implemented to 
confirm the validity of the robustness model. Accordingly, the Hansen-J test, as 
reported in the last row of Table 5.12, yields a p-value of 0.22, suggesting that the 
instruments employed in the robustness model are valid. The results of difference-
in-Hansen tests reported in Table 5.13 also suggest that the subsets of instruments 
in the robustness model are econometrically exogenous. In addition, as reported in 
Table 5.12, the F-test statistic (12.721) for the overall significance of the 
robustness regression also supports the model specification. 
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Table 5.11: The relationship between corporate governance structures and 
performance of Vietnamese listed companies: A System GMM estimation 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (t) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -5.391* (-1.755) 
  [0.082]  
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.611*** (3.123) 
  [0.002]  
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] 0.018* (1.858) 
  [0.066]  
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] -0.017** (-2.131) 
  [0.035]  
Duality [dual] -0.011 (-0.054) 
  [0.957]  
Board size [lnbsize] -1.178 (-1.248) 
  [0.214]  
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.010* (1.881) 
  [0.062]  
Firm age [lnfage] 0.369** (2.291) 
  [0.024]  
Firm size [fsize] 0.243* (1.850) 
  [0.067]  
Leverage (%) [lev] -0.003 (-0.352) 
  [0.725]  
Industry dummy variables [industry] no 
Firm fixed-effects yes 
Year dummy variables [year] yes 
Number of observations 352 
F statistic 12.806*** 
Number of instruments 28 
Number of clusters 120 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences (p-value) 0.146 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (p-value) not defined 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.299 
Note: This table reports the result of the System GMM regression of firm performance (lnq) on 
board structure variables and other control variables. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. 
Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The p-values are presented in 
brackets. Lags 2 and 3 of the levels of firm performance variable (lnq), board structure variables 
(female, nonexe, dual, and lnbsize) and other control variables (block, fsize, and lev) are employed 
as GMM-type instruments for the first-differenced equation. Lag 1 of the first differences of firm 
performance, board structure variables, and other control variables are used as GMM-type 
instruments for the levels equation. Year dummies and lnfage are treated as exogenous variables. 
Year dummy variables are included in the regression but not reported. 
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Table 5.12: Robustness check of the sensitivity of the results to the 
instrumental variables’ reduction 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (t) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -4.795* (-1.680) 
  [0.096]  
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.633*** (3.791) 
  [0.000]  
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] 0.021** (2.109) 
  [0.037]  
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] -0.019** (-2.429) 
  [0.017]  
Duality [dual] -0.017 (-0.084) 
  [0.933]  
Board size [lnbsize] -1.429 (-1.373) 
  [0.172]  
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.014** (2.237) 
  [0.027]  
Firm age [lnfage] 0.430** (2.578) 
  [0.011]  
Firm size [fsize] 0.227* (1.744) 
  [0.084]  
Leverage (%) [lev] -0.000 (-0.013) 
  [0.990]  
Industry dummies [industry] no 
Firm fixed-effects yes 
Year dummies [year] yes 
Number of observations 352 
F statistic 12.721*** 
Number of instruments 21 
Number of clusters 120 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences (p-value) 0.085 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (p-value) not defined 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.220 
Note: This table presents robustness check of the sensitivity of the results obtained from the 
System GMM to the instruments’ reduction. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. Asterisks 
indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The p-values are presented in 
brackets. Lags 2 and 3 of the levels of firm performance variable (lnq), lag 2 of the levels of board 
structure variables (female, nonexe, dual, and lnbsize) and other control variables (block, fsize, and 
lev) are employed as GMM-type instruments for the first-differenced equation. Lag 1 of the first 
differences of firm performance, board structure variables, and other control variables are used as 
GMM-type instruments for the levels equation. Year dummies and lnfage are treated as exogenous 
variables. Year dummy variables are included in the regression but not reported. 
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Table 5.13: Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets 
used in the robustness model 
Tested instrument subsets 
Test 
statistics 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-
value 
Panel A: System GMM-type instruments       
Instruments for levels equation as a group 10.82 8 0.212 
lnqit-2 and lnqit-3 (for transformed equation) 1.36 2 0.506 
Δlnqit-1 (for levels equation) 1.55 1 0.213 
Instruments for board structure variables 11.60 8 0.170 
Instruments for control variables 10.56 6 0.103 
Panel B: Standard instruments       
2009 and 2010 year dummies, and lnfage 6.25 3 0.100 
Note: This table presents difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets 
employed in the robustness model to check the sensitivity of the results to the instrumental 
variables’ reduction. The test is under the null hypothesis of joint validity of a specific instrument 
subset. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6 The test statistics are asymptotically Chi-
squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of questionable instrumental 
variables (Roodman 2009).  
GMM instrument subset used for levels equation includes one-year lagged differences of firm 
performance, board structure, ownership structure, capital structure, and other control variables 
(Δlnqit-1 ; Δfemaleit-1 ; Δnonexeit-1 ; Δdualit-1 ; Δlnbsizeit-1 ; Δblockit-1 ; Δfsizeit-1 ; and Δlevit-1). 
GMM instrument subset used for board structure variables includes lag 1 of the first difference 
and lag 2 in levels of board structure variables (femaleit-2 and Δfemaleit-1 ; nonexeit-2 and 
Δnonexeit-1 ; dualit-2 and Δdualit-1 ; lnbsizeit-2 and Δlnbsizeit-1).  
GMM instrument subset used for the other corporate governance and control variables includes 
lag 1 of the first differences and lag 2 in levels of these variables (blockit-2 and Δblockit-1 ; fsizeit-2 
and Δfsizeit-1 ; levit-2 and Δlevit-1). The subset of standard instruments for levels equation includes 
2009 and 2010 year dummies, and lnfage. 2008 and 2011 year dummies are dropped due to 
collinearity. 
5.2.3.2 Robustness check with alternative corporate governance variables 
As mentioned in Subsection 4.3.3.2, in order to check the robustness of the 
estimations reported in Table 5.11 and Table 5.12, this subsection follows 
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) and employs two alternative proxies for 
gender diversity, including a gender diversity dummy variable (d1women) and the 
Blau index for gender (blau).  
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The result reported in column 1 of Table 5.14 shows that the presence of female 
directors in the boardroom (measured by d1women) is positively related to firm 
value at the 10% level (p = 0.076). The coefficient on d1women (𝛽  = 0.379) 
implies that the difference in the predicted Tobin’s Q between companies with at 
least one female director on their boards and those without is about 37.90% or, 
more exactly, 100×[exp(0.379) – 1] ≈ 46%.  
Similarly, it is observed from column 2 of Table 5.14 that heterogeneous boards 
(measured by blau) have a statistically positive impact on firm performance at the 
5% level (𝛽 = 1.461, p = 0.023). Thus, the positive relationship between board 
gender diversity and firm performance remains robust when alternative proxies 
for gender diversity are employed. It is also observed that the estimated 
coefficients on the other corporate governance structure variables reported in 
Table 5.14 are not qualitatively different from those reported in Table 5.11 and 
Table 5.12. This suggests that the findings of this chapter appear to display little 
variability across different proxies for corporate governance structures. 
To capture the potential effect of the number of female directors, this study 
follows Liu et al. (2014) and includes in equation (4.2) one dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if there are at least two female directors and zero otherwise 
(denoted as d2women). It is reported in column 2 of Table 5.15 that the estimated 
coefficient on d2women (𝛽 = 0.610) is statistically significant at the 5% level and 
considerably larger than that on d1women reported in column 1 of Table 5.14 (𝛽 = 
0.379). This finding suggests that boards with at least two female directors appear 
to have a stronger effect on firm performance than those with at least one.  
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Table 5.14: Robustness check of the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
proxies for board gender diversity 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] b/[p] 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -4.867 -4.560 
  [0.134] [0.104] 
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.629*** 0.607*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] 
Dummy variable for gender diversity (1) [d1women] 0.379*   
  [0.076]   
Blau's index for gender [blau]   1.461** 
    [0.023] 
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] -0.016*** -0.018*** 
  [0.008] [0.007] 
Duality [dual] -0.117 -0.078 
  [0.484] [0.663] 
Board size [lnbsize] -1.051 -1.368 
  [0.222] [0.149] 
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.009** 0.012** 
  [0.045] [0.022] 
Firm age [lnfage] 0.275** 0.378** 
  [0.034] [0.014] 
Firm size [fsize] 0.228 0.222* 
  [0.147] [0.099] 
Leverage (%) [lev] -0.007 -0.003 
  [0.433] [0.745] 
Firm fixed-effects yes yes 
Year dummies [year] yes yes 
Number of observations 352 352 
F statistic 14.562*** 14.228*** 
Number of instruments 27 20 
Number of clusters 120 120 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.300 0.230 
Note: This table presents robustness check of the sensitivity of the results obtained from the 
System GMM to alternative corporate governance structure variables. The variables are as defined 
in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The p-values are 
presented in brackets. The t-statistics are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors and 
presented in parentheses. Lag 2 of the levels of firm performance, lags 2 and 3 of board structure 
and other control variables are employed as GMM-type instruments for the first-differenced 
equation of the model in column (1). Lag 2 of the levels of firm performance, board structure and 
other control variables are employed as GMM-type instruments for the first-differenced equation 
of the model in column (2). Lag 1 of the first differences of firm performance, board structure, and 
other control variables are used as GMM-type instruments for the levels equations in both the 
models. Year dummies and lnfage are treated as exogenous variables. Year dummies are included 
in both the models but not reported.  
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Table 5.15: Robustness checks with alternative proxies for gender diversity 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] b/[p] 
 
(2) (3) 
Intercept -5.261** -4.120** 
  [0.03] [0.02] 
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.602*** 0.545*** 
  [0.00] [0.00] 
Dummy variable for gender diversity (2) [d2women] 0.610**   
  [0.05]   
Percentage of female directors (%) [female]   0.033** 
    [0.04] 
The square of female [female_squared]   -0.001 
    [0.14] 
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] -0.018** -0.012* 
  [0.04] [0.06] 
Duality [dual] 0.009 -0.127 
  [0.96] [0.46] 
Board size [lnbsize] -0.973 -0.588 
  [0.30] [0.37] 
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.012** 0.008* 
  [0.03] [0.06] 
Firm age [lnfage] 0.374** 0.229* 
  [0.02] [0.10] 
Firm size [fsize] 0.224* 0.166* 
  [0.05] [0.05] 
Leverage (%) [lev] -0.000 -0.003 
  [0.97] [0.51] 
Firm fixed-effects yes yes 
Year dummy variables [year] yes yes 
Number of observations 352 352 
F statistic 15.76*** 14.84*** 
Number of instruments 22 30 
Number of clusters 120 120 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.15 0.16 
Note: This table presents the robust results from estimating modified equation (4.2) using the 
System GMM approach. Column (2) presents the robust results when the dummy variable 
d2women is added to equation (4.2) to capture the potential effect of the number of female 
directors. Column (3) presents the robust results when a quadratic term of female (denoted as 
female_squared) is included in equation (4.2) to empirically check for the possible non-linearity in 
the board gender diversity–performance relationship. The definitions of the variables are provided 
in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The p-values are 
based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors and presented in brackets. Year dummies are not 
reported. 
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This empirical result generally supports the perspective of ‘critical mass theory’ 
proposed by Kanter (1977) that women may have a more significant effect on a 
group when they increase from a token number to form a significant minority of 
the group. In other words, if female board representation increases board 
effectiveness and firm performance, then that effect should be more pronounced 
when the number of female directors increases (Liu et al., 2014). However, given 
the significantly positive coefficient on both d1women and d2women, this study 
also supports the perspective of Zaichkowsky (2014), who suggests that although 
two or more women on boards appear to have a stronger effect on firm outcomes, 
even one woman can make a difference. 
It is noteworthy that although the relationship between board gender diversity and 
firm performance appears to be significantly positive, it is not necessarily a linear 
relationship. To check empirically for possible non-linearity in the board gender 
diversity–performance relationship, a quadratic term of the variable female 
(denoted as female_squared) is included in equation (4.2). In an un-tabulated 
analysis, the pooled OLS approach is applied to the modified equation (4.2) and 
the results show that: (i) the estimated coefficient on female_squared is 
statistically insignificant ( 𝛽  = –0.0001; p = 0.142); and (ii) the estimated 
coefficient on female is still significantly positive (𝛽 = 0.0060; p = 0.021).  
To further challenge these results, the System GMM estimation approach is 
applied to the modified equation (4.2) and the results are similar to those reported 
above. Specifically, as reported in column 3 of Table 5.15, the estimated 
coefficient on female_squared is statistically insignificant ( 𝛽  = –0.001; p = 
0.140), whereas the coefficient on the variable female is still significantly positive 
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(𝛽 = 0.033; p = 0.040). The results obtained from the OLS and System GMM 
methods lead to a conclusion that there is not enough statistical evidence to 
support a non-linear relationship between board gender diversity and the 
performance of Vietnamese companies.  
Nevertheless, one concern is that over-diversification will wipe out the variety 
and/or the balance of board gender diversity, so that gender diversification leading 
to an all-female BOD may be counterproductive. This argument raises an 
important empirical question: What is the breakpoint at which an undesired effect 
of gender diversification occurs? To find a possible answer to this question, the 
relationship between firm performance and board gender diversity is further 
explored by plotting a graph including a median-band plot together with a scatter-
plot for Tobin’s Q against the Blau index. The Blau index for gender is employed 
since, as mentioned earlier in Subsection 4.3.3.2, it allows for both aspects of 
diversity, that is, gender variety and gender balance.  
 
Figure 5.2: The median-spline plot and scatter-plot for Tobin’s Q against the 
Blau index  
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As shown by the median spline on Figure 5.267, the medians of Tobin’s Q increase 
with the medians of the Blau index until the latter reaches about 0.30 and then 
seem to remain unchanged when the Blau index goes beyond 0.30. This suggests 
that 0.30 is likely to be the breakpoint at which the undesired effect of gender 
diversification may occur. To check this result empirically, a segmented 
regression analysis is undertaken by dividing the sample into two separate 
datasets on the basis of the Blau index. Accordingly, the modified equation (4.2) 
is re-estimated on the sub-dataset with a Blau index smaller than 0.30, and on the 
other with a Blau index equal to or larger than 0.30. The results reported in Table 
5.16 show that the relationship between Tobin’s Q and the Blau index appears to 
change over different intervals of the Blau index.  
More specifically, for firms with a Blau index smaller than 0.30, the Blau index is 
significantly positively related to financial performance (columns 2 and 3 of Table 
5.16). By contrast, for firms with a Blau index equal to or larger than 0.30, the 
relationship becomes insignificant (columns 4 and 5 of Table 5.16). These results 
remain robust when alternative econometric techniques are applied and, consistent 
with what can be observed from the median-band plot, there is likely to be an 
upward trend in Tobin’s Q as the Blau index increases to 0.30. After this point, 
there is no further significant trend in the Tobin’s Q.  
The critical Blau index of 0.30 can be approximately translated into two critical 
percentages of female directors: ether 20% or 80%. However, it is impractical to 
consider the critical percentage of 80%, given that the maximum proportion of 
female directors on boards in the sample is just about 67%. Consequently, it is 
                                                 
67 A related two-way median spline providing a smoother version of the median-band 
plot is included in Figure 5.2. 
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evident from the aforementioned empirical analysis that a Blau index of about 
0.30, corresponding to a ratio of about 20% of women on the BOD, is the 
breakpoint at which the potential performance effect of female board 
representation may change. In order to check for robustness, the segmented 
regression procedure is repeated in which the sample is divided into two datasets 
on the basis of female. Accordingly, the modified equation (4.2) is re-estimated on 
the sub-dataset with female less than 20%, and on the other with female equal to 
or greater than 20%. It is found that the results (unreported) are not qualitatively 
different from those reported in Table 5.16. 
Table 5.16: Robustness checks using a segmented regression analysis 
Regressant: [lnq] 
Blau Index < 0.3   Blau Index  0.3 
OLS System GMM   OLS System GMM 
b/[p] b/[p]  b/[p] b/[p] 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) 
... ... ... 
 
... ... 
Blau index [blau] 0.550*** 1.493** 
 
0.215 0.265 
  [0.00] [0.04] 
 
[0.58] [0.53] 
... ... ... 
 
... ... 
No observations 209 209 
 
143 143 
R-squared 0.70 
  
0.70 
 F statistic 31.90*** 10.80***
 
26.46*** 14.10***
Hansen-J test (p-value) 0.43 
  
0.47 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficient on blau obtained from a segmented regression 
analysis in which the sample is divided into two separate datasets on the basis of the Blau index. 
Accordingly, modified equation (4.2) is estimated on the sub-dataset in which the Blau index is 
smaller than 0.30, and on the other sub-dataset in which the Blau index is equal to or larger than 
0.30. Columns (2) and (4) present the results obtained from the pooled OLS approach. Columns 
(3) and (5) present the results obtained from the System GMM approach. The definitions of the 
variables are provided in Table 4.6.  
Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The p-values are presented in 
brackets. The p-values reported in columns (2) and (4) are based on cluster-robust standard errors 
corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the error term. The p-values 
reported in columns (3) and (5) are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. To save space, 
the estimated coefficients on other variables are not reported.  
Although it is difficult to answer explicitly what the mechanism behind the scene 
is, for the purposes of the current study, one possible explanation for this finding 
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could be that greater gender diversity on boards will add value as long as the 
potential benefits obtained from the diversification outweigh its costs. The author 
believes that the trade-off between the costs and benefits of board gender 
diversification may offer insight into developing a theoretical framework that can 
provide a clear-cut prediction about the nature of the board gender diversity–firm 
performance relationship. 
5.3 SUMMARY 
To address the first research question of this thesis, Chapter 5 investigates the 
relationship between corporate governance structures and financial performance 
of companies operating in the Vietnamese market characterised by a weak 
corporate governance system. Using a dynamic panel modelling approach, this 
chapter concludes that corporate governance structures matter for firm 
performance in the Vietnamese market even after controlling for the potential 
sources of endogeneity inherent in this relationship. More precisely, it is found 
that there is econometrical evidence to support the hypotheses HVN1; HVN4; and 
HVN5. Meanwhile, the others HVN2; HVN3; and HVN6 are not supported by this 
study. The empirical findings obtained from this chapter are summarised and 
reported in Table 5.17. 
Noticeably, this chapter documents that gender diversity in the BOD of publicly 
listed companies in Vietnam tends to have a positive effect on financial 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q. It is also observed that the number of female 
directors in the boardroom makes a difference. Boards with at least one female 
director seem to outperform those with none, and boards with at least two female 
directors appear to have a stronger effect on firm performance than those with at 
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least one. Furthermore, this chapter finds that the nature of the board gender 
diversity–financial performance of Vietnamese listed companies may change 
when the percentage of women reaches the breakpoint of about 20%.  
Table 5.17: Summary of empirical findings for the Vietnamese market 
Hypotheses Tested relationships 
Support 
hypotheses 
Findings 
HVN1 Board gender diversity–performance  Yes +* 
HVN2 Board composition–performance  No –* 
HVN3 Board leadership structure–performance  No  
HVN4 Board size–performance  Yes  
HVN5 Ownership concentration–performance  Yes +* 
HVN6 Capital structure–performance  No  
Note: This table presents the summary of empirical evidence on the relationship between 
corporate governance structures and financial performance of listed companies in Vietnam. The 
table is based on the robust estimation results reported in Table 5.12. Symbols (+), (–) and () 
represent positive, negative, and no significant relationships, respectively. Asterisk (*) indicates 
significance at the 10% level or better. 
Additionally, it is well-documented in this chapter that the positive effect of 
ownership concentration on firm performance is consistent in all four empirical 
models applied. This empirical finding supports the prediction of agency theory 
about the efficient monitoring effect of large shareholders in markets with highly 
concentrated ownership. The next chapter continues to address the first research 
question of this thesis by using a panel dataset collected from Singapore, a market 
characterised by a well-established corporate governance system. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND 
FIRM PERFORMANCE IN SINGAPORE68 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
Applying a similar approach to the previous chapter, this chapter investigates the 
relationship between corporate governance structures and financial performance 
of Singaporean listed companies. The findings attained from Chapters 5 and 6 
address the first research question of this thesis regarding whether the causal 
relationship between corporate governance structures and financial performance 
persist in these two markets when the dynamic nature of this relationship is taken 
into consideration. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.1 presents descriptive 
analyses to provide readers with an initial look at the dataset. The slow-changing 
characteristic of corporate governance variables of the Singaporean market is 
discussed in Subsection 6.1.3. Multiple regression analyses will be introduced in 
Section 6.2. A summary of the empirical findings obtained from this chapter is 
provided in Section 6.3. 
6.1 PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
As presented in Table 4.5, the panel dataset for the Singaporean market includes 
1028 firm-year observations which have relatively full information on key 
corporate governance variables covering a four-year period from 2008 to 2011. 
                                                 
68 A version of this chapter has been published as a scholarly article in Economic 
Modelling, vol 40(C), pp.1-11, under the title ‘A dynamic estimation of governance 
structures and financial performance for Singaporean companies’. The content of this 
chapter is reproduced from the article with permission from Elsevier (License number: 
3370481040535 | Date: April 15, 2014). 
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Following Balatbat et al. (2004); Cornett et al. (2007) among others, this study 
drops 20 firm-year observations within the first and beyond the 99th percentiles to 
ensure the findings are not driven by the outliers of Tobin’s Q. As a result, the 
final sample for the Singaporean market includes 1008 firm-year observations.  
Applying a similar approach to Chapter 5, this chapter reports descriptive 
statistics based on individual samples to maximise the obtainable sample sizes. 
This, as a consequence, provides the best possible statistics of corporate 
governance and firm performance in Singapore. In the case of static multiple 
regression models, a common sample including 931 firm-year observations will 
be used. This common sample is obtained by removing 77 firm-year observations 
in which there are one or more missing values in any variables used in the static 
models. 
When the dynamic models are applied to the dataset, 250 observations are lost due 
to the use of one-year lagged Tobin’s Q as an explanatory variable in the dynamic 
models. In addition, 46 observations with missing values in the variables used in 
the models are also removed from the sample. Therefore, the common sample 
used for formal dynamic multiple regression models is finally reduced from 1008 
to 712 firm-year observations.  
For other models used for robustness checks, the common sample sizes are 
reported either in the relevant tables of results or in attached footnotes. Table 6.1 
summarises the general information of the sample sizes employed in alternative 
situations of analysis for the Singaporean market.  
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Table 6.1: Sample sizes of alternative research models for Singapore 
1 The initial sample size   1028 
2 The number of outliers of Tobin's Q excluded 20   
3 The final sample size* (3) = (1) – (2)   1008 
4 Panel A: For static models     
5 
The number of observations removed because of missing 
values in variables used in the static models 
77   
6 
The common sample size for the static models**  
(6) = (3) – (5) 
  931 
7 Panel B: For dynamic models     
8 
The number of observations lost because of using one-year 
lagged Tobin’s Q as an explanatory variable in the 
dynamic models 
250   
9 
The number of observations lost because of missing values 
in variables used in the dynamic models 
46   
10 
The common sample size for dynamic models**  
(10) = (3) – (8) – (9) 
  712 
Note: (*) individual samples' sizes may be various because of missing values. (**) For other 
models used for robustness checks, the common sample sizes are reported either in the relevant 
tables of results or in attached footnotes. This table is based on data downloaded from Thomson 
One Banker Database and the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company, including 
companies’ annual reports (accessed in December 2011). 
6.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.2 presents the summary of descriptive statistics for the variables used in 
equation (4.2) the sampling period 2008–2011. The mean (median) of Tobin’s Q 
is 0.82 (0.68). Given that a Tobin’s Q ratio greater than one is favourable, the 
smaller-than-one mean value of Tobin’s Q suggests that the companies, on an 
average, did not create value for the shareholders during the sampling period. The 
mean percentage of female directors is 7.89% which is two percentage points 
higher than the total Asian region (6%) reported by Sussmuth-Dyckerhoff et al. 
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(2012). However, this percentage is relatively lower when compared to other 
mature markets such as the US or Australia. Arguably, the gap between female 
representation on the boards of Singapore’s listed companies and that of 
developed countries remains large (CGIO, 2011, 2012). There is a wide variation 
in the percentage of non-executive directors across the sample firms. While the 
maximum percentage of non-executive directors is about 83%, the minimum is 
zero percent. On average, about 15% of board directors in the sample are non-
executive, and approximately 47% are independent directors. Approximately 35% 
of chairpersons concurrently hold CEO positions, indicating that role duality is 
quite uncommon in Singapore. 
The mean (median) number of directors on boards is around seven, which is in 
line with that reported by Witt (2012). The mean (median) percentage of stock 
held by the 20 largest shareholders (blocktop20) is approximately 75% (79%). 
Whereas, the mean (median) percentage of stock held by shareholders who own at 
least 5% of the common stock (block) is around 44% (49%). The values for 
blocktop20 and block reflect that ownership concentration is relatively high in 
Singapore, which is consistent with the observation of Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang (2000) regarding highly concentrated ownership structure in almost all 
Asian markets.  
Despite having a highly concentrated ownership structure, the rights of investors, 
especially minority shareholder rights, are still well protected (World Bank, 
2013). Indeed, the World Bank (2013) indicates that Singapore has been ranked 
second out of 185 economies on the strength of investor protection over the two 
years 2012 and 2013. 
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Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics 
  Observations Mean Median SD Min Max 
Tobin's Q ratio 1008 0.82 0.68 0.50 0.23 3.45 
Percentage of female directors (%) 1003 7.89 0.00 10.66 0.00 50.00 
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) 1004 15.00 14.29 15.61 0.00 83.33 
Percentage of independent directors (%) 1004 46.84 44.44 13.22 0.00 90.91 
CEO duality 1005 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Board size (person) 1005 6.94 7.00 1.83 4.00 14.00 
Ownership concentration (%) 981 43.75 48.55 24.74 0.00 95.39 
Ownership concentration top20 (%) 987 75.44 78.58 14.52 23.58 99.35 
Firm age (year) 978 10.56 9.00 8.38 0.00 43.00 
Firm size [Ln(Total assets)] 1008 19.25 18.93 1.50 16.15 24.66 
Leverage (%) 1008 19.46 17.18 17.09 0.00 101.46 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics based on individual samples of which the sizes may be various because of missing values. The variables are 
as defined in Table 4.6. For interpretation purposes, the descriptive statistics of Tobin’s Q ratio, board size, and firm age are calculated on the basis of 
levels instead of logarithmic form. This table is based on data downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database and the website of Singapore Exchange 
Ltd. Company, including companies’ annual reports (accessed in December 2011). 
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6.1.2 Correlation matrix and multi-collinearity diagnostic 
Table 6.3 shows a pair-wise correlation matrix for the key variables used in 
equation (4.2) as well as in robustness checks 69 . A significantly positive 
correlation between lnbsize and dependent variable indicates that companies with 
larger board size tend to have higher firm value. The correlation coefficient 
between lnbsize and fsize is 0.56 and statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
may suggest that larger companies tend to have larger boards.  
Two proxies for ownership concentration, namely block and blocktop20, are 
significantly positively correlated with the percentage of non-executive directors 
(nonexe) thus indicating that companies with a higher level of concentrated 
ownership also tend to have more non-executive directors on their boards. 
Importantly, the correlation coefficient between one-year lags of Tobin’s Q and 
the current values of Tobin’s Q is 0.75 (p = 0.00). This shows that past 
performance is strongly positively correlated with current performance. This 
evidence supports the proposition suggested by Wintoki et al. (2012) that the 
appropriate empirical model for the studies of the impact of corporate governance 
structures on performance should be a dynamic model in which past performance 
is used as an explanatory variable.  
                                                 
69 As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, a pair-wise correlation coefficient between a pair of 
variables is computed from all observations that have valid data on those two variables. 
Therefore, the pair-wise correlation matrix is based on various individual samples.  
For comparative purposes, a case-wise correlation matrix based on the common sample 
of 712 firm-year observations in the Singaporean market is also reported in Appendix 4. 
In contrast to the pair-wise correlation matrix, the case-wise correlation matrix is 
calculated on the basis of only those observations for which no selected variables are 
missing. It is observed from Table 6.3 and Appendix 4 that the correlation coefficients 
between a given pair of variables are not qualitatively different from each other 
regardless how they are calculated. 
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As reported in Table 6.3, the largest significant correlation coefficient among 
independent variables used in equation (4.2) is 0.56 which is well below the 
threshold of 0.80 suggested by Damodar (2004). This suggests that the multi-
collinearity issue is unlikely to be a serious problem in empirical estimations of 
this chapter. The formal diagnostic of multi-collinearity presented in the last 
column of Table 6.3 indicates that the values of VIFs for all the explanatory 
variables are also well below the threshold of 10. The evidence provided above 
leads to a conclusion that there is no multi-collinearity issue in the estimations for 
the Singaporean market. 
6.1.3 The slow-changing characteristic of corporate governance 
variables 
Following a similar approach to Subsection 5.1.3 in Chapter 5, this subsection 
investigates the within-firm variance of the independent variables employed in 
equation (4.2). It is observed from Table 6.4 that the within-firm variations of the 
variables female, nonexe, indep, dual, lnbsize, block and blocktop20 are all lower 
than their between-firm variations. This finding suggests that the corporate 
governance variables used for the Singaporean market do not vary greatly over 
time, which is consistent with Brown et al. (2011), who reported that most 
corporate governance variables do not change so much over time. 
As mentioned earlier in Subsection 5.1.3 of Chapter 5, the empirical model (4.2) 
will be estimated by the System GMM method which is considered to be superior 
to other panel estimators (e.g., the FE or AB Difference GMM) for dealing with 
the highly persistent characteristic of the explanatory variables (Antoniou et al., 
2008; Hoechle et al., 2012). 
174 
 
Table 6.3: Pair-wise correlation coefficients and variance inflation factor coefficients 
  lnq female nonexe indep dual lnbsize block blocktop20 lnfage fsize lev laglnq VIFs 
lnq 1.00                         
female 0.03 1.00                     1.06 
nonexe 0.06* -0.11*** 1.00                   1.59 
indep 0.15*** -0.03 -0.45*** 1.00                 1.62 
dual 0.04 0.09*** -0.27*** 0.08** 1.00               1.17 
lnbsize 0.17*** -0.08*** 0.28*** -0.14*** -0.23*** 1.00             1.69 
block 0.04 -0.11*** 0.24*** -0.10*** -0.15*** 0.26*** 1.00           1.71 
blocktop20 0.06* -0.05 0.15*** -0.07** -0.02 0.25*** 0.62*** 1.00         1.65 
lnfage -0.11*** 0.04 0.02 0.15*** 0.02 0.12*** 0.06* -0.02 1.00       1.22 
fsize 0.11*** -0.04 0.09*** 0.20*** -0.11*** 0.56*** 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 1.00     2.02 
lev 0.13*** 0.04 -0.10*** 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.09*** 0.00 -0.14*** 0.29*** 1.00   1.26 
laglnq 0.75*** -0.00 0.02 0.20*** 0.05 0.10*** 0.01 -0.00 -0.10*** 0.08** 0.12*** 1.00 1.15 
Note: This table presents pair-wise correlation coefficients which are based on various individual samples. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) are based on the common 
sample of 712 firm-year observations. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). Raw data are downloaded 
from Thomson One Banker Database and the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company, including listed companies’ annual reports (accessed in December 2011). 
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Table 6.4: Overall, between and within standard deviations of the corporate 
governance variables for the Singaporean market  
Variables Standard Deviations 
  overall between within 
Percentage of female directors (%) 10.66 10.29 2.69 
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) 15.61 14.54 5.65 
Percentage of independent directors (%) 13.22 12.38 4.71 
CEO duality 0.48 0.46 0.13 
Board size (person) 1.83 1.75 0.52 
Ownership concentration (%) 24.74 20.90 13.46 
Ownership concentration top20 (%) 14.52 14.20 3.28 
Note: This table reports overall, between and within standard deviations of the corporate 
governance variables for the Singaporean market based on various individual samples. The 
variables are as defined in Table 4.6. For interpretation purposes, the standard deviations of 
board size are calculated on the basis of levels instead of logarithmic form. Raw data are 
downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database and the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. 
Company, including listed companies’ annual reports (accessed in December 2011). 
6.2 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
It should be remembered that most previous studies examine the corporate 
governance–firm performance relationship in a static framework in which the 
potential effect of past performance on current performance and corporate 
governance structures is ignored. This study therefore investigates the relationship 
in a dynamic modelling framework in which the lagged dependent variable is 
employed as an explanatory variable.  
However, in the presence of the dynamic structure in equation (4.2), the OLS 
estimation on 1 will be upward biased while the FE estimation on 1 will be 
downward biased when the panel is short (Nickell, 1981). It follows that the 
estimates obtained from the OLS and FE methods can be considered to be upper 
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bound and lower bound for reasonable estimates obtained from the System GMM 
method, respectively (Bond, 2002). As a consequence, it is necessary to compare 
the estimates provided by the System GMM with those provided by the OLS and 
FE estimators in order to detect potential biases in empirical studies (Bond, 2002).  
Applying a similar approach to Chapter 5, the Subsection 6.2.1 reports the 
empirical findings attained from estimating equation (4.2) through the use of 
alternative regression techniques, such as the OLS and FE70, before proceeding 
with the more complicated System GMM model. By doing so, this study aims to: 
(i) check the robustness of the findings across different econometric estimation 
techniques; (ii) compare the findings of the current study with those of previous 
relevant studies; and (iii) follow the good practices suggested by Bond (2002) that 
the consistent System GMM estimator should be compared with simpler 
estimators such as the pooled OLS or FE estimator to detect potential biases in 
empirical studies. 
6.2.1 Static vs. dynamic models: Pooled OLS and FE estimations 
The empirical analysis in this subsection commences with the pooled OLS model 
to have a preliminary look at the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance of Singaporean listed companies. Then, the potential effect of 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across firms will be controlled by using 
common estimation approaches for panel data, such as the FE and random-effects 
(RE) approaches. The Hausman test for a comparison between the FE and RE 
models was performed under the null hypothesis that the preferred model is 
                                                 
70For the static models using the OLS and FE methods, the coefficient on one-year 
lagged Tobin’s Q (1) is assumed to be zero. 
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random-effects. It is found that the null hypothesis cannot be accepted at any 
conventional level of significance (Chi-sq(9) = 698.78; p = 0.00), suggesting that 
the FE estimation procedure should be employed. To save space and to avoid 
repeating similar interpretations to Chapter 5, this subsection only signals the 
findings obtained from estimating equation (4.2) using the pooled OLS and FE 
methods71.  
First, the explanatory power of the dynamic models is improved when compared 
to the static ones (as evidenced by the considerably higher value of R2) regardless 
of the estimation techniques used. This indicates that including a lagged 
dependent variable in the right-hand side of equation (4.2) is necessary to control 
for the persistence of firm performance and mitigate potential omitted variable 
biases (Wooldridge, 2002). This also supports the view suggested by Wintoki et 
al. (2012) that the relationship between corporate governance structures and firm 
performance should be investigated in a dynamic framework. 
Second, the estimated coefficient on one-year lagged Tobin’s Q (laglnq) obtained 
from the System GMM estimator72 (1 = 0.308) is well below the one obtained 
from the OLS (1  = 0.657) but well above the one obtained from the FE estimator 
(1  = –0.050). In line with Bond (2002), this suggests that the System GMM is 
likely to produce reasonable estimates, at least better than those of the OLS and 
FE approaches. 
Third, it can be observed that the estimated coefficient on the variable block 
appears to be robust across different econometric estimation techniques, thus 
                                                 
71 The detailed results obtained from the pooled OLS and FE methods are fully reported 
in Appendix 5; Appendix 6; and Appendix 7. 
72 Reported in Table 6.6. 
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supporting the hypothesis HSG5. This suggests that the performance effect of 
ownership concentration in the Singaporean market seems to persist even after 
controlling for unobserved fixed-effects across firms.  
Fourth, it can be also observed from Appendix 6 that the presence of female 
directors in the boardrooms of Singaporean listed companies has no significant 
effect on firm performance. However, once time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity across firms is controlled by using the FE method (Appendix 7), the 
relationship between female and lnq is now negative, but not statistically different 
from zero at the 5% level. This may suggest that the positive correlation between 
board gender diversity and firm performance in the Singaporean market reported 
by the OLS estimator (Appendix 6) is driven by omitted firm characteristics. 
Finally, it is likely that there is no significant relationship between board 
composition (measured by nonexe) and firm performance (measured by lnq). This 
finding is robust when different estimation techniques are employed, thus 
providing support for the hypothesis HSG2. Meanwhile, the estimated coefficients 
on the other corporate governance variables in both static and dynamic models 
provided by the OLS and FE techniques are inconclusive.  
6.2.2 Dynamic models: A System GMM estimation 
6.2.2.1 Testing for endogeneity of the regressors 
Applying a similar approach to Chapter 5, this subsection reports the DWH test 
for endogeneity of all regressors as a group. As aforementioned in 
Subsection 4.3.5.1, the test is under the null hypothesis that the endogenous 
regressors may actually be treated as exogenous variables (Baum et al., 2007). 
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Following Schultz et al. (2010), the test is undertaken based on the levels equation 
of firm performance and corporate governance variables. Test statistics follow a 
Chi-squared (Chi-sq) distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to eight, 
which is the number of explanatory variables checked for endogeneity. The 
instrumental variables are one-year lagged differences of independent variables, 
including Δlnqit-1 ; Δfemaleit-1 ; Δnonexeit-1 ; Δdualit-1 ; Δlnbsizeit-1 ; Δblockit-1 ; 
Δfsizeit-1 ; and Δlevit-1. Year dummies, industry dummies and lnfage are included 
in the test specification and treated as exogenous variables.  
The DWH test’s result indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be accepted at any 
conventional levels of significance (Chi-sq(8) = 25.67; p = 0.001). This suggests 
that the endogeneity in the corporate governance–firm performance relationship in 
the Singaporean market is a significant concern. Therefore, it is argued that the 
OLS and FE estimators cannot produce unbiased and consistent parameter 
estimates, and that applying the System GMM is necessary. 
6.2.2.2 The validity of the System GMM estimator 
As mentioned in Subsection 4.3.5.2, the validity of the System GMM estimation 
is very much affected by the validity of instrumental variables. It is therefore very 
important to diagnose whether the instruments employed in the System GMM 
regressions are exogenous. For this reason, several formal tests, including the 
Hansen-J test of over-identification and the difference-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity of instrument subsets, have been conducted to confirm the validity of 
the System GMM estimator used in this chapter.  
As presented in the last row of Table 6.6, the Hansen-J test yields a p-value of 
0.791 suggesting that the instrumental variables used in the System GMM model 
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are valid. In an additional analysis, the author follows good practice in 
implementing the System GMM estimation recommended by Roodman (2009b) 
and applies the difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity to the subsets of System 
GMM-type instrumental variables, and standard instruments. The results of the 
difference-in-Hansen tests are reported in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets 
Tested instrument subsets 
Test 
statistics 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-
value 
Panel A: System GMM-type instruments       
Instruments for levels equation as a group 6.69 8 0.571 
lnqit-2 and lnqit-3 (for transformed equation) 0.03 2 0.983 
Δlnqit-1 (for levels equation) 0.07 1 0.796 
Instruments for board structure variables 5.43 12 0.942 
Instruments for other corporate governance 
and control variables 7.72 9 0.563 
Panel B: Standard instruments       
2009 and 2010 year dummies, and lnfage 2.17 3 0.538 
Note: This table presents difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets, under the 
null hypothesis of joint validity of a specific instrument subset. The variables are as defined in 
Table 4.6. The test statistics are asymptotically chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of questionable instrumental variables (Roodman 2009).  
GMM instrument subset used for levels equation includes one-year lagged differences of firm 
performance variable, board structure variables, and other control variables (Δlnqit-1 ; Δfemaleit-1 ; 
Δnonexeit-1 ; Δdualit-1 ; Δlnbsizeit-1 ; Δblockit-1 ; Δfsizeit-1 ; and Δlevit-1). GMM instrument subset 
used for board structure variables includes lag 1 of the first differences; lags 2 and 3 in levels of 
board structure variables namely female; nonexe; dual and lnbsize.  
GMM instrument subset used for other corporate governance and control variables includes lag 1 
of the first differences; lags 2 and 3 in levels of these variables, including block, fsize, and lev. The 
subset of standard instruments for levels equation includes 2009 and 2010 year dummies, and 
lnfage. 2008 and 2011 year dummies are dropped due to collinearity. 
Specifically, the author tests the validity of five subsets of System GMM-type 
instrumental variables including: (i) all GMM instruments for levels equation as a 
group; (ii) GMM instruments for lagged dependent variable for transformed 
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equation; (iii) GMM instruments for lagged dependent variable for levels 
equation; (iv) GMM instruments for board structure variables including female, 
nonexe, dual, and lnbsize; and (v) GMM instruments for the other corporate 
governance and control variables including block, fsize, and lev. The subset of 
standard instruments for levels equation including 2009 and 2010 year dummies 
and lnfage is also tested (Table 6.5). The tests are under the null hypothesis of 
joint validity of a specific instrument subset. The test results reported in Table 6.5 
suggest that all the subsets of instruments employed in the System GMM model 
are econometrically exogenous. 
6.2.2.3 Empirical results from the System GMM model 
This subsection reports the empirical results obtained from the System GMM 
model. As presented in Table 6.6, the coefficient on one-year lagged Tobin’s Q 
ratio is found to be statistically positive at the 5% level of significance (𝛽 = 0.308, 
p = 0.014). This implies that past firm performance has significant effect on the 
current one. This finding is consistent with recent studies (see, e.g., Schultz et al., 
2010; Wintoki et al., 2012 among others) suggesting that past firm performance 
should be considered an important variable to control for the dynamic nature of 
the corporate governance–firm performance relationship. 
Taking into account the concerns of simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity, the 
result reported in Table 6.6 shows that the presence of female directors in the 
boardroom is significantly negatively correlated with firm performance (𝛽 = –
0.028, p = 0.026). This result provides empirical evidence to support the 
hypothesis HSG1, and is consistent with the argument of Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) who argue that the nature of the relationship between board gender 
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diversity and firm performance is contingent upon whether the firms are well 
governed. Accordingly, since female directors bring tougher monitoring to 
boardrooms, adding more women directors is likely to provide excessive and 
unnecessary monitoring for well-governed firms, which may ultimately have a 
detrimental impact on firm performance. This being the case, it is plausible to 
infer that the presence of female directors in boardrooms is undervalued by the 
Singaporean market where the corporate governance system is well established 
and the companies are, in general, well-governed. In terms of estimation 
technique, Adams and Ferreira (2009, p. 306) argue that the positive relationship 
between boardroom gender diversity and firm performance reported in previous 
studies using the OLS or FE methods may be spurious, and that if the endogeneity 
of gender diversity is controlled, the relationship seems to be negative.  
The size of boards is found to be significantly negatively correlated with firm 
performance (𝛽 = –1.183., p = 0.014) which is consistent with prior studies of 
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) for the US market; and Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005) for the Singaporean market. This result supports the hypothesis 
HSG4 that there will be an inverse relationship between board size and firm value 
(as measured by Tobin’s Q) of listed companies in Singapore. This finding also 
agrees with the prediction of agency theory. Based on agency theory, Jensen 
(1993) argues that firm performance will be enhanced if the board is kept small 
and suggests that the optimal size should be no more than eight. This is because 
an organisation tends to function less efficiently when staff numbers rise; the 
benefits obtained from having more members cannot compensate for troubles in 
terms of cooperation and procedure (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). From agency 
theory’s perspective, Muth and Donaldson (1998) explain that if board size is 
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larger, it will take the CEO more time and effort to convince the various directors 
to consent to managerial decisions. This, in turn, may negatively influence firm 
performance as predicted by agency theory.  
Table 6.6 reports that the presence of non-executive directors has no significant 
effect on firm performance. This result of the System GMM model supports the 
hypothesis HSG2 and is consistent with results obtained from the pooled OLS and 
the FE models, thus suggesting that this finding is robust to alternative 
econometric approaches. This result is also consistent with several prior studies of 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); Laing and Weir (1999); and Reddy et al. (2010), 
who, among others, suggest that non-executive director representation does not 
matter at all. The reason could be that companies appoint non-executive directors, 
who may lack knowledge about the firm and industry, to fulfil the Singaporean 
Code and obtain legitimacy. If that is the case, non-executive directors will play a 
tokenism role and may add no value to their firms (Reddy et al., 2010).  
As reported in Table 6.6, there is no statistical evidence from the sample to 
support the hypothesis HSG3 that CEO duality is negatively correlated with firm 
performance of listed companies in Singapore. This result is in line with the study 
of Mak and Kusnadi (2005) for the Singaporean market. It is interesting to note 
that the concentration of ownership (as measured by block) appears to be 
significantly positively correlated with Tobin’s Q, thus supporting the hypothesis 
HSG5. This finding is consistent with agency theory and robust to alternative 
econometric approaches, including the pooled OLS, FE, and System GMM 
models.   
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Table 6.6: The relationship between corporate governance structures and 
performance of Singaporean listed companies: A System GMM estimation 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (t) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -2.051 (-1.057) 
  [0.291]   
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.308** (2.484) 
  [0.014]   
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] -0.028** (-2.237) 
  [0.026]   
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] -0.001 (-0.208) 
  [0.835]   
Duality [dual] 0.066 (0.227) 
  [0.821]   
Board size [lnbsize] -1.183** (-2.488) 
  [0.014]   
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.007** (2.409) 
  [0.017]   
Firm age [lnfage] -0.115* (-1.871) 
  [0.062]   
Firm size [fsize] 0.208 (1.626) 
  [0.105]   
Leverage (%) [lev] 0.004 (1.010) 
  [0.313]   
Industry dummy variables [industry] no 
Firm fixed-effects yes 
Year dummy variables [year] yes 
Number of observations 712 
F statistic 9.601*** 
Number of instruments 28 
Number of clusters 243 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.791 
Note: This table reports the result of the System GMM regression of firm performance (lnq) on 
board structure variables and other control variables. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. 
Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. The p-values are presented in 
brackets. Lags 2 and 3 of the levels of firm performance variable (lnq), board structure variables 
(female, nonexe, dual, and lnbsize) and other control variables (block, fsize, and lev) are employed 
as GMM-type instruments for the first-differenced equation. Lag 1 of the first differences of firm 
performance, board structure variables, and other control variables are used as GMM-type 
instruments for the levels equation. Year dummies and lnfage are treated as exogenous variables. 
Year dummy variables are included in the regression but not reported. 
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This result supports the proposition of agency theory that shareholders who hold a 
large proportion of firm assets may have greater incentives to become involved in 
and monitor managerial behaviours. This, in turn, may help to mitigate agency 
cost and improve firm performance. However, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) suggest that concentration of ownership may lead to 
possible conflicts of interest between minority and majority shareholders. In the 
context of Singapore where minority shareholder rights are well protected (Witt, 
2012), such a concern is unlikely to be a serious problem.  
Regarding the capital structure variable, Table 6.6 shows that financial leverage 
appears to have no significant effect on Tobin’s Q ratio. Although this finding 
does not support the hypothesis HSG6, it is consistent with the finding observed 
from the Vietnamese market. The arguments of Jiraporn et al. (2012) and 
González (2013), mentioned earlier in Subsection 5.2.3.1, appear to be suitable to 
explain why capital structure has no significant effect on financial performance of 
listed Singaporean companies. 
6.2.3 Robustness checks 
This subsection reports the post-estimation checks for the robustness of the results 
obtained from the System GMM model. More specifically, Subsection 6.2.3.1 
presents the sensitivity of the results to the reduction of instrumental variables, 
and Subsection 6.2.3.2 reports the robustness of the results when alternative 
proxies for corporate governance structure variables are employed. 
  
186 
 
6.2.3.1 The sensitivity of the results to the reduction of instruments 
As mentioned in Subsection 5.2.3.1, using too many internal instrumental 
variables (also referred to as ‘instrument proliferation’) may bias the estimated 
coefficients and severely deteriorate the power of the Hansen-J test in detecting 
the invalidity of the instruments employed (Roodman, 2009b). It is clear that 28 
instruments used in the System GMM model (Table 6.6) are small relative to the 
total of 243 clusters. This suggests that instrument proliferation is unlikely to be a 
significant concern in the System GMM estimations reported in this chapter.  
Though, following the good standard practices in using the System GMM 
approach suggested by Roodman (2009a, 2009b), the author carefully checked the 
sensitivity of the results against reductions in the number of instrumental 
variables. Specifically, the author reduced the number of instruments in the 
System GMM model from 28 to 20 by using only one lag of each instrumenting 
variable rather than all available lags. Following the suggestion of Roodman 
(2009b), the author also applied a collapsing instruments approach to reduce the 
instruments’ count. As shown in column 1 of Table 6.7, the results obtained from 
the robustness checking generally remain unchanged, suggesting that this 
chapter’s findings are robust to the instrument reduction.  
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Table 6.7: Robustness check of the sensitivity of the results to the 
instrumental variables’ reduction 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (t) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -2.330 (-1.029) 
  [0.304]   
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.305** (2.245) 
  [0.026]   
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] -0.030* (-1.822) 
  [0.070]   
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] -0.003 (-0.493) 
  [0.623]   
Duality [dual] -0.088 (-0.262) 
  [0.793]   
Board size [lnbsize] -1.156* (-1.868) 
  [0.063]   
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.007* (1.793) 
  [0.074]   
Firm age [lnfage] -0.129* (-1.724) 
  [0.086]   
Firm size [fsize] 0.229 (1.488) 
  [0.138]   
Leverage (%) [lev] 0.003 (0.741) 
  [0.459]   
Industry dummies [industry] no 
Firm fixed-effects yes 
Year dummies [year] yes 
Number of observations 712 
F statistic 8.343*** 
Number of instruments 20 
Number of clusters 243 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.324 
Note: This table presents robustness check of the sensitivity of the results obtained from the 
System GMM to the instruments’ reduction. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. Asterisks 
indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The p-values are presented in brackets. 
The t-statistics are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors and presented in parentheses. 
Lag 2 of the levels of lnq, female, nonexe, dual, lnbsize, block, fsize and lev are employed as 
GMM-type instruments for the first-differenced equation. Lag 1 of the first differences of these 
variables is used as GMM-type instruments for the levels equation. Year dummies and lnfage are 
treated as exogenous variables. Year dummies are included but not reported. 
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6.2.3.3 Robustness check with alternative corporate governance variables 
This subsection checks the robustness of the findings, obtained from the System 
GMM model, when alternative proxies for corporate governance structures are 
employed. Specifically, equation (4.2) is re-estimated by replacing nonexe with 
indep, and replacing block with blocktop20. As mentioned earlier in 
Subsection 4.3.2.2, indep is employed as an alternative proxy for board 
composition and blocktop20 is used as an alternative proxy for concentrated 
ownership structure.  
Column 1 of Table 6.8 shows that the coefficients on indep and blocktop20 are 
similar to those on nonexe and block in terms of both direction and magnitude. 
The coefficients on the other corporate governance variables are generally 
unchanged except for those on dual and female. In the robust model, while the 
coefficient on the variable of dual obtains a marginal significance at 10% level, 
the variable female loses significance but still negatively relates to firm financial 
performance. Basically, the findings regarding the key corporate governance 
variables of interest, such as board size, board composition, ownership structure, 
and capital structure, are robust when the alternative proxies for corporate 
governance structures are used. 
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Table 6.8: Robustness check of the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
corporate governance structure variables  
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (t) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -1.267 (-0.802) 
  [0.423]   
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.228* (1.958) 
  [0.051]   
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] -0.017 (-1.204) 
  [0.230]   
Percentage of independent directors (%) [indep] -0.003 (-0.360) 
  [0.719]   
Duality [dual] 0.498* (1.666) 
  [0.097]   
Board size [lnbsize] -1.521*** (-3.199) 
  [0.002]   
Ownership concentration top 20 (%) [blocktop20] 0.020*** (2.654) 
  [0.008]   
Firm age [lnfage] -0.054 (-0.920) 
  [0.359]   
Firm size [fsize] 0.128 (1.346) 
  [0.180]   
Leverage (%) [lev] 0.004 (1.595) 
  [0.112]   
Industry dummies [industry] no 
Firm fixed-effects yes 
Year dummies [year] yes 
Number of observations 720 
F statistic 10.721*** 
Number of instruments 28 
Number of clusters 247 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.456 
Note: This table presents robustness check of the sensitivity of the results obtained from the 
System GMM to alternative corporate governance structure variables. The variables are as defined 
in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The p-values are 
presented in brackets. The t-statistics are based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors and 
presented in parentheses. Lags 2 and 3 of the levels of lnq, female, indep, dual, lnbsize, 
blocktop20, fsize and lev are employed as GMM-type instruments for the first-differenced 
equation. Lag 1 of the first differences of these variables is used as GMM-type instruments for the 
levels equation. Year dummies and lnfage are treated as exogenous variables. Year dummies are 
included but not reported. 
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6.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance structures 
and financial performance of companies operating in a market characterised by a 
well-established corporate governance system. A sample of 257 Singaporean 
domiciled non-financial listed companies is investigated using the System GMM 
estimator. Contrary to the Vietnamese market, it is observed that female 
representation in boardrooms is negatively related to firm performance in the 
Singaporean market. This result supports the view of Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
that while more gender-diverse boards may add value to companies with weak 
governance, they appear to result in decreasing shareholder value of well-
governed companies.  
Importantly, the robust evidence indicates that past performance can help control 
unobserved historical factors in the corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship. This finding strongly supports the arguments of Pham et al. (2011); 
Schultz et al. (2010) and Wintoki et al. (2012) among others, that the link between 
corporate governance and firm performance should be investigated in a dynamic 
framework. Additionally, it is evident in this chapter that the positive effect of 
ownership concentration on firm performance is consistent in all four empirical 
models applied. 
In summary, it is found that the three corporate governance structures, including 
board gender diversity, board size and ownership structure have significant effects 
on firm performance. These findings support the hypotheses HSG1; HSG4; and 
HSG5, respectively. It is also found that board composition has no significant 
effect on firm performance, thus supporting the hypothesis HSG2. However, there 
191 
 
is no econometric evidence to support the other hypotheses, including HSG3; and 
HSG6. Table 6.9 provides a summary of the findings of this chapter. 
Table 6.9: Summary of empirical findings for the Singaporean market 
Hypotheses Tested relationships 
Support 
hypotheses 
Findings 
HSG1 Board gender diversity–performance  Yes –* 
HSG2 Board composition–performance  Yes  
HSG3 Board leadership structure–performance  No  
HSG4 Board size–performance  Yes –* 
HSG5 Ownership concentration–performance  Yes +* 
HSG6 Capital structure–performance  No  
Note: This table presents the summary of empirical evidence on the relationship between 
corporate governance structures and financial performance of listed companies in Singapore. The 
table is based on the robust estimation results reported in Table 6.7. Symbols (+), (–) and () 
represent positive, negative, and no significant relationships, respectively. Asterisk (*) indicates 
significance at the 10% level or better. 
Taken together, the findings of Chapters 5 and 6 provide robust empirical 
evidence to address the first research question of the current thesis. After 
controlling for potential sources of endogeneity, the author concludes that 
corporate governance structures have causal effects on financial performance of 
listed companies in Singapore and Vietnam.  
Using an aggregate dataset on both markets, the next chapter investigates the 
relationship between corporate governance structures and financial performance 
of companies in the Singaporean and Vietnamese markets from a comparative 
perspective. Chapter 7 will address the second research question of this thesis as 
to the moderating role of national governance quality in the corporate 
governance–firm performance relationship.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND 
FIRM PERFORMANCE: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS BETWEEN AN EMERGING MARKET 
AND A MATURE MARKET 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide the answer to the first research question of this study: 
whether the performance effects of corporate governance structures persist once 
the dynamic endogeneity is taken into consideration. This chapter examines the 
corporate governance–firm performance relationship from a comparative 
perspective to answer the second research question regarding the moderating 
effect of national governance quality on the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship.  
Specifically, Section 7.1 provides evidence from cross-country comparison in 
which the corporate governance–firm performance relationship is discussed and 
compared in the institutional scenarios of each market. Taking the country-
specific institutional characteristics into consideration, Section 7.2 will present the 
results of an econometric model using a combined dataset of both countries. The 
model aims to explore the potential interaction of country-level and firm-level 
governance mechanisms and the effect of this interaction on determining the 
financial performance of listed companies in the two countries. Section 7.3 
provides a summary for the chapter.  
194 
 
7.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND PERFORMANCE: 
EVIDENCE FROM A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 
7.1.1 A comparison of corporate governance structures and firm 
performance between Singapore and Vietnam 
For comparison purposes, this subsection reports and analyses the results of: (i) t-
test for the difference in the population means of numerical variables; and (ii) z-
test for the difference in the population proportions of categorical variables. As 
introduced in Subsection 4.3.2, there are seven numerical variables and two 
categorical variables that need to be compared between the Vietnamese market 
and the Singaporean market.  
The seven numerical variables include: (i) Tobin’s Q ratio; (ii) percentage of 
female directors; (iii) percentage of independent and/or non-executive directors; 
(iv) board size; (v) ownership concentration; (vi) leverage; and (vii) firm age. The 
two categorical variables are: (i) a dummy variable for gender diversity; and (ii) a 
dummy variable for CEO duality. Following Adams and Ferreira (2009), the tests 
are conducted across firm-year observations instead of on a year-to-year basis in 
order to capture both cross-sectional and time-series variances. 
In summary, this subsection indicates that the age, capital structure and board 
structure including board size, board composition and board gender diversity of 
firms in both markets are statistically significantly different. This subsection also 
shows that ownership structure, board leadership structure, and firm performance 
of companies in both markets are not significantly different.   
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7.1.1.1 The difference in the means of numerical variables between 
Singapore and Vietnam 
This subsection reports the results of comparing the means of the numerical 
variables through the use of a hypothesis-testing procedure in which the test 
statistic approximately follows a Student’s t-distribution. This t-test procedure is 
based on two important assumptions that the populations should: (i) be normally 
distributed and (ii) have equal variances (Berenson, Levine, & Krehbiel, 2012). 
Therefore, checking if the populations are satisfied with such assumptions is 
essential to ensure the validity of the t-test procedure (Berenson et al., 2012). For 
this purpose, the remainder of this subsection will proceed as follows. First, 
assumption (i) will be assessed by implementing the Shapiro–Wilk normality test. 
Second, assumption (ii) will be checked by executing the Levene’s robust test for 
the equality of variances. 
To evaluate the normality assumption necessary for using the t-test, the Shapiro–
Wilk normality test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) is carried out on the two markets’ 
sample datasets. As reported in Table 7.1, the null hypothesis that the numerical 
variables of interest are normally distributed cannot be accepted at any 
conventional level of significance. In other words, the assumption of normal 
distribution required for the t-test is violated. However, according to Berenson et 
al. (2012), in cases where the populations are not normally distributed, the t-test 
still can be used if the sample sizes are large enough (N  30). It is evident from 
Table 7.3 that the sample sizes employed in the tests are large enough to 
reasonably assume that the populations are normally distributed. As suggested by 
Berenson et al. (2012), it is a standard practice to check the robustness of the t-
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test’s results by implementing an alternative nonparametric test in which 
normality is not a strict constraint73  
To test whether the variance of a given variable differs by country, the Levene’s 
robust test for the equality of variances between the two markets’ numerical 
variables is applied74 (Levene, 2006, as cited in Berenson et al., 2012). The test is 
under the null hypothesis that the variances of a given variable are the same across 
the two-country sample. The results displayed in Table 7.2 suggest that the null 
hypothesis cannot be accepted at any conventional level of significance.  
Given the unequal population variances, the separate-variance t-test procedure 
developed by Satterthwaite (1946, as cited in Berenson et al., 2012) which takes 
into account the inequality of variances and sample sizes will be employed in this 
subsection to test for the difference in the population means of numerical 
variables. Specifically, this subsection tests the hypothesis that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the mean values of a given variable 
between the two markets under the assumption that the two population variances 
are unequal. Formally, 𝜇𝑉 is the population mean of a particular variable from the 
Vietnamese market, and 𝜇𝑆  is the population mean of a corresponding variable 
from the Singaporean market. The null hypothesis of no difference in the means 
of two independent populations and the alternative hypothesis can be stated as 
follows:  
𝐻0: 𝜇𝑉 −  𝜇𝑆 = 0                           𝐻1: 𝜇𝑉 −  𝜇𝑆 ≠ 0  (7.1) 
                                                 
73 This will be discussed in more detail at the end of this subsection. 
74 Given that none of the seven numerical variables are normally distributed, the 
normality assumption of Bartlett’s test for homogeneity of variances is thus violated. For 
this reason, the Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance, which is robust under non-
normality situations, is employed instead. 
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Table 7.1: Shapiro-Wilk test for the normality of the numerical variables 
Variables Vietnam sample   Singapore sample 
  Observations z-statistics p-values 
 
Observations z-statistics p-values 
Tobin's Q ratio 479 9.318 0.000 
 
1008 11.963 0.000 
Percentage of female directors (%) 472 5.406 0.000 
 
1003 7.064 0.000 
Percentage of independent / nonexecutive directors (%) 479 2.909 0.002 
 
1004 5.404 0.000 
Board size (person) 479 7.480 0.000 
 
1005 8.131 0.000 
Ownership concentration (%) 478 5.079 0.000 
 
981 7.400 0.000 
Firm age (year) 479 7.096 0.000 
 
978 11.292 0.000 
Leverage (%) 479 6.370 0.000 
 
1008 9.044 0.000 
Note: This table reports the results of Shapiro-Wilk test for the normality of seven numerical variables. The test is based on various individual samples which are reported in 
the column ‘Observations’. The test is under the null hypothesis that a given numerical variable is normally distributed. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. For the 
Singaporean market, raw data are downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database and the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company, including listed companies’ 
annual reports. For the Vietnamese market, the calculation is based on data directly provided by StoxPlus Corporation and/or downloaded from Thomson One Banker 
Database, and/or extracted from companies’ annual reports which are downloaded from FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in December 
2011). 
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Table 7.2: Levene's robust test for the equality of variances of the numerical variables  
Variables Observations F-statistics p-values 
  Total Vietnam Singapore     
Tobin's Q ratio 1487 479 1008 18.005 0.000 
Percentage of female directors (%) 1475 472 1003 73.903 0.000 
Percentage of independent and/or nonexecutive directors (%) 1483 479 1004 82.008 0.000 
Board size (person) 1484 479 1005 49.649 0.000 
Ownership concentration (%) 1459 478 981 25.834 0.000 
Firm age (year) 1457 479 978 272.647 0.000 
Leverage (%) 1487 479 1008 44.523 0.000 
Note: This table reports the results of Levene's robust test for the equality of variances of seven numerical variables. The test is based on various individual 
samples which are reported in the column ‘Observations’. The test is under the null hypothesis that the variances of a given variable are the same across the 
two-country sample. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. For the Singaporean market, raw data are downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database and 
the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company, including listed companies’ annual reports. For the Vietnamese market, the calculation is based on data 
directly provided by StoxPlus Corporation and/or downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database, and/or extracted from companies’ annual reports which 
are downloaded from FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in December 2011).  
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Table 7.3: Two-sample t-test on the equality of population means with unequal variances 
Variables Observations Mean values t-statistics 
 
Vietnam Singapore Total Vietnam Singapore Difference 
 Tobin's Q ratio 479 1008 1487 0.85 0.82 0.03 1.222 
Percentage of female directors (%) 472 1003 1475 12.06 7.89 4.17*** 5.82 
Percentage of independent / nonexecutive directors (%) 479 1004 1483 48.91 61.84 -12.93*** -12.152 
Board size (person) 479 1005 1484 5.81 6.94 -1.13*** -13.73 
Ownership concentration (%) 478 981 1459 43.92 43.75 0.17 0.141 
Firm age (year) 479 978 1457 3.34 10.56 -7.22*** -25.449 
Leverage (%) 479 1008 1487 29.22 19.46 9.76*** 9.113 
Note: This table reports the results of two-sample t-test on the equality of population means (with unequal variances) of seven numerical variables. The test is based on 
various individual samples which are reported in the column ‘Observations’. The test is under the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the mean values of a given variable between the two markets (assume that the two population variances are inhomogeneous). The variables are as defined in 
Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). For the Singaporean market, raw data are downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database 
and the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company, including listed companies’ annual reports. For the Vietnamese market, the calculation is based on data directly 
provided by StoxPlus Corporation and/or downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database, and/or extracted from companies’ annual reports which are downloaded 
from FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in December 2011).  
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As reported in Table 7.3, there is not enough statistical evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis for two variables: (i) Tobin’s Q and (ii) ownership concentration. This 
suggests that neither the means of Tobin’s Q ratio nor the means of ownership 
concentration are statistically significantly different across the two markets. Given 
that the means of Tobin’s Q ratio of companies in Singapore and Vietnam are 
both less than one, the companies, on average, did not create value for the 
shareholders during the four-year period of 2008– 2011. 
The percentage of stock held by shareholders who own at least 5% of the common 
stock (ownership concentration) in both countries is approximately 44%, 
suggesting that ownership concentration is relatively high in these two markets. 
This finding is in agreement with the study undertaken by Claessens et al. (2000) 
who document a highly concentrated ownership structure in almost all Asian 
markets. It is worth noting that although sharing a similar characteristic of a 
highly concentrated ownership structure, the two markets differ in terms of 
providing minority shareholder protection. While investor rights are well 
protected in the Singaporean market (World Bank, 2013), the protection of 
minority shareholder rights in the Vietnamese market is weak because both 
internal and external governance mechanisms are under-developed (Le & Walker, 
2008; Nguyen, 2008; World Bank, 2006a). 
The fact that companies in both countries, on average, are not significantly 
different in financial performance and concentrated ownership structure offers a 
pseudo-experiment scenario which facilitates investigating the impact of national 
governance characteristics, such as investor protection, on the corporate 
governance–firm performance relationship. In other words, the effect of national 
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governance characteristics on the corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship will be examined in a circumstance where potential noise made by the 
differences in Tobin’s Q and block is controlled. Table 7.3 shows that there are 
statistically significant differences in the population means of the other numerical 
variables under consideration. More specifically, there is statistical evidence to 
document that the percentage of female directors; percentage of independent 
and/or non-executive directors; board size; leverage; and firm age are significantly 
different by country.  
The percentage of female directors on the BOD of Vietnamese companies is 4.17 
percentage-points (equivalent to 53%) higher than that of Singaporean companies. 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, the Vietnamese government has put a lot of 
effort into improving the country’s gender-related institutional environment. As a 
consequence, the greater boardroom gender diversity in Vietnamese companies 
may be a reflection of a higher proportion of females in the labour force (World 
Bank, 2011). In contrast, the smaller number of female directors in Singaporean 
boardrooms “may stem from the traditional view of women as primarily 
responsible for family care and welfare in Singapore, where women are often the 
default caregiver or homemaker” (Kang, Ding, & Charoenwong, 2010, p. 890). 
The percentage of independent and/or non-executive directors of Vietnamese 
companies, on average, is approximately 13 percentage-points lower than that of 
Singaporean companies. It should be noted that the Singaporean Code 2005 and 
the Vietnamese Code 2007 both stipulate that independent and/or non-executive 
directors should/must make up at least one-third of the board. Because the board 
size of Vietnamese companies (mean ≈ 5.81 persons), on average, is statistically 
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significantly smaller than their Singaporean counterparts (mean ≈ 6.94 persons), 
the significantly lower percentage of independent and/or non-executive directors 
on Vietnamese companies is a reasonable and credible finding. Table 7.3 also 
shows that, on average, Vietnamese companies are younger than Singaporean 
companies. This is plausible because almost all Vietnamese companies were first 
listed on the HOSE and HNX markets from 2007 onwards. This also reflects the 
different development history of the stock exchange markets in the two countries.  
With regard to using financial leverage in the two countries, it is evident from 
Table 7.3 that, on average, Vietnamese firms employ approximately a ten 
percentage point higher debt ratio than Singapore firms. In other words, 
Vietnamese companies tend to use more interest-bearing liabilities in their 
financial structures. This finding is consistent with the characteristics of the 
financial market in each country. Given an under-developed financial market, the 
financial structure of Vietnamese companies is considered to be a bank-based type 
(World Bank, 2006a) where firms predominantly use bank loans to finance their 
business operations. On the contrary, Singaporean companies enjoy a market-
based financial system (Anderson & Gupta, 2009) where financing decisions are 
primarily based on the activities of the stock market.  
In addition, this finding may also be a reflection of differences in institutional 
characteristics between the two countries which have potential to affect the capital 
structure choices of firms (Antoniou et al., 2008). Operating in an institutional 
environment with more efficient law enforcement regulations, especially in 
bankruptcy laws, Singaporean companies, naturally, tend to keep their financial 
leverage lower to alleviate the risk of bankruptcy.  
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In an unreported analysis, the robustness of the comparative results obtained from 
the t-test procedure is checked by using an alternative nonparametric approach 
which does not require the normality assumption. Specifically, the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test (Wilcoxon, 1945, as cited in Berenson et al., 2012) is performed 
under the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference 
between two medians of a given variable. In general, the results of this 
nonparametric test are numerically equivalent to those of its parametric 
counterpart. This implies that the comparative findings obtained from the t-test 
procedure are robust even after the non-normality of data is taken into 
consideration. 
7.1.1.2 The difference in the proportions of categorical variables between 
Singapore and Vietnam 
The aim of this subsection is to compare the proportions of categorical variables 
between the two markets by employing a z-test on the equality of proportions, 
using large-sample statistics in which the test statistic is approximated by a 
standardized normal distribution (Berenson et al., 2012). The null hypothesis of 
the z-test is that the population proportions of a given categorical variable are 
equal across the two countries.  
As mentioned earlier, the two categorical variables under consideration are: (i) a 
dummy variable for gender diversity (dwomen); and (ii) a dummy variable for 
CEO duality (dual). It should be noted that because these dummy variables use a 
[0, 1] system of values, their ‘mean’ values are actually the proportions of those 
observations that take the value of one. For example, the dummy variable for 
gender diversity for the Vietnamese market has the ‘mean’ value of 0.51. This 
means that 51% of companies in the sample have at least one female director in 
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their boards. As reported in Table 7.4, the proportion of companies having one or 
more female directors in their boardrooms in Vietnam (mean ≈ 51%) is 
statistically significantly different from that in Singapore (mean ≈ 42%). On 
average, this nine percentage point difference indicates that the number of 
companies with at least one female director on the BOD in Vietnam is about 21% 
higher than in Singapore. This finding is in accordance with that presented in 
Subsection 7.1.1.1. 
With regard to the dummy variable for CEO duality, there is statistical evidence to 
conclude that the companies across the two countries are not significantly 
different from each other with respect to the proportions of those CEOs who are 
also BOD chairpersons. The relatively modest proportions of companies with a 
dual leadership structure (around 32% to 35% for the Vietnamese and 
Singaporean markets, respectively) suggest that CEO duality is uncommon in 
both markets. 
Table 7.4 Two-sample z-test on the equality of population proportions 
Variables Observations Proportions z-statistics 
  Viet Sing Total Viet Sing Difference   
dwomen 472 1003 1475 0.51 0.42 0.09*** 3.157 
dual 479 1005 1484 0.32 0.35 -0.03 -0.975 
Note: This table reports the results of two-sample z-test on the equality of population proportions 
of the two categorical variables, including dwomen and dual. The test is based on various 
individual samples which are reported in column ‘Observations’. The test is under the null 
hypothesis that the population proportions of a given categorical variable are equal across the two 
markets. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. Asterisk indicates significance at 1% (***). 
For the Singaporean market, raw data are downloaded the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. 
Company, including listed companies’ annual reports. For the Vietnamese market, the calculation 
is based on data directly provided by StoxPlus Corporation, and/or extracted from companies’ 
annual reports which are downloaded from FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway and 
Vietstock (accessed in December 2011). 
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7.1.2 A cross-country comparative analysis of corporate 
governance structures–firm performance relationship 
In this subsection, a cross-country comparative analysis of the corporate 
governance structures–firm performance relationship is performed on the basis of 
the empirical estimations obtained from Chapters 5 and 6. Accordingly, the role of 
country-specific institutional characteristics is taken into consideration to interpret 
the similarities and differences in the corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship of each country. In other words, each market is examined separately 
and the impact of corporate governance structures on firm performance is 
discussed and compared in the institutional context of each market. For the 
convenience of the readers, the robust empirical evidence on the relationship 
between corporate governance structures and financial performance of listed 
companies in Vietnam and Singapore75 is summarised in Table 7.5. 
7.1.2.1 Dynamic nature of the corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship in Singapore and Vietnam 
Table 7.5 shows that the relationship between the current performance and one-
year lagged performance is statistically significantly positive in both markets. 
Being robust to alternative estimation methods and models, this empirical finding 
strongly support the arguments of Pham et al. (2011); Schultz et al. (2010) and 
Wintoki et al. (2012), among others, that the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship should be investigated in a dynamic framework. This 
means that past firm performance should be considered an important independent 
variable to control for potential effects of unobserved historical factors on current 
corporate governance structures and performance. 
                                                 
75 For the six pairs of hypotheses, denoted from [HVN1 – HSG1] to [HVN6 – HSG6] 
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Table 7.5: Summary of empirical estimations: A cross-country comparison 
Determinants Measures Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q ratio [lnq] 
    The Vietnamese market The Singaporean market 
Past firm performance One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] +* +* 
Board gender diversity  Percentage of female directors (%) [female] +* –* 
Board composition Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] –*  
Board leadership structure Duality [dual]   
Board size Board size [lnbsize]  –* 
Ownership concentration Ownership concentration (%) [block] +* +* 
Capital structure Leverage (%) [lev]   
Note: This table presents the summary of empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate governance structures and financial performance of listed 
companies in Vietnam and Singapore. The table is based on the robust estimation results reported in Table 5.11; Table 5.12; Table 6.6; and Table 6.7. The variables 
are as defined in Table 4.6 Symbols (+), (–) and () represent positive, negative, and no significant relationships, respectively. Asterisk (*) indicates significance at 
the 10% level or better. 
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This is consistent with Wooldridge (2009) who argues that including a lagged 
dependent variable as a proxy for omitted variables is a simple and useful 
approach to account for historical factors having effects on current differences in 
the regressant. This also implies that other commonly used static estimators that 
ignore the dynamic nature of the corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship may be biased (Wintoki et al., 2012). However, in the presence of 
lagged dependent variable(s) in the right hand-side of a model, traditional 
estimations for panel data such as the pooled OLS or FE will be biased and/or 
inconsistent as well (Nickell, 1981). In this situation, the System GMM estimator 
is an appropriate solution for controlling the dynamic nature of the corporate 
governance–firm performance relationship and other endogeneity problems.  
The empirical results reported in Chapters 5 for the Vietnamese market and 
Chapter 6 for the Singaporean market have confirmed that it is necessary to use 
the System GMM estimator to alleviate the endogeneity concerns inherent in the 
corporate governance–firm performance relationship. This study therefore 
supports the recent calls for applying dynamic panel GMM estimator in corporate 
governance research in particular (Wintoki et al., 2012) as well as in corporate 
finance studies in general (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). 
7.1.2.2 Board diversity and firm performance 
As explained earlier, Singapore and Vietnam offer two pseudo-experimental 
scenarios for investigating and generalising the argument of Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) that the true relationship between gender diversity and firm performance 
seems to be complicated and depends on whether that firm is well governed or 
not. As reported in Table 7.5, it is found that the relationship between board 
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gender diversity and firm performance is positive in the weak corporate 
governance system (Vietnam) but negative in the strong one (Singapore). 
Since the estimated coefficients on the variable female are not only statistically 
significant but also economically meaningful, boardroom gender diversity appears 
to be value-relevant for firms in both countries. In addition, the direction of the 
relationship between the two variables in each country well follows what one 
would expect. Specifically, the presence of female directors on the BOD has a 
significantly positive effect on financial performance for companies in Vietnam 
where corporate governance is under-developed. In contrast to the finding for the 
Vietnamese market, having a woman on the BOD leads to a significantly lower 
financial performance for companies in Singapore where corporate governance is 
well-developed.  
The significantly positive relationship for the Vietnamese market is in agreement 
with Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Gul et al. (2011) who argue that higher 
gender-diverse boards may offer stronger monitoring, and therefore may 
substitute for weak corporate governance mechanisms. This implies that there is 
potential for poorly-governed companies to benefit from board gender diversity 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). It is therefore plausible to expect that board gender 
diversity will have a positive effect on financial performance of companies 
operating in the under-developed corporate governance system of Vietnam.  
By way of contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2009) also argue that although more 
diverse boards may add value in weak-governed companies, it is likely that they 
would decrease the value of companies that have strong governance. A plausible 
reason could be that more gender-diverse boards may offer stronger monitoring, 
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which could result in over-monitoring in well-governed companies (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that board gender diversity 
will have a negative effect on the financial performance of companies operating in 
the well-developed corporate governance system of Singapore. 
7.1.2.3 Board composition and firm performance 
The study finds that the greater presence of non-executive directors on boards is 
significantly associated with lower firm value in the Vietnamese market (Table 
7.5). It is also observed that non-executive directors have no significant effect on 
the financial performance of Singaporean companies. The finding is consistent 
with Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) who posit that in countries where 
external corporate governance mechanisms are under-developed, the boards’ 
monitoring function becomes an important internal corporate governance 
mechanism. In that situation, if the so-called non-executive directors play a vague 
role, the boards will not perform their monitoring functions effectively, allowing 
opportunists to follow their self-interests. Consequently, the presence of 
ineffective non-executive directors will ultimately lead to decreasing firm value. 
This finding may be explained from the perspective of institutional theory. 
According to this theory, companies may randomly invite non-executive directors 
to participate on their boards to demonstrate merely that they comply strictly with 
the rule, and for this reason, they can obtain their legitimacy. In that case, the 
presence of non-executive directors on the board may not necessarily have a 
beneficial impact on the independence of the board or on firm performance 
(DiMag & Powell, 1983, as cited in Peng, 2004). By extension, it is likely that 
firms apply corporate governance rules or recommendations to seek firm 
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legitimacy instead of improving firm performance (Lynall et al., 2003). 
Institutional theorists argue that popularly institutionalised norms in the society in 
which companies are situated will largely establish the composition of boards. As 
a consequence, “boards of organisations in the same institutional set will tend to 
be more similar to each other than to the boards of organisations outside their set” 
(Lynall et al., 2003, p. 419). This point of view, again, indicates that it is 
necessary to take institutional perspectives into consideration for comparative 
studies on corporate governance between countries, such as Vietnam 
(characterised by a weak institutional environment and a poor corporate 
governance system) and Singapore (characterised by an advanced institutional 
environment and a strong corporate governance system). 
7.1.2.4 Board leadership structure and firm performance 
Table 7.5 shows that there is no significant relationship between board leadership 
structure (measured by dual) and financial performance of companies in both 
countries. It is necessary to recall that the comparative result reported in Table 7.4 
shows that only 32% to 35% of the chairpersons of the two countries’ boards play 
dual roles. This result suggests that most companies in both countries follow a 
board leadership structure in which the CEO and chairperson roles are separated. 
However, the non-dual leadership structure may be more form than substance for 
the Singaporean companies (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005) and also for the Vietnamese 
companies (World Bank, 2006a).  
For example, the Guideline 3.1, Principle 3 of the Singaporean Code (2005, p. 4) 
recommends that “the chairman and chief executive officer should in principle be 
separate persons, to ensure an appropriate balance of power, increased 
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accountability and greater capacity of  the board for independent decision 
making”. Mak (2007), in his study, reports that 59% Singaporean listed 
companies establish a dual leadership structure to enhance the independence of 
the board. However, “while there is some anecdotal evidence of an improvement 
in willingness of directors to act independently, there remains considerable 
scepticism in the market about whether many independent directors really do 
exercise independent judgement and act in the interest of all shareholders” (Mak, 
2007, p. 43). It is therefore plausible to infer that the board leadership structure 
has no significant influence on financial performance of Singaporean listed 
companies.  
It is also common in the two markets that the chairperson is in practice an 
executive director who is also a major shareholder and interferes in the CEO’s 
operational decisions76 (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; World Bank, 2006a). This implies 
that the board leadership structure in the two countries is in fact a dual system but 
not a non-dual system as described by the statistical numbers in Table 7.4. In this 
situation, the dummy variable dual may not exactly reflect the board leadership 
structures in these two markets, and therefore, may result in problematic estimates 
and misleading interpretations. 
7.1.2.5 Board size and firm performance 
As reported in Table 7.5, the relationship between board size and firm 
performance is insignificant for the Vietnamese market but significantly negative 
                                                 
76 The LOE 2005 provides that the BOD chairperson appointed by the GMS can also be 
the CEO, unless otherwise stipulated by the company’s charter. A study conducted by 
Nguyen (2008) shows that most directors of Vietnamese listed firms including the BOD 
chairperson are majority shareholders, and therefore, they are elected as senior executive 
managers for their company. 
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for the Singaporean market. The finding for the Singaporean market is consistent 
with the prediction of agency theory suggesting that firm performance will be able 
to be enhanced if the size of the board is small (Jensen, 1993). Therefore, Jensen 
(1993) suggests that the optimal threshold of board size should not be more than 
eight. Meanwhile, the finding for the Vietnamese market is in line with Schultz et 
al. (2010); Wintoki et al. (2012) who, among others, have documented an 
insignificant relationship between board size and firm performance after 
controlling for endogeneity issues.  
7.1.2.6 Ownership concentration and firm performance 
Table 7.5 also indicates that the relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance is statistically significantly positive in both markets. This 
finding is generally in agreement with Heugens et al. (2009); Ma, Naughton, and 
Tian (2010); and Yabei and Izumida (2008), among others. This empirical 
evidence supports agency theory’s perspective that ownership concentration is an 
effective internal corporate governance strategy that helps to enhance financial 
performance of firms operating in markets where the ownership structures are 
highly-concentrated, such as Singapore and Vietnam. Accordingly, by owning a 
large proportion of shares, controlling shareholders have strong incentives to 
actively monitor and real power to discipline and/or influence management 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). This helps to mitigate agency problems and improve 
performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
7.1.2.7 Capital structure and firm performance 
As reported in Table 7.5, it is found that there is no evidence to support a 
significant relationship between capital structure and financial performance of 
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firms in both markets. This finding does not support the perspective of agency 
theory, that using debt in capital structure helps to alleviate the potential agency 
costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1993), which in turn may lead to improved 
performance. Several possible explanations presented in Subsection 5.2.3.1 of 
Chapter 5 provide insight into this complex relationship between capital structure 
and firm performance. 
In summary, it is documented in this subsection that financial performance of 
listed companies in both markets is quite persistent, i.e., past performance has a 
statistically significant influence on current performance. With regard to corporate 
governance structures, it is found that greater gender-diverse boards are 
significantly positively related to the financial performance of Vietnamese listed 
companies but significantly negatively correlated with the financial performance 
of their Singaporean counterparts. While ownership concentration has a 
significantly positive effect on firm performance in both markets, the leadership 
structure of boards has no significant effect at all.  
It is also evident from this subsection that the presence of non-executive directors 
on the BOD appears to have significantly negative influence on the financial 
performance of Vietnamese companies but no significant impact on financial 
performance of their Singaporean counterparts. Finally, there is statistical 
evidence to conclude that the relationship between board size and financial 
performance is insignificant for Vietnamese firms but significantly negative for 
Singaporean companies. These comparative findings support the view that the 
effectiveness of corporate governance structures: (i) is country-specific; and (ii) 
appears to be contingent upon the institutional environment within which firms 
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operate. The next section further examines this point of view through the use of 
multiple regression techniques. 
7.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE: DOES NATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
QUALITY MATTER? 
Taking the country-specific institutional characteristics into consideration, this 
section examines the direct effect of national governance quality on determining 
the financial performance of listed companies in the two countries. The potential 
interaction between national governance quality and corporate governance 
structures is also empirically investigated. The remainder of this section is 
structured as follows. Subsections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 in turn provide descriptive 
statistics, the correlation matrix, and a multi-collinearity diagnostic. This is 
followed by Subsection 7.2.3 introducing empirical results obtained from multiple 
regression analyses. 
7.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
It should be remembered that the dataset used in this chapter is based on the 
combination of the two countries’ datasets. The data collection yields an initial 
panel dataset of 1516 firm-year observations. This initial dataset has relatively full 
data on key variables covering the period 2008–2011 (1028 observations for 
Singapore and 488 observations for Vietnam). 
Following Balatbat et al. (2004) and Schultz et al. (2010), among many others, 29 
firm-year observations within the first and beyond the 99th percentiles are 
excluded to alleviate the potential bias caused by the outliers of Tobin’s Q. As a 
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consequence, the final sample comprises 1487 firm-year observations. Because of 
data insufficiency or unavailability of the variables used in models (4.3) and (4.4), 
the individual samples used in univariate analyses may slightly vary. The general 
information of the combined sample sizes employed in this chapter is summarised 
in Table 7.6.  
Table 7.6: Sample sizes of alternative research models using combined 
dataset of Singapore and Vietnam 
1 The initial sample size   1516 
2 The number of outliers of Tobin's Q excluded 29   
3 The final sample size* (3) = (1) – (2)   1487 
4 Panel A: For static models     
5 
The number of observations removed because of missing 
values in variables used in the static models 
108   
6 
The common sample size for the static models**  
(6) = (3) – (5) 
  1379 
7 Panel B: For dynamic models     
8 
The number of observations lost because of using one-year 
lagged Tobin’s Q as an explanatory variable in the 
dynamic models 
371   
9 
The number of observations lost because of missing values 
in variables used in the dynamic models 
52   
10 
The common sample size for dynamic models**  
(10) = (3) – (8) – (9) 
  1064 
Note: (*) individual samples' sizes may be various because of missing values. (**) For other 
models used for robustness checks, the common sample sizes are reported either in the relevant 
tables of results or in attached footnotes. For the Singaporean market, raw data are downloaded 
from Thomson One Banker Database and the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company, 
including listed companies’ annual reports. For the Vietnamese market, the calculation is based on 
data directly provided by StoxPlus Corporation and/or downloaded from Thomson One Banker 
Database, and/or extracted from companies’ annual reports which are downloaded from FPT-Ez-
search Online Information Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in December 2011). 
It should also be noted that 371 observations are dropped in the dynamic models 
in which one-year lagged Tobin’s Q is employed as an explanatory variable. 
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Besides, some of the control variables are missing for some observations which 
results in excluding 52 observations with missing values in the variables 
employed. Therefore, the common sample used for the dynamic models is finally 
reduced from 1487 to 1064 firm-year observations.  
Using the combined sample of the Singaporean and Vietnamese markets, Table 
7.7 summarises the descriptive statistics of the variables included in equation 
(4.3). The mean (median) of Tobin’s Q is 0.83 (0.72), thus suggesting that market 
value of firms in these two countries during the sampling period is, on average, 
lower than their book value. This reflects the markets’ expectations about poor 
capability of firms in exploiting their resources (Lewellen & Badrinath, 1997).  
It is observed from Table 7.7 that female directors account for, on average, 9.22% 
of total directors in the boardrooms of companies in these two countries. This 
percentage is higher than the average in the Asian region (6%), reported by 
Sussmuth-Dyckerhoff et al. (2012). Non-executive and/or independent directors 
account for approximately 57.66% of total directors, while only about 34% of 
board chairpersons play dual roles. This suggests that companies in the two 
markets tend to follow a relatively independent board structure in which the 
proportion of non-executive and/or independent directors is high and the roles of 
CEO and chairperson are separated. In comparison with other countries in the 
Asian region, such as China (11.60), Hong Kong (11.50), and India (10.80) (The 
Korn/Ferry Institute, 2012), the average size of boards in Singapore and Vietnam 
is considerably smaller (6.57). This is, however, in line with the recommendation 
of Jensen (1993) that the optimal board size should not exceed eight members. 
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Table 7.7: Descriptive statistics for the combined sample of Singapore and Vietnam 
  Observations Mean Median SD Min Max 
Tobin's Q ratio  1487 0.83 0.72 0.47 0.20 3.45 
Percentage of female directors (%) 1475 9.22 0.00 11.90 0.00 66.67 
Percentage of independent and/or non-executive directors (%) 1483 57.66 60.00 18.26 0.00 100.00 
CEO duality 1484 0.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Board size (person) 1484 6.57 6.00 1.75 4.00 14.00 
Ownership concentration (%) 1459 43.81 48.88 23.53 0.00 95.39 
Firm age (year) 1457 8.19 6.00 7.74 0.00 43.00 
Firm size [Ln(Total assets)] 1487 18.45 18.29 1.57 14.39 24.43 
Leverage (%) 1487 22.60 20.07 18.73 0.00 101.46 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics based on combined samples of which the sizes may be various because of missing values. The variables are 
as defined in Table 4.6. For interpretation purposes, the descriptive statistics of Tobin’s Q ratio, board size, and firm age are calculated on the basis of 
levels instead of logarithmic form. For the Singaporean market, raw data are downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database and the website of 
Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company, including listed companies’ annual reports. For the Vietnamese market, the calculation is based on data directly 
provided by StoxPlus Corporation and/or downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database, and/or extracted from companies’ annual reports which are 
downloaded from FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in December 2011).  
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The mean (median) percentage of shares held by shareholders who own at least 
5% of common shares is around 43.81% (48.88%) suggesting that the ownership 
structure of companies in the two countries is highly concentrated when compared 
to companies in the US or the UK. It should be noted that this proportion varies 
substantially from zero to about 95.39%, reflecting the heterogeneity of ownership 
structure across firms and the two countries. The average age of firms across the 
combined sample (i.e., the average period of time since the IPO was undertaken) 
is 8.19 years and the average leverage ratio is around 22.6% with a standard 
deviation of 18.73%. 
7.2.2 Correlation matrix and multi-collinearity diagnostic 
Table 7.8 reports the pair-wise correlation coefficients between each pair of 
variables employed in equation (4.3). As reported in Table 7.8, independent 
variables are all statistically significantly correlated with the dependent variable, 
which is likely to offer at least some rough support for the proposition that these 
independent variables interact with performance. This evidence confirms that it is 
necessary to include these independent variables in the empirical models (4.3) and 
(4.4) to mitigate potential bias caused by variable omission. Importantly, the 
correlation coefficient between Tobin’s Q (lnq) and one-year lagged Tobin’s Q 
(laglnq) is positive and statistically significant (0.71), which supports the well-
documented proposition that firm performance is path-dependent. Moreover, one-
year lagged Tobin’s Q is significantly correlated with almost all other corporate 
governance variables. Together, these findings tentatively reveal the dynamic 
nature of the corporate governance–performance relationship which has an 
important implication for the choice of estimation method. 
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Table 7.8: Pair-wise correlation coefficients and variance inflation factor coefficients for the combined sample of Singapore and Vietnam 
  lnq female indep_nonexe dual lnbsize block lnfage fsize lev laglnq VIFs 
lnq 1.00 
          female 0.08*** 1.00
        
1.03
indep_nonexe 0.06** -0.15*** 1.00
       
1.28 
dual 0.06** 0.09*** -0.22*** 1.00
      
1.12 
lnbsize 0.13*** -0.08*** 0.16*** -0.12*** 1.00
     
1.47 
block 0.06** -0.09*** 0.13*** -0.15*** 0.12*** 1.00
    
1.07 
lnfage -0.15*** -0.06** 0.28*** 0.02 0.25*** 0.02 1.00
   
1.42 
fsize 0.08*** -0.08*** 0.27*** -0.06** 0.55*** 0.19*** 0.38*** 1.00
  
1.82 
lev 0.13*** 0.03 -0.18*** -0.02 -0.03 0.09*** -0.24*** 0.16*** 1.00
 
1.25 
laglnq 0.71*** 0.06* 0.07** 0.05* 0.06** 0.04 -0.13*** 0.05 0.11*** 1.00 1.06 
Note: This table presents pair-wise correlation coefficients which are based on combined samples of which the sizes may be various because of missing values. The variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) are based on the common sample of 1064 firm-year observations. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 
5% (**), and 1% (***). For the Singaporean market, raw data are downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database and the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company, 
including listed companies’ annual reports. For the Vietnamese market, the calculation is based on data directly provided by StoxPlus Corporation and/or downloaded from 
Thomson One Banker Database, and/or extracted from companies’ annual reports which are downloaded from FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway and Vietstock 
(accessed in December 2011).  
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Consistent with the prediction of agency theory, the correlation analysis reveals a 
significantly positive relationship between ownership concentration (block) and 
firm performance (lnq). Similar evidence is reported by Thomsen and Pedersen 
(2000); Yabei and Izumida (2008), among others. Remarkably, firm size is 
significantly positively correlated with leverage as evidenced by the correlation 
coefficient of 0.16 which suggests that larger firms tend to employ higher 
financial leverage. This finding is consistent with Antoniou et al. (2008, p. 64) 
who argue that larger companies, due to their lower information asymmetry, may 
have “higher debt capacity and may borrow more to maximise their tax benefits”.  
Whereas, the significantly positive correlation coefficients between fsize and 
lnbsize (0.55); fsize and indep_nonexe (0.27); fsize and lnfage (0.38) suggest that 
larger firms tend to have larger board size, more independent and/or non-
executive directors on their boardrooms, and tend to be more mature. The 
significantly positive correlation coefficient between block and lev supports the 
view of Antoniou et al. (2008) that companies with concentrated ownership 
structures favour financing their business operations through the use of debt rather 
than external equity to prevent possible dilution of ownership and control. 
It is also evident from Table 7.8 that none of the correlation coefficients among 
independent variables are larger than 0.80. As suggested by Damodar (2004), 
unless correlation coefficients among regressors exceed the threshold of 0.80, 
multi-collinearity will not be a serious problem for multiple analysis. This result is 
also confirmed by the VIFs which are usually calculated to detect multi-
collinearity among independent variables in the empirical models. Chatterjee and 
Hadi (2012, p. 236) suggest that values of VIFs larger than ten are usually 
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considered an indication of the presence of collinearity problems. As reported in 
the last column of Table 7.8, the values of VIFs are all smaller than two, which is 
well below the cut-off value of ten. This evidence thus suggests that multi-
collinearity is unlikely a problem in this chapter’s empirical models. 
7.2.3 Multiple regression analysis 
7.2.3.1 Empirical findings from the combined dataset of both markets: The 
pooled OLS and FE models  
An analytical procedure similar to that implemented in Chapters 5 and 6 will be 
employed in this subsection. Specifically, equation (4.3) is estimated by applying 
the pooled OLS approach to the combined data of both countries. Additionally, 
the effects of time-invariant unobserved characteristics across firms are controlled 
through the use of common estimation methods for panel data, such as the FE and 
the RE techniques. The Hausman test is conducted to differentiate between the FE 
and RE approaches. The test result shows that the null hypothesis cannot be 
accepted at any conventional level of significance [Chi-sq(9) = 1046.66 ; p = 
0.000]. Therefore, the FE approach is employed to control for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
The results obtained from the OLS and FE estimations are respectively reported in 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 7.10. For the OLS model, the coefficient on past 
performance variable (laglnq) is found to be statistically positive at the 1% level 
(𝛽 = 0.655; p = 0.00). This supports the claim that performance is path-dependent, 
i.e., past performance has significant effect on current performance. It is also 
evident from columns 2 and 3 of Table 7.10 that the statistical significance of 
estimated coefficients on board structure variables (including indep_nonexe and 
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lnbsize) disappears when the unobserved firm fixed-effects have been taken into 
consideration. This implies that the results obtained from the OLS estimator are 
likely to be driven by omitted firm-level characteristics.  
It should, however, be noted that the significantly positive relationship between 
concentrated ownership (block) and performance (lnq) still holds even after 
controlling for such omitted characteristics. Thus, empirical evidence obtained 
from applying the OLS and FE approaches to the combined dataset supports both 
hypotheses HVN5 and HSG5 that ownership concentration is positively correlated 
with firm performance. Although this finding is consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Ma et al., 2010), it is likely to be severely distorted 
by other potential sources of endogeneity which are not controlled by the FE 
approach such as simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the System GMM method is employed in the next subsection to control 
for such potential sources of endogeneity.  
7.2.3.2 Empirical findings from the combined dataset of both markets: The 
System GMM models  
 Testing for endogeneity of the regressors 
In this subsection, the endogeneity of the regressors is checked empirically 
through the use of the DWH test for endogeneity. The test, executed for all the 
regressors as a group, is under the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors 
may actually be treated as exogenous variables (Baum et al., 2007). Test statistics 
follow a Chi-squared (Chi-sq) distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to 
eight, which is the number of suspected regressors (laglnq, female, indep_nonexe, 
dual, lnbsize, ownership, fsize, and lev).  
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Following Schultz et al. (2010), the test is conducted based on the levels equation 
of firm performance and corporate governance variables in which one-year lagged 
differences of the regressors are employed as instrumental variables. Year 
dummies, industry dummies and lnfage are included in the test specification and 
treated as exogenous variables. It is found that the null hypothesis cannot be 
accepted at any conventional levels of significance (Chi-sq(8) = 24.03; p = 0.000), 
thus suggesting that the System GMM model will be superior in terms of 
consistency when compared with the OLS and FE models.  
 The validity of the System GMM estimator 
The validity of the System GMM estimator is contingent on whether the lagged 
instrumental variables are exogenous (Roodman, 2009b). For this reason, this 
subsection checks empirically the validity of the System GMM estimator through 
the use of the Hansen-J test of over-identification and difference-in-Hansen tests 
of exogeneity of instrument subsets.  
As reported in the last row of Table 7.10, the Hansen-J test yields a p-value of 
0.152 confirming that the instruments (as a group) used in the System GMM 
model are valid. Applying a similar approach to Subsection 5.2.2.2 of Chapter 5, 
the author also follows Roodman (2009b) and applies the difference-in-Hansen 
tests of exogeneity to the subsets of System GMM-type instruments and standard 
instruments. The tests are under the null hypothesis of joint validity of a specific 
instrument subset. The results reported in Table 7.9 confirm that all the subsets of 
instruments used in the System GMM model are econometrically exogenous. 
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Table 7.9: Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets 
Tested instrument subsets 
Test 
statistics 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-
value 
Panel A: System GMM-type instruments       
Instruments for levels equation as a group 12.45 8 0.132 
lnqit-2 and lnqit-3 (for transformed equation) 3.81 2 0.149 
Δlnqit-1 (for levels equation) 0.29 1 0.589 
Instruments for board structure variables 12.99 8 0.112 
Instruments other corporate governance 
and control variables 10.58 6 0.102 
Panel B: Standard instruments    
2009 and 2010 year dummies, and lnfage 0.63 3 0.890 
Note: This table presents difference-in-Hansen tests for exogeneity of instrument subsets, under the 
null hypothesis of joint validity of a specific instrument subset. The variables are as defined in 
Table 4.6.The test statistics are asymptotically Chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of suspect instrumental variables (Roodman, 2009b).  
GMM instrument subset used for the equation in levels includes one-year lagged differences of firm 
performance variable; two-year lagged differences of board structure, ownership concentration, and 
other control variables. GMM instrument subset used for board structure variables includes two-
year lagged differences and lag 3 in levels of board structure variables.  
GMM instrument subset used for the other corporate governance and control variables includes 
two-year lagged differences and lag 3 in levels of these variables. The subset of standard 
instruments for the equation in levels includes 2009 and 2010 year dummies, and lnfage. 2008 and 
2011 year dummies are dropped due to collinearity. 
Given that the OLS and FE estimates of 𝛼1 (the coefficient on laglnq) tend to be 
biased in opposite directions when the length of panel is short (Bond, 2002; 
Nickell, 1981), a reasonable estimate of 𝛼1should lie between the FE estimate 
(lower bound) and the OLS estimate (upper bound) (Bond, 2002). It is evident 
from Table 7.10 that 𝛼1 obtained from the System GMM (0.268) is higher than 
that obtained from the FE (–0.053), but well below the OLS estimate (0.655). This 
is consistent with what one would expect, thus suggesting that the System GMM 
is likely to produce reasonable estimates, at least better than the OLS and FE 
estimates.  
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Moreover, the Wald chi-squared statistic (218.017) reported in Table 7.10 
confirms the overall fit of the System GMM model. Hence, the results from the 
Hansen-J test, difference-in-Hansen tests, Wald chi-squared test of overall model 
fit, together with the reasonable estimate of 𝛼1, suggest that the System GMM 
model appears to be well-specified. 
 The results from the System GMM model 
The results using the System GMM estimator with the Windmeijer (2005) finite-
sample correction are reported in column 4 of Table 7.10. The board structure 
variables have no significant effects on firm performance after controlling for 
dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity, and unobserved heterogeneity. This finding, 
obtained from the combined dataset, is in line with recent findings by Pham et al. 
(2011); Wintoki et al. (2012), among others.  
However, it is important to remember that some board structure variables, as 
documented in Chapters 5 and 6, do have significant effects on the financial 
performance of companies in the Vietnamese and Singaporean markets. For 
example, the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance is 
significantly positive for Vietnamese companies but significantly negative for 
their Singaporean counterparts. Naturally, these contrasting effects will disappear 
when the combined dataset of both markets is used. The author argues that if the 
opposing effects of board structure variables on firm performance obtained from 
the separate country datasets do exist (as reported in Chapters 5 and 6), then it 
would be plausible to expect that they will be neutralised when the combined 
dataset is employed (as reported in this chapter). 
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Table 7.10: The relationship between corporate governance structures and 
performance: Evidence from the combined sample of Singapore and Vietnam 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables Pooled OLS Fixed-effects GMM 
  b/(t) b/(t) b/(z) 
  (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.796*** 5.409*** -0.350 
  (-5.363) (3.947) (-0.311) 
One-year lagged Tobin's Q 0.655*** -0.053 0.268*** 
  (24.199) (-1.487) (2.643) 
Percentage of female directors (%) 0.001 -0.001 0.005 
  (1.382) (-0.368) (0.452) 
Percentage of independent and/or 
non-executive directors (%) 0.001** -0.000 0.000 
  (2.085) (-0.316) (0.036) 
Duality 0.041** 0.161** 0.371 
  (1.972) (2.260) (1.045) 
Board size 0.183*** 0.084 -0.131 
  (4.464) (0.734) (-0.210) 
Ownership concentration (%) 0.001** 0.002** 0.014*** 
  (2.309) (2.383) (2.652) 
Firm age -0.034** -0.291*** -0.100 
  (-2.270) (-4.001) (-0.902) 
Firm size -0.002 -0.249*** -0.023 
  (-0.665) (-3.946) (-0.799) 
Leverage (%) 0.001** 0.005** 0.003 
  (2.558) (2.536) (0.575) 
Industry dummies yes no no 
Firm fixed-effects no yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1064 1064 1064 
R-squared 0.614 0.346   
F statistic 67.722*** 29.143***   
Wald Chi-squared statistic     218.017*** 
Number of instruments     21 
Number of clusters   363 363 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value)   0.152 
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation (4.3). Column 2 reports the results 
obtained from the OLS method with clustering at the firm level. Column 3 presents the results 
obtained from the FE method. The estimates gained from the System GMM approach are 
reported in column 4. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The 
notation is as defined in Table 4.6. The t-statistics of the OLS and FE estimators are reported in 
parentheses and are based on cluster-robust standard errors corrected for potential 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The z-statistics of the System GMM model are reported 
in parentheses and based on Windmeijer-corrected standard errors. Year dummies and industry 
dummies are unreported. 
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Noticeably, there is a significantly positive relationship between the concentrated 
ownership variable and firm performance (𝛽 = 0.014), which is consistent with 
the findings attained from the OLS and FE procedures. Thus, the positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and performance is robust across 
different econometric estimation techniques, providing strong support for both 
hypotheses HVN5 and HSG5 that ownership concentration is positively correlated 
with firm performance. This finding is generally in agreement with Heugens et al. 
(2009); Ma et al. (2010); and Yabei and Izumida (2008), among others. This 
empirical evidence thus supports the agency perspective that ownership 
concentration appears to be an effective internal corporate governance strategy 
that helps to enhance performance.  
7.2.3.3 Does national governance quality matter? 
Chapters 5 and 6 report that ownership concentration is significantly positively 
related to the financial performance of companies in both markets. Importantly, 
this positive relationship is robust to alternative econometric estimators, including 
the pooled OLS, FE, and System GMM. Hence, the positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance displays little variability across 
samples and negligible biases across different econometric techniques.  
Therefore, it is plausible to further investigate whether or not this robust 
relationship may be influenced by the national governance systems in which the 
firms operate. And if it does, then (i) how much does national governance quality 
matter in determining firm performance?; and (ii) what is the interaction effect of 
country-level and firm-level variables of governance on the relationship between 
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ownership structure and firm performance? This subsection reports the empirical 
analyses, testing the hypotheses HVN_SG7 and HVN_SG8, to answer those questions. 
As mentioned earlier in Subsection 4.3.3.4, the hypotheses HVN_SG7 and HVN_SG8 
will be tested through estimating equation (4.4). As reported in columns 1 and 2 
of Table 7.11, the positive relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance remains unchanged after controlling for national governance 
characteristics, thus supporting both hypotheses HVN5 and HSG5. It is also found 
that the aggregate national governance quality index (NGindex) has a significantly 
positive effect on firm performance ( 𝛽  = 0.465 ; p = 0.061). This evidence 
supports the hypothesis HVN_SG7 and is in line with Ngobo and Fouda (2012) who 
documented the positive role of national governance quality in improving firm 
performance. One of the potential explanations is that good national governance is 
likely to encourage low-risk investments which result in better profitability and 
lower performance variability of firms (Ngobo & Fouda, 2012). 
Interestingly, it is found that national governance quality not only has a 
significantly direct impact on firm performance, it also moderates the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance, thus supporting the 
hypothesis HVN_SG8. As reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7.11, the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term [block×NGindex] is negative (𝜑 = –0.004) and 
statistically different from zero at the 5% level. It would be inferred from this 
result that the higher the national governance quality is, the weaker the effect of 
ownership concentration on performance will be.  
These outcomes confirm the emergent proposition that the performance 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms can be contingent upon 
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organisational and environmental characteristics (Kumar & Zattoni, 2013). In line 
with Munisi et al. (2014), this study argues that in the absence of effective 
national governance mechanisms, ownership concentration is likely to be an 
important corporate governance strategy for Vietnamese firms to control potential 
agency problems. In contrast, in Singapore, where national governance quality, 
such as legal protection of shareholders, is much better, the role of ownership 
concentration in determining performance seems to be weaker. 
Consistent with the results found by estimating equation (4.3), it can be observed 
from the combined dataset of both markets that there is no statistical evidence for 
the relationship between board structure variables and firm performance. All the 
estimated coefficients on board structure variables are not statistically different 
from zero even at the 10% level of significance, after controlling for national 
governance quality. This finding is generally in agreement with recent empirical 
studies that use a similar estimation approach (e.g., Pham et al., 2011; Schultz et 
al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012), but contrary to the predictions of both agency and 
resource dependence theories. As argued by the author in Subsection 7.2.3.2, that 
if the contrasting effects of board structure variables on firm performance 
obtained from the separate country datasets do exist (as reported in Chapters 5 and 
6), then it would be plausible to expect that such effects will be neutralised when 
the combined dataset is employed (as reported in this subsection).  
As can be seen in Table 7.11, the significantly positive coefficients on the one-
year lagged dependent variable (laglnq) indicate that performance is quite 
persistent. This is in line with Yabei and Izumida (2008) who argue that firms 
having performed well previously tend to continue to do so. This finding is robust 
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to all three models using alternative proxies for national governance quality, and 
consistent with previous studies (e.g., Pham et al., 2011; Wintoki et al., 2012 
among others). This implies that past performance is a key explanatory variable 
that needs to be included when modelling the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance.  
Regarding the capital structure variable, it is observed from column 4 of Table 
7.10 that this variable has no significant effect on firm performance when the 
potential sources of endogeneity are controlled. This finding is consistent with 
that obtained from estimating equation (4.2) for the Vietnamese and Singaporean 
markets. Thus, the empirical models using the separate datasets of each market as 
well as the combined dataset of both markets provide consistent evidence for an 
insignificant relationship between capital structure and firm performance. 
However, the relationship between capital structure and firm performance 
becomes significantly positive when the differences in national governance 
quality between the two markets are taken into account in equation (4.4). This 
result persists for all three models using alternative proxies for national 
governance quality (as reported in Table 7.11; Table 7.12; and Table 7.13), thus 
providing support for the hypotheses HVN6 and HSG6. Similar evidence is reported 
by Mak and Kusnadi (2005) for Singapore and Malaysia, and Black et al. (2014) 
for Brazil, Korea, Turkey and Russia.  
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Table 7.11: The relationship between corporate governance structures and 
performance: Does national governance quality matter?  
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (z) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -3.984 (-1.413) 
  [0.158] 
 One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.190* (1.837) 
  [0.066] 
 Percentage of female directors (%) [female] 0.009 (0.881) 
  [0.378] 
 Percentage of independent and/or non-executive directors 
(%) [indep_nonexe] -0.013 (-1.440) 
  [0.150] 
 Duality [dual] -0.029 (-0.086) 
  [0.931] 
 Board size [lnbsize] -1.371 (-1.538) 
  [0.124] 
 Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.044*** (3.339) 
  [0.001] 
 Firm age [lnfage] -0.050 (-0.744) 
  [0.457] 
 Firm size [fsize] 0.166 (0.968) 
  [0.333] 
 Leverage (%) [lev] 0.013** (2.306) 
 
[0.021] 
 National governance index [NGindex] 0.465* (1.874) 
 
[0.061] 
 Interaction term [block×NGindex] -0.004** (-2.305) 
 
[0.021] 
 Industry dummies [industry]   no
Firm fixed-effects   yes 
Year dummies [year]   yes 
Number of observations 1064 
Wald Chi-squared statistic 168.740*** 
Number of instruments 26 
Number of clusters 363 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.595 
Note: This table reports the empirical results from estimating equation (4.4) through the use of the 
System GMM approach. Columns 1-2 present the results obtained from using NGindex as a proxy 
for national governance quality. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). 
The notation is as defined in Table 4.6. The z-statistics and p-values are reported in parentheses 
and brackets, respectively. Year dummies are unreported. 
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The contradictory evidence for the capital structure–firm performance relationship 
revealed by empirical models (4.2); (4.3); and (4.4) confirm the argument 
presented in Subsection 5.2.3.1 that this relationship appears to be complicated 
and not really clear in practice. It is likely that such contradictory evidence is a 
consequence of one (or several) potential empirical concerns which have not been 
addressed by this study. Further research is therefore necessary to fully grasp the 
nature of the relationship between capital structure and firm performance. 
One concern is that the inclusion of the interaction term block×NGindex on the 
right-hand side of equation (4.4) may produce potential multi-collinearity because 
the interaction term is itself a product of their components. To check if the main 
findings are distorted by this potential multi-collinearity problem, this study 
follows Lai and Chen (2014); Wan and Yiu (2009) and centres the main effect 
variables (block and NGindex) at their grand-means before forming the interaction 
term. The (unreported) results indicate that the coefficient on the concentrated 
ownership variable (𝛾) and the coefficient on the interaction term (𝜑) are not 
qualitatively different from those reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7.11. 
Hence, the multi-collinearity is unlikely to be a significant concern when the 
interaction term block×NGindex is included in the equation (4.4). 
7.2.4 Robustness checks 
7.2.4.1 Robustness check for the possible non-linearity in the ownership 
structure–performance relationship 
Yabei and Izumida (2008) have documented that ownership concentration has a 
U-shaped effect on performance implying a trade-off between expropriation 
effects and efficient monitoring effects. More specifically, at low levels of 
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ownership concentration, large shareholders tend to expropriate minority 
shareholders’ wealth (Yabei & Izumida, 2008). Whereas at high levels of 
concentration, large shareholders have incentives to actively involve themselves 
in monitoring management (Yabei & Izumida, 2008). For this reason, a quadratic 
term of ownership concentration variable is included in equation (4.3) to allow for 
possible non-linearity in the ownership structure–performance relationship. 
Applying the pooled OLS, FE, and System GMM methods on the modified 
equation (4.3), the author finds that the coefficient on the quadratic term of 
ownership concentration variable is insignificant regardless of the econometric 
approaches employed77. 
The robustness check indicates that the ownership structure–performance 
relationship does not follow the U-shaped pattern, at least for the two markets’ 
sample of firms used herein. This finding is in line with Wang and Shailer (2015) 
who, using a meta-analytical technique to survey primary studies on the 
ownership–performance linkage across 18 emerging markets, report that there is 
no evidence of any non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance.  
This finding supports the proposition drawn from agency theory that the efficient 
monitoring effects of ownership concentration play a dominant role in highly 
concentrated ownership markets, as is the case in most emerging markets in the 
Asian region. In other words, ignoring the potential non-linearity in the ownership 
structure–performance relationship is highly unlikely to cause serious 
misspecification in the empirical models of this study. 
                                                 
77 The results are not reported to save space, but available from the author upon request. 
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7.2.4.2 Robustness check with alternative national governance quality 
variables 
In this subsection, the robustness of the main findings is checked by using 
alternative proxies for national governance quality. Specifically, the variable 
NGindex is in turn replaced by NGindex(a) and IPindex, and the equation (4.4) is 
re-estimated using the System GMM approach78. The results are reported in Table 
7.12 [for NGindex(a)] and Table 7.13 [for IPindex].  
It is found that the estimated coefficients (𝛾), (𝛿) and (𝜑) in modified equation 
(4.4) are qualitatively similar in both direction and magnitude to those obtained 
from the original equation. Hence, the main conclusion about the moderating 
effect of the national governance quality on the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship is robust when the alternative proxies for national 
governance quality are employed.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
78 The difference-in-Hansen tests are executed to ensure that the subsets of instrumental 
variables used in these robustness check models are valid. The (unreported) test results 
confirm that the instruments employed in these models are econometrically exogenous. 
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Table 7.12: Robustness check of the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
national governance variables (NGindex(a)) 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (z) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -2.437 (-1.176) 
  [0.240] 
 One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.190* (1.841) 
  [0.066] 
 Percentage of female directors (%) [female] 0.010 (0.904) 
  [0.366] 
 Percentage of independent and/or non-executive 
directors (%) [indep_nonexe] -0.013 (-1.463) 
  [0.143] 
 Duality [dual] -0.032 (-0.096) 
  [0.923] 
 Board size [lnbsize] -1.402 (-1.563) 
  [0.118] 
 Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.029*** (3.834) 
  [0.000] 
 Firm age [lnfage] -0.050 (-0.750) 
  [0.453] 
 Firm size [fsize] 0.173 (0.998) 
  [0.318] 
 Leverage (%) [lev] 0.013** (2.291) 
  [0.022] 
 National governance index [NGindex(a)] 1.570* (1.897) 
  [0.058] 
 Interaction term [block×NGindex(a)] -0.014** (-2.302) 
  [0.021] 
 Industry dummies [industry]   no
Firm fixed-effects   yes 
Year dummies [year]   yes 
Number of observations 1064 
Wald Chi-squared statistic 168.941*** 
Number of instruments 26 
Number of clusters 363 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.605 
Note: This table reports the empirical results from estimating equation (4.4) through the use of 
the System GMM approach. Columns 1-2 present the results obtained from using NGindex(a) as 
a proxy for national governance quality. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 
1% (***). The notation is as defined in Table 4.6. The z-statistics and p-values are reported in 
parentheses and brackets, respectively. Year dummies are unreported. 
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Table 7.13: Robustness check of the sensitivity of the results to alternative 
national governance variables (IPindex) 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (z) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -6.594* (-1.650) 
  [0.099]   
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.206** (2.119) 
  [0.034]   
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] 0.015 (1.529) 
  [0.126]   
Percentage of independent and/or non-executive 
directors (%) [indep_nonexe] -0.010 (-1.065) 
  [0.287]   
Duality [dual] 0.037 (0.115) 
  [0.909]   
Board size [lnbsize] -1.341 (-1.459) 
  [0.144]   
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.053*** (2.719) 
  [0.007]   
Firm age [lnfage] -0.066 (-1.051) 
  [0.293]   
Firm size [fsize] 0.195 (1.087) 
  [0.277]   
Leverage (%) [lev] 0.010* (1.860) 
  [0.063]   
Investor protection index [IPindex] 0.505* (1.775) 
  [0.076]   
Interaction term [block×IPindex] -0.004** (-2.181) 
  [0.029]   
Industry dummies [industry]   no 
Firm fixed-effects   yes 
Year dummies [year]   yes 
Number of observations 1064 
Wald Chi-squared statistic 184.037*** 
Number of instruments 25 
Number of clusters 363 
Hansen-J test of over-identification (p-value) 0.585 
Note: This table reports the empirical results from estimating equation (4.4) through the use of 
the System GMM approach. Columns 1-2 present the results obtained from using IPindex as a 
proxy for national governance quality. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 
1% (***). The notation is as defined in Table 4.6. The z-statistics and p-values are reported in 
parentheses and brackets, respectively. Year dummies are unreported. 
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7.3 SUMMARY 
The corporate governance literature focuses on the performance effects of firm-
level specific governance characteristics and does not pay sufficient attention to 
the importance of national governance quality. Motivated by the recent 
development in integrating the institutional perspective with the traditional agency 
perspective in corporate governance studies (see eg., Aslan & Kumar, 2014; 
Kumar & Zattoni, 2013; Van Essen et al., 2013), this chapter documents the 
interaction effect of national governance quality on the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship by applying a dynamic modelling approach to the 
combined dataset of mature and transitional markets in the Asian region. Two 
important findings obtained from this chapter are summarised in Table 7.14.  
Table 7.14: Summary of empirical findings from Chapter 7 
Hypotheses Tested relationships 
Support 
hypotheses 
Findings 
HVN_SG7 
National governance quality–firm 
performance  
Yes +* 
HVN_SG8 
Moderating effect of national 
governance quality on the corporate 
governance–firm performance 
relationship  
Yes –* 
Note: This table presents the summary of empirical evidence obtained from estimating equation 
(4.4) using the combined dataset of Singapore and Vietnam. The table is based on the results 
reported in Table 7.11. Symbols (+), (–) represent positive and negative relationships, 
respectively. Asterisk (*) indicates significance at the 10% level or better. 
First, it is observed from this chapter that better national governance plays a 
positive role in determining the financial performance of firms in these two 
markets, thus supporting the hypothesis HVN_SG7. Second, it is found that in 
Singapore, where the national governance quality is considered to be the best in 
the Asian region, the ownership concentration adds little to firm value. In contrast, 
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the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance is 
significantly stronger in Vietnam where national governance quality is poor. This 
finding provides support for the hypothesis HVN_SG8 regarding the moderating 
effect of national governance quality on the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship. This finding also supports the view that the 
performance effects of the internal corporate governance mechanisms are country-
specific, and therefore highlights the importance of incorporating country-level 
governance quality into studies on the corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship. 
The next chapter summarises the contributions and implications of this study. 
Given that research limitations may hinder the interpretation and generalisation of 
this study’s findings, Chapter 8 also provides recommendations for potential 
future research.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a summary of empirical findings, reported in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7, concerning the relationship between corporate governance structures, 
national governance quality, and financial performance of publicly listed 
companies in Vietnam and Singapore. Relevant conclusions and implications for 
policy formulation in the two markets are noted in Section 8.1. Section 8.2 
concludes the thesis with limitations and recommendations for potential future 
research. 
8.1 CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
8.1.1 A summary of key findings and policy implications 
In this thesis, the relationship between corporate governance structures and 
financial performance of companies in Singapore and Vietnam is investigated in a 
dynamic modelling framework. By focusing on two different types of national 
governance systems (well-developed vs. under-developed), this study examines 
how the relationship is moderated by national governance quality. To the best of 
the author’s knowledge, this study is the first attempt to document the interaction 
effect of national governance quality on the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship by applying a dynamic modelling approach to a dataset 
that includes both mature and emerging markets in the Asian region. 
Three key findings obtained from this study are: (i) corporate governance 
structures do matter to the financial performance of publicly listed companies in 
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Singapore and Vietnam, even after the dynamic nature of this relationship is taken 
into consideration; (ii) national governance quality is positively related to firm 
performance; and (iii) national governance quality does matter when explaining 
the ownership concentration–firm performance relationship. Several most 
noticeable findings together with corresponding implications are noted below. 
Table 8.1 also provides a summary of all the findings attained from this thesis. 
Noticeably, it is found that female representation in the BOD has a significantly 
positive effect on the financial performance of listed companies in Vietnam where 
corporate governance is under-developed. In contrast, having a woman on the 
BOD leads to a significantly lower financial performance for listed companies in 
Singapore where corporate governance is well-developed. This is in line with 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Gul et al. (2011) who argue that higher gender-
diverse boards may offer stronger monitoring, and therefore, may substitute for 
weak corporate governance mechanisms. This implies that poorly-governed 
companies may have potential to benefit from board gender diversification 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
Although the abovementioned finding is in no way intended to support mandating 
a gender quota system for the BOD, it does offer an important implication for 
policy formulation. This study suggests that any efforts to rejuvenate corporate 
governance by increasing the number of women on Vietnamese boards of 
directors (and perhaps the BOD in other Asian markets sharing similar corporate 
governance characteristics) should take existing conditions of the corporate 
governance system into consideration.  
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Table 8.1: A summary of the empirical findings of the thesis 
Hypotheses Tested relationships 
The Vietnamese market The Singaporean market 
Expected sign Empirical sign Expected sign Empirical sign 
HVN1 – HSG1 Board gender diversity–firm performance  + + – – 
HVN2 – HSG2 Board composition–firm performance   –   
HVN3 – HSG3 Board leadership structure–firm performance  –  –  
HVN4 – HSG4 Board size–firm performance    – – 
HVN5 – HSG5 Ownership concentration–firm performance  +/– + +/– + 
HVN6 – HSG6 Capital structure–firm performance  +  +  
HVN_SG7 National governance quality–firm performance  +/– + +/– + 
HVN_SG8 
Moderating effect of national governance quality on 
the corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship 
+/– – +/– – 
Note: Symbols (+), (–) and () represent positive, negative, and no significant relationships, respectively. 
 
242 
 
Based in the context of the Vietnamese market, this finding may also imply that in 
Asian developing countries where women are traditionally subordinate to men, 
female directors may have the potential to add value if there is a supportive 
institutional environment and if the advancement of women is consistently 
promoted. Therefore, this study suggests that a better institutional environment for 
women plays an important role in board gender diversification, which may have a 
positive effect on firm performance. 
In line with the prediction of agency theory about the efficient monitoring effect 
of large shareholders in markets with highly concentrated ownership, this thesis 
also finds that ownership concentration has a positive effect on financial 
performance of listed companies in both Singaporean and Vietnamese markets. 
However, the performance effectiveness of ownership concentration is contingent 
upon the institutional environment in which firms operate. The positive effect of 
concentrated ownership on performance of firms operating in the under-developed 
national governance system (Vietnam) tends to be stronger than in the well-
established system (Singapore).  
This finding is consistent with the argument that ownership concentration is an 
efficient corporate governance mechanism which can substitute for weak national 
governance quality. Econometrically, this finding is robust when alternative 
proxies for national governance quality are employed, and still holds even after 
controlling for dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity, and unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity inherent in the corporate governance–firm performance 
relationship. Therefore, with reasonable confidence, it can be stated that the key 
findings of this study are not driven by potential sources of endogeneity.  
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The abovementioned findings offer some implications for policy formulation. 
First, given that firm performance is significantly driven by ownership 
concentration, the effort in setting up corporate governance regulations in markets 
characterised by highly concentrated ownership, such as Singapore and Vietnam, 
should not undervalue the role of ownership structure (Yabei & Izumida, 2008). 
Second, because national governance quality is a positive determinant of firm 
performance, regulatory bodies should put more effort into improving national 
institutional characteristics, such as investor protection or rule of law, all of which 
are ultimately good for business.  
Finally, since the performance effect of ownership concentration is dependent 
upon the quality of the national governance system in which firms are embedded, 
corporate governance reforms in countries with concentrated ownership should 
take national governance characteristics into consideration. As one example, given 
the poor national governance quality of Vietnam, the effort by the Vietnamese 
policy-makers to establish a new shareholding pattern, for example, the Anglo-
Saxon model characterised by dispersed ownership, may be counterproductive.  
8.1.2 The contributions of the thesis 
The contribution of this thesis to the corporate governance literature is twofold. 
First, unlike most prior studies examining the corporate governance–firm 
performance relationship in a static perspective, this study re-investigates the 
relationship in a dynamic modelling framework within which the possible impact 
of historical performance on current performance and corporate governance 
structures is fully controlled. By taking into account the dynamic endogeneity and 
other potential sources of endogeneity (including simultaneity, and time-invariant 
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unobserved heterogeneity), this study expects to achieve more reliable inferences 
about the causal link between corporate governance structures and firm 
performance.  
Second, by providing robust empirical evidence from two typical kinds of national 
governance systems in the Asian region (well-developed vs. under-developed), 
this study supports the emergent proposition that the performance effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms can be contingent upon organisational and 
environmental characteristics (Kumar & Zattoni, 2013). This study therefore 
enriches the understanding of the interplay between corporate governance 
mechanisms and national governance quality, as well as its impacts on corporate 
performance. Given that Vietnam and Singapore are typical examples of under-
developed and well-developed national governance systems, the findings are, to 
some extent, generalizable to markets having similar corporate-level and national-
level governance characteristics. 
8.2 LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Despite the abovementioned contributions, this study does have some limitations, 
many of which may indicate fruitful avenues for future research. First, given that 
the variables relating to board structure change slowly over time, which has the 
potential to reduce the efficiency of panel data estimations, the four-year dataset 
used in this study may render comprehensive explanations of governance–
performance dynamics ineffective. Following Wintoki et al. (2012), the author 
suggests that datasets covering a longer period of time may enable future research 
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to overcome the highly persistent feature of board structure variables by using 
data at two-year intervals rather than annually.  
Secondly, this research considers only the relationship between gender diversity 
on the BOD and firm performance. Given the two-tier board structure of listed 
companies in Vietnam, it might be useful for future research to treat gender 
diversity on the BOS as a factor driving firms’ profitability. Besides, other 
observable diversity characteristics of directors, such as age, education, and 
experience, should be included in future research as long as the relevant data are 
available. Additionally, this study measures financial performance by employing 
the commonly-used Tobin’s Q ratio. Although the Tobin’s Q ratio has many 
advantages compared with other accounting-based metrics, using other alternative 
accounting-based performance measures could possibly lead to different 
conclusions. This may highlight the sensitivity of inferences drawn from 
empirical studies in which the observable variables are usually not the perfect 
proxies for the true phenomenon of interest. For example, it will be interesting to 
investigate the potential impact of corporate governance structures on operating 
performance metrics. The metrics for operating performance may be, among 
others: sales revenue per employee and fixed-asset turnover ratios which look at 
how well a firm uses its workers and fixed assets to generate sales, respectively. 
Another common operating performance metrics is the operating cycle ratio 
which measures a firm's ability to convert its inventory into cash.  
Moreover, like most previous empirical studies on corporate governance, this 
study’s sample selection process relies primarily on the availability of data, 
including firm annual reports and corresponding financial reports. It is likely that 
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the selected firms are the more transparent ones and therefore could actually be 
well governed and/or better performing firms. If that is the case, this research will 
suffer from selection bias which hinders interpretation and generalisation.  
Thirdly, although this study does find a significant linkage between board gender 
diversity and the performance of Vietnamese listed companies, the channels 
through which female directors positively affect financial performance remain 
unclear. It is argued that if the presence of women on the BOD matters for firm 
outcomes, then there should be gender-based differences in behaviour and 
characteristics between female and male directors (Mohan, 2014).  
A recent survey conducted by Adams and Funk (2012) confirms that this is indeed 
the case, i.e., female and male directors differ systematically in their core values 
and risk attitudes. Such gender-related differences may have an effect on firm 
performance through several potential channels (Mohan, 2014). For instance, they 
may enrich the directorial behaviours and improve the directorial task 
performance of the boards, all of which ultimately lead to better performance 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Female representation on boards is also likely to add 
value if the market reacts positively to their presence, since they are usually 
considered to be free from overconfidence and have a lower tolerance for risk (for 
a review, see Mohan, 2014). The aforementioned findings imply that the issue 
here is probably not the gender difference of directors but the gender-based 
differences in leadership behaviour and style, and personality characteristics 
(Mohan, 2014; Mohan & Chen, 2004).  
In agreement with Mohan (2014), therefore, this study suggests that understanding 
the personality traits of female directors, such as consensus-building ability, 
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management style, or attitude to risk, is essential to shed light on the potential 
channels through which director gender matters for firm performance. As 
suggested by Adams et al. (2011); and Mohan (2014), using an event study 
approach to investigate market reaction to the appointment of female directors, or 
a survey approach to grasp how gender-related behavioural differences affect 
board effectiveness and firm outcomes, may be possible directions for future 
research.  
Additionally, in a recent review article, Mohan (2014) points out that there is 
empirical evidence that greater gender diversity on boards may promote better 
opportunities for women to be appointed to top management positions. Female 
representation on top management teams in turn provides a feminine managerial 
style (Mohan, 2014) and managerial expertise, and helps to improve managerial 
task performance (Dezsö & Ross, 2012). If this evidence is considered, female 
directors may also add value through their contribution in choosing the CEO and 
motivating women in senior management positions. For this reason, this study 
suggests that investigating the role of women at top management levels in 
interaction with the role of women on boards may offer potential for 
understanding another channel through which female directors add value.  
Fourthly, due to the lack of data regarding corporate governance practices, this 
study, like most prior studies, only concentrates on observable corporate 
governance structures presented in annual reports, such as CEO duality, board 
size, or the presence of independent directors. As Mak and Kusnadi (2005) have 
noted, while establishing a corporate governance structure that meets the 
corporate governance code is important, it does not necessarily guarantee that the 
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corporate governance structure will operate effectively. For example, a board 
structured on the basis of international best practices probably does not 
successfully function if it does not meet regularly, or if the so-called independent 
directors are not independent in practice (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005).  
Indeed, a study undertaken by Chuanrommanee and Swierczek (2007) posits that 
corporate governance as reported in Singaporean companies’ documents is 
actually unlikely to reflect their real governance practices. It is noteworthy that the 
research of Chuanrommanee and Swierczek was conducted in a context in which 
corporate governance practices are considered to be consistent with international 
best practice (Chuanrommanee & Swierczek, 2007) and are recognised to be the 
best corporate governance practices in the Asian region (CLSA, 2010, 2012). 
Therefore, it is likely that observable corporate governance variables used in this 
thesis are not good proxies for real corporate governance practices even if in a 
near perfect research setting like the Singaporean market. If that is the case, it 
ultimately makes the estimates problematic. As a consequence, it will be seriously 
misleading to suggest that corporate governance structures have significant effects 
on firm performance. For this reason, more comprehensive data in terms of 
corporate governance practices will foster future research in deeply investigating 
the substance of corporate governance but not the form. 
Finally, this study considers ownership concentration as an effective corporate 
governance strategy employed by shareholders to influence managerial behaviour, 
mitigate agency problems, and enhance performance. It should also be noted that 
the ownership identity may have a potential influence on the aims of the owners 
and the way they implement their power (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). As a 
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consequence, different types of ownership concentration may have different 
motivations and capability that, in turn, have different impacts on firm 
performance (Holderness, 2009). However, the lack of data for the Vietnamese 
market has meant that the role of ownership identity noted by Thomsen and 
Pedersen (2000) could not be investigated in this thesis. For this reason, in line 
with Judge (2012); and Munisi et al. (2014), it is desirable for further research to 
seek to understand how various ownership types (such as managerial ownership, 
foreign ownership, government ownership, and family ownership) are related to 
the performance of firms in Singapore, Vietnam and other markets in the Asian 
region. 
As mentioned in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3, the high concentration of ownership by 
government is one of the key characteristics of corporate governance systems in 
Singapore (Kimber et al., 2005). A common type of fully or partly state-owned 
firm in Singapore is the GLCs and according to Ang and Ding (2006), these 
account for approximately 24% of the stock market’s total capitalisation and 
control over 10% of the economic output of the country. Unlike state-owned firms 
in many other countries, the “GLCs are run on a commercial and competitive 
basis” (Witt, 2012, p. 9). In addition, the GLCs in Singapore have higher 
valuations and have better corporate governance than a control group of non-
GLCs (Ang & Ding, 2006). Keeping the dynamic endogeneity in mind, future 
research taking the role of government or government-related ownership into 
consideration should prove fruitful.  
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8.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of findings, contributions, and 
policy implications. The major interest of this thesis is twofold: (i) whether the 
relationship between corporate governance structures and financial performance 
of listed companies in Singapore and Vietnam persists when the dynamic nature 
inherent in this relationship is taken into consideration; and (ii) whether this 
relationship varies according to the quality of national governance systems within 
which firms operate. 
Using a dynamic modelling approach to investigate a panel dataset of 1064 firm-
year observations collected from Singapore and Vietnam, this thesis documents 
that: (i) corporate governance structures do have impacts on financial performance 
of publicly listed companies in Singapore and Vietnam, even after controlling for 
the dynamic nature of this relationship; (ii) better national governance quality is 
good for firm performance; and (iii) national governance quality has a significant 
moderating effect on the ownership concentration–firm performance relationship.  
This thesis contributes to the corporate governance literature in at least two 
dimensions: (i) applying a better model specification and estimation approach to 
two typical corporate governance systems in the Asian region; and (ii) enriching 
the understanding of the interaction between corporate-level and national-level 
governance mechanisms. Of course, no study is without limitations and this study 
is no exception. The limitations for which the current study suffers are highlighted 
in this chapter. Given that there is still much one can do and there is always some 
room for improvement, this thesis suggests several endeavours for potential future 
research.  
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1: Some illustrations of the differences in corporate governance 
regulations between the financial industry and other industries in the 
Vietnamese and Singaporean markets  
In the Vietnamese market, financial firms and banks are governed not 
only by the Law on Enterprises 2005 (the LOE), but also by the Law on 
Credit Institutions (the LOCI) (2010). Article 34.1 of the LOCI stipulates 
that a Vietnamese bank’s chairperson of the BOD must not be 
simultaneously an executive director. Whereas, the Vietnamese Code 
(2007) applying to publicly listed companies does not have this 
requirement. This implies that the BOD chairperson in other industries 
can also be CEOs. Articles 41.1 and 43.6 of the LOCI also require credit 
institutions to establish inside audit bodies, risk management committees 
and personnel committees in order to assist the BOS and the BOD in 
implementing their functions.  
According to the Vietnamese Code, it is not compulsory for other 
sectors’ listed companies to meet these LOCI requirements. In addition, 
Article 62.1 of the LOCI requires that the BOD of joint stock credit 
institutions must have at least one independent director, and that at least 
50% directors are independent and/or non-executive directors. While the 
Vietnamese Code and the LOE do not distinguish between independent 
directors and non-executive directors, the LOCI details the standards for 
an independent director.  
252 
 
In terms of ownership structure, Article 55 of the LOCI specifies that an 
individual stockholder of credit institutions must not hold over 5% of 
total capital recorded in their charter, whereas an institutional stockholder 
is not allowed to own over 15%.  
Similarly, in the Singaporean market, higher standards of corporate 
governance are also imposed on banks and financial firms. Indeed, while 
all Singaporean listed companies conform to the Singaporean Code on 
the basis of the “comply or explain” principle, locally incorporated banks 
and financial firms must comply with the Corporate Governance 
Regulations (the Regulations) which are compulsory and more stringent. 
For example, the Regulations require the BOD to have at least one-third 
independent directors, and the chairperson must not be an executive 
director. 
 
Appendix 2: Changes in the Vietnamese stock index (%) vs. Tobin’s Q  
2008–2011  
 
Source: %ΔVN-index and the mean and median values of Tobin’s Q are based on data 
collected from the HOSE website and Thomson One Banker (Worldscope database)  
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Appendix 3: Case-wise correlation matrix for the variables used for the Vietnamese market 
  lnq female nonexe dual lnbsize block lnfage fsize lev laglnq 
lnq 1.00                   
female 0.14 1.00                 
nonexe -0.07 -0.02 1.00               
dual 0.10 0.09 -0.31 1.00             
lnbsize 0.15 0.10 -0.11 0.05 1.00           
block 0.09 -0.03 0.11 -0.12 -0.22 1.00         
lnfage -0.24 -0.07 0.15 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 1.00       
fsize 0.15 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.25 0.10 0.01 1.00     
lev 0.03 -0.07 -0.13 -0.10 0.05 0.08 -0.18 0.37 1.00   
laglnq 0.57 0.13 -0.03 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.26 -0.03 1.00 
Note: This table reports case-wise correlation coefficients which are based on the common sample of 352 firm-year observations in the Vietnamese market. The variables 
are as defined in Table 4.6. This table is based on data directly provided by StoxPlus Corporation and/or downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database, and/or 
extracted from companies’ annual reports which are downloaded from FPT-Ez-search Online Information Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in December 2011). 
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Appendix 4: Case-wise correlation matrix for the variables used for the Singaporean market 
  lnq female nonexe indep dual lnbsize block lnfage fsize lev laglnq 
lnq 1.00                     
female 0.02 1.00                   
nonexe 0.06 -0.15 1.00                 
indep 0.17 -0.02 -0.45 1.00               
dual 0.04 0.06 -0.29 0.07 1.00             
lnbsize 0.17 -0.06 0.28 -0.14 -0.22 1.00           
block 0.04 -0.11 0.28 -0.07 -0.20 0.25 1.00         
lnfage -0.12 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.12 1.00       
fsize 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.19 -0.11 0.55 0.25 0.28 1.00     
lev 0.16 0.08 -0.12 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.08 -0.13 0.28 1.00   
laglnq 0.75 0.01 0.02 0.21 0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.10 0.07 0.14 1.00 
Note: This table reports case-wise correlation coefficients which are based on the common sample of 712 firm-year observations in the Singaporean market. The variables 
are as defined in Table 4.6. Raw data are downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database and the website of Singapore Exchange Ltd. Company, including listed 
companies’ annual reports (accessed in December 2011). 
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Appendix 5: The relationship between corporate governance structures and 
performance of Singaporean listed companies: Static models 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] OLS FE 
  b/[p] b/[p] 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -0.643** 2.772*** 
  [0.044] [0.008] 
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] 0.001 0.000 
  [0.529] [0.913] 
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] 0.001 0.000 
  [0.461] [0.790] 
Duality [dual] 0.095*** 0.244*** 
  [0.007] [0.005] 
Board size [lnbsize] 0.380*** -0.041 
  [0.000] [0.811] 
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.000 0.002*** 
  [0.599] [0.003] 
Firm age [lnfage] -0.097*** -0.041 
  [0.000] [0.503] 
Firm size [fsize] -0.005 -0.176*** 
  [0.741] [0.001] 
Leverage (%) [lev] 0.004*** 0.007*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry dummy variables [industry] yes no 
Firm fixed-effects no yes 
Year dummy variables [year] yes yes 
Number of observations 931 931 
R-squared 0.151 0.164 
F statistic 11.701*** 14.114*** 
Note: This table reports the result of static OLS (column 1) and fixed-effects (column 2) 
regressions of firm performance (lnq) on corporate governance structure variables and other 
control variables. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% 
(*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The p-values are reported in brackets and are based on cluster-robust 
standard errors (cluster on firm) corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in 
the error term. Industry and year dummy variables are not reported. 
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Appendix 6: The relationship between corporate governance structures and 
performance of Singaporean listed companies: A dynamic OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (t) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -0.861*** (-3.960) 
  [0.000]   
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] 0.657*** (20.369) 
  [0.000]   
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] 0.001 (0.833) 
  [0.405]   
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] 0.001 (0.901) 
  [0.368]   
Duality [dual] 0.034 (1.318) 
  [0.188]   
Board size [lnbsize] 0.174*** (2.852) 
  [0.004]   
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.001** (1.988) 
  [0.047]   
Firm age [lnfage] -0.036* (-1.870) 
  [0.062]   
Firm size [fsize] 0.006 (0.542) 
  [0.588]   
Leverage (%) [lev] 0.001 (1.443) 
  [0.149]   
Industry dummy variables [industry] yes 
Firm fixed-effects no 
Year dummy variables [year] yes 
Number of observations 712 
R-squared 0.625 
F statistic 43.847*** 
Note: This table reports the result of a dynamic OLS regression of firm performance (lnq) on 
corporate governance structure variables and other control variables. The variables are as defined 
in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses and are based on cluster-robust standard errors (cluster on firm) 
corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. The p-values are 
presented in brackets. Industry and year dummy variables are included in the regression but not 
reported. 
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Appendix 7: The relationship between corporate governance structures and 
performance of Singaporean listed companies: A fixed-effects estimation 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q ratio [lnq] 
Explanatory variables [notation] b/[p] (t) 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept 3.952*** (2.746) 
  [0.006]   
One-year lagged Tobin's Q [laglnq] -0.050 (-1.146) 
  [0.253]   
Percentage of female directors (%) [female] -0.003 (-0.612) 
  [0.541]   
Percentage of non-executive directors (%) [nonexe] 0.002 (0.591) 
  [0.555]   
Duality [dual] 0.242* (1.866) 
  [0.063]   
Board size [lnbsize] 0.038 (0.283) 
  [0.777]   
Ownership concentration (%) [block] 0.002* (1.916) 
  [0.057]   
Firm age [lnfage] -0.129 (-1.277) 
  [0.203]   
Firm size [fsize] -0.220*** (-2.975) 
  [0.003]   
Leverage (%) [lev] 0.004* (1.775) 
  [0.077]   
Industry dummy variables [industry] no 
Firm fixed-effects yes 
Year dummy variables [year] yes 
Number of observations 712 
R-squared 0.219 
F statistic 14.000*** 
Note: This table reports the result of fixed-effects regression of firm performance (lnq) on 
corporate governance structure variables and other control variables. The variables are as defined 
in Table 4.6. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***). The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses and are based on cluster-robust standard errors (cluster on firm) 
corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. The p-values are 
presented in brackets. Year dummy variables are included in the regression but not reported. 
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Appendix 8: Case-wise correlation matrix for the variables (combined dataset of Singapore and Vietnam) 
 
lnq female indep_nonexe dual lnbsize block lnfage fsize lev laglnq 
lnq 
1.00 
         
female 
0.07 1.00 
        
indep_nonexe 
0.07 -0.14 1.00 
       
dual 
0.05 0.06 -0.23 1.00 
      
lnbsize 
0.13 -0.06 0.15 -0.12 1.00 
     
block 
0.06 -0.06 0.14 -0.18 0.10 1.00 
    
lnfage 
-0.17 -0.09 0.28 0.04 0.26 0.03 1.00 
   
fsize 
0.08 -0.06 0.27 -0.05 0.54 0.15 0.40 1.00 
  
lev 
0.13 0.06 -0.19 -0.01 -0.03 0.10 -0.26 0.15 1.00 
 
laglnq 
0.71 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.13 0.05 0.12 1.00 
Note: This table reports case-wise correlation coefficients which are based on the common sample of 1064 firm-year observations in the Singaporean and Vietnamese 
markets. The variables are as defined in Table 4.6. For the Singaporean market, raw data are downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database and the website of Singapore 
Exchange Ltd. Company, including listed companies’ annual reports. For the Vietnamese market, the calculation is based on data directly provided by StoxPlus Corporation 
and/or downloaded from Thomson One Banker Database, and/or extracted from companies’ annual reports which are downloaded from FPT-Ez-search Online Information 
Gateway and Vietstock (accessed in December 2011). 
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